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ABSTRACT 
This thesis concerns the gathering, interpretation and use of information 
pertaining to work-related violence as a risk to the health and safety of 
staff. It considers incident reporting systems in particular, and describes 
work carried out to extend the usefulness of such a system operating within 
the licensed retail trade. 
Information obtained from the system falls into two categories. First, 
information about the reporting system itself includes the benefits and 
limitations of incident reporting as a diagnostic tool for the occurrence of 
violence, and the use of complementary methods to enhance its 
effectiveness; the design of a report form that elicits more detail than is 
required by national reporting; the evolution of a flexible and easily 
expandable coding scheme; and the usefulness of innovative pathway and 
survival techniques in the treatment of the violent incident as a developing 
situation. Second, information about violent incidents within licensed 
premises concerns characteristics of reported incidents; the dynamic nature 
of incidents; common pathways through violent incidents; the relation of the 
outcomes of incidents to other features; the timing of incidents; and the 
perceived seriousness of the reported incidents. 
Key findings include the role of every-day situations and ordinary objects 
used as weapons; the pivotal importance of intervention by staff, 
particularly. in challenging customer misbehaviour-, a system memory effect 
that increases the likelihood of a further incident occurring during the days 
and weeks following a reported incident at the same premises; and the 
variety of features that contribute to the seriousness rating given to an 
incident by the members of staff involved. 
The methods and findings have implications for academic research, for the 
organisational management of work-related violence and for the day-to-day 
management of licensed premises. Primarily, they can be used in devising 
strategies to reduce the risks to staff. 
Heywords: Work-related violence; incident reporting; licensed premises; 
health and safety-, risk assessment; risk management; psychosocial, 
hazards.. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis considers violence as a health and safety issue for people at 
work, in particular for licensees and staff working in public houses and 
other licensed premises. It considers the usefulness of an incident reporting 
system as a tool in the control and management of work-related violence. It 
challenges the conventional use of such a system just as a device to monitor 
the number of incidents that occur in an organisation and to provide simple 
descriptive statistics. It argues not only that this treatment of a reporting 
system may provide inadequate information about incident numbers but 
also that it is a waste of a valuable resource. Careful design of the system 
and innovative methods of analysis, which regard each incident as a 
dynamic process, can produce high quality information regarding the 
nature and timing of incidents. Such information, combined with theoretical 
understanding of the influences affecting aggressive interactions, provides 
invaluable input to the design of effective intervention strategies to reduce 
the occurrence of violence. 
The aims of the work described here fell into two categories. The first 
concerned the reporting system itself. The aims here were to demonstrate 
the benefits and limitations of an operational violent incident reporting 
system, and to explore ways of extending the potential usefulness of such a 
system. The second set of aims concerned the provision of information about 
violent incidents within public houses. Here the aims were to produce 
accessible results for the organisation on which measures to control the risk 
to licensees could reliably be based, and to further the treatment of violent 
incidents as developing situations. 
An important aspect of the research is this interdependence of the academic 
study of violent incidents with the provision of practically applicable 
information within a commercially operational setting. The motivation for 
carrying out such a study is to be effective in helping to reduce the real 
risks that people face from aggression and violence in the course of their 
work. The study forms part of a larger body of research into work-related 
violence carried out by the Social and Environmental Psychology (SEP) 
Group in the Institute of Work, Health & Organisations, at the University of 
Nottingham. 
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The thesis relates to the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Reporting System 
(EPP IRS) which operated within Allied Domecq Retailing (ADR) between 
1988 and 1998 and which pre-dated, by 8 years, the national requirement 
for the reporting and recording of work-related violent incidents. It 
examines information obtained from the system during that time, and 
considers subsidiary studies carried out to complement the system and 
enhance its effectiveness. It then describes analyses that were carried out to 
explore the timing and nature of the reported incidents using both standard 
techniques and methods borrowed from other areas of science. These non- 
standard methods included log survival analysis and the adaptation of 
sequence analysis to produce an innovative method of modelling pathways 
through incidents. 
Chapter 1 outlines the treatment of work-related violence as a health and 
safety issue, and the rationale and theoretical background underpinning the 
research. It then discusses both work-related violence and violence in 
licensed premises as reported in the academic and professional literature. 
Chapter 2 considers the range of methods available for gathering 
information about violent incidents, focusing particularly on incident 
reporting systems and exploring their benefits and limitations. 
Reporting systems essentially provide three types of information about 
violent incidents occurring within an organisation: the numbers of 
incidents, the nature of incidents and the timing of incidents. Chapter 3, 
after briefly describing the 1KPP IRS, presents information about the 
numbers of reported incidents and considers how these reflect the numbers 
of incidents that actually occurred. It considers incident reporting as a 
diagnostic tool and describes two other studies carried out to explore 
incident occurrence and reporting. Finally, it examines the effect of the 
seriousness of incidents on reporting behaviour. 
Chapters 4 briefly describes the structure of the incident report form used 
to gather information about the violent incidents, then discusses the nature 
and distribution of incident characteristics extracted from the reports. It 
introduces the treatment of each incident as a developing situation, in 
accordance with theoretical considerations. Chapter 5 relates the physical 
outcomes, in terms of injury and damage, to events and features of the 
incident using hierarchical multiple regression. A similar analysis relates 
the seriousness of incidents, as rated by the licensees involved, to the same 
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events and features plus the physical outcomes. Other influences affecting 
perceived seriousness are also extracted from the incident reports. Chapter 
6 describes how treating the incident as a dynamic process in this way led 
to the development of the innovative technique of logical pathway 
modelling, which identifies and quantifies frequently occurring sequences of 
events in reported incidents. 
Chapter 7 considers the timing of the reported violent incidents, 
particularly the relative timing of successive reported incidents at the same 
premises. A log survival technique was used to examine the rate of 
reoccurrence of incidents over time, while survival analysis related survival 
time to incident characteristics. Together these revealed a system memory 
effect showing an increased likelihood of further incidents occurring during 
the first 4 to 5 weeks following a reported incident, and particularly during 
the first 3 to 4 days. This extended the treatment of the violent incident as a 
dynamic process with discrete beginning and ending by identifying an 
influence on future events at the premises. 
Chapter 8 sijmm arises the findings from the previous chapters and 
considers further their relevance to the management of work-related 
violence. It draws conclusions about the useffilness of the incident reporting 
system and makes recommendations based on these conclusions. It 
considers the implications for those working in licensed premises, for 
organisations in general and for academic research. 
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ABJLJBREVIATIONS AND EXPIANATION OF TERMS 
ADI Allied Domecq Inns 
ADL Allied Domecq Leisure 
ADR Allied Domecq Retailing; previously Allied Breweries 
(to 1993) then Allied-Lyons Retailing (1993-1994) 
BCS British Crime Survey 
Cal/OSHA California Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration 
COHD Centre for Organizational Health and Development 
(now Institute of Work Health and Organisations) 
EC European Commission 
HSE Health and Safety Executive (U. K. ) 
IRC Incident Report Centre at the University of 
Nottingham 
I-WHO Institute of Work, Health and Organisations 
(incorporating the Centre for Organizational Health 
and Development) 
EPP Keeping Pubs Peaceful project developed to manage 
violence within the managed houses of Allied Domecq 
Retailing 
KPP IRF Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report Form 
1KPP IRS Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Reporting System 
NIOSH National Institute of Safety and Health (U. SA) 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(U. SJQ 
PDSD Prolonged duress stress disorder 
PTSD Post traumatic stress disorder 
RIDDOR95 Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 1995 
SEP Group Social and Environmental Psychology Group, 
Institute of Work, Health and Organisations, 
University of Nottingham 
'Ihe terms "licensed premises", "licensed house" and "public house" are used 
interchangeably through this thesis to describe premises that are licensed 
to sell alcoholic drinks for consumption on the premises, and for whom this 
is their core business. These cover premises described as "pubs", "inns", 
"taverns", "bars", "hotels", "nightclubs", "wine bars", etc. 
CHAPTER 1: CONSIDERING VIOLENCE AS A 
HEALTH AND SAFETY ISSUE 
The work reported in this thesis concerns the use of an incident reporting 
system as a tool in the management of work-related violence using a risk 
assessment and risk reduction process as recommended in health and safety 
legislation and guidance. The particular reporting system under 
consideration was established within the retailing arm of a large national 
brewery, gathering reports of incidents of aggression and violence that 
occurred within public houses and other licensed premises. This chapter 
Provides the background to the research in terms of good practice in health 
and safety management, the general strategy and rationale adopted in the 
work, the nature and extent of work-related violence, and previous research 
concerning violence in licensed premises. 
1.1 HEALTH AND SAFETY FPAMEWORK 
Work-related violence has received increasing attention, over the past 
decade, from health and safety bodies such as the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE), in the U. K., and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and the National Institute of Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), in the U. S. These and other government agencies have been active 
in producing guidelines for the prevention of violence to staff since the mid 
1980s, covering staff in general (HSE, 1996a; NIOSH, 1996; Poyner & 
Warne, 1986,1988) and specielc sectors at risk. These include the 
healthcare and social services (Department of Health and Social Security, 
1988; Health Services Advisory Committee, 1987,1997; OSHA 1996a), 
education (Education Services Advisory Committee, 1997), banks and 
building societies (HSE, 1993a), the retail sector (HSE, 1995a; OSHA, 
1996b), broadcasting (HSE, 1996b) and community work (OSHA, 1996c). 
Such activity indicates a growing awareness of violence at work at a 
national level within both the U. K. and the U. S. 
In the past, violence has been regarded as the province of security 
professionals, the police and the criminal justice system. More recently, 
however, it is also being seen as a hazard that should be assessed and 
managed by organisations in order to provide a safe workplace for their 
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employees (Cox & Leather, 1994; Goerth, 1988; Nigro & Waugh, 1996) as 
required under legislation such as the Occupational Safety and Realth Act 
1970 in the U. S., and the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 and the 
Management ofHealth and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 (Health & 
Safety Commission, 2000) in the U. K. 
The Management ofHealth and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 
operationalise European Community legislation within the U. K. They 
require that employers assess all risks to the health and safety of their 
employees, identify the precautionary measures needed, make 
arrangements for the effective management of these precautions, and 
provide information and training for employees. The legislation does not 
mention particular risks, but requires assessment of all potential risks, 
which undoubtedly include risk from the occurrence of violent incidents. 
However, the Reporting ofbduries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences 
Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR 95) specifically include violence done to a person 
at work as an "accident" that must be reported to the HSE, or the local 
authority, if it results in certain iWuries. These regulations confirmed work- 
related violence as an issue within the domain of health and safety 
management, as discussed by Beale, Cox and Leather (1996). 
As a health and safety issue work-related violence can be dealt with using 
the risk management framework that has proved effective for other risks to 
the safety and health of workers (Cox & Cox, 1993). Risk management has 
two mqjor components, risk assessment and risk reduction, which comprises 
prevention, timely reaction and rehabilitation (Cox & Leather, 1994). A 
third component consists of checking the effectiveness of measures put in 
place to reduce the risk. 
Violence as a risk to health and safety 
In health and safety terms, then, violence can be thought of as posing a risk 
as does any other physical hazard in the workplace. The risk from a hazard 
can be considered as a function of exposure to the hazardous situation and 
the magnitude of the harm caused (Cox and Cox, 1993). If we apply this to 
violence (Beale, Lawrence, Smewing & Cox, 1999), bearing in mind that 
most people have the potential to act violently given the wrong combination 
of circumstances, the hazard can be regarded as any individual, the 
hazardous situation as interpersonal conflict and the harm as including 
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physical and psychological injury, property damage and financial cost. Thus 
the risk from violence can be regarded as a fimction of four factors: 
" the frequency of conflict situations, 
" the duration of conflict situations, 
" the likelihood of the individuals involved acting in a violent 
manner, and 
0 the magnitude of the harm caused. 
Strategies to reduce the risk fall into three types targeted at prevention 
before an incident occurs, timely reaction when a conflict situation arises 
and rehabilitation after an incident has occurred (Cox & Leather, 1994). 
Preventative strategies attempt to reduce both the frequency with which 
conflict situations occur and the likelihood of the individuals concerned 
reacting violently, which can be considered as a combination of the 
individuals' general tendency to act in a violent manner and their 
experiences immediately prior to, or particularly relevant to, the conflict 
situation. 
71mely reactive strategies concentrate on methods of resolving quickly and 
peacefully any conflict that arises, in such a way that satisfies both parties 
and reduces the likelihood of people parting with a grievance. If such 
attempts at resolution are not successful and violence occurs, either 
immediately or later as retaliatory action, then further reactive strategies 
include emergency action procedures that aim to finish the violent episode 
quickly and effectively and to limit the magnitude of the harm caused. 
Rehabilitative strategies are designed to minimise the physical and 
psychological harm and to promote recovery. Such strategies include 
providing access to medical assistance, provision for trauma counselling and 
general support from the work team and the organisation. 
1.2 GENERAL STRATEGY, 
The approach of the SEP Group integrates a view of violence as a risk to 
health and safety with a theoretical view of the processes involved in 
individual violent incidents. It is based on three key concepts that have been 
combined over the course of its work on violence. 
A violent incident comprises a developing situation consisting of a 
series of escalating steps. Understanding of the influences 
3 
affecting these steps can be employed to create conditions that 
lessen the likelihood of the escalation occurring. 
2. The management of work-related violence is most effectively 
tackled using an integrated organisational approach rather than 
being regarded as a problem for individuals. 
3. Work-related violence is a hazard that can be managed using the 
same risk assessmentlrisk management paradigm as can be 
applied to any other health and safety hazard. This is best 
operationallsed using the control cycle for the management of 
risk. 
1.2.1 Theoretical background 
Many approaches to violence treat it as a developing process. Cox and 
Leather (1994: 222), for example, state that "human aggression is typically 
the product of interpersonal interactions wherein two or more persons 
become involved in a sequence of escalating moves and counter moves, each 
of which successively modifies the probability of subsequent aggression". A 
cognitive behavioural model suggests that each step in the sequence 
modifies the situation so demanding reappraisal by the participants, 
involving cognition, affect and behaviour (Cox & Leather, 1994; Hollin, 
1993). Novaco (1978) described the stages in a person's reaction to an 
unwelcome event or situation. These consisted of appraisal of the "trigger" 
event as unpleasant in some way so sparking off certain thoughts and 
feelings, followed by selection of a course of action or behaviour. Novaco 
suggested that there might be a complex interplay between these 
components, such that angry thoughts, for example, might heighten 
emotional arousal which, in turn, might intensify the angry thoughts and so 
increase the likelihood of aggressive action. In a much simplified form, 
Novaco's model can be combined with the Cox and Leather (1994) model of 
an incident as an escalating series of interpersonal interactions to form the 
model given in Figure 1.1 (Leather, Lawrence, Beale & Maxwell, 1996a). 
Here the chosen behaviour of one participant at each step serves as a 
trigger to the other person for the next step. 
Interventions to reduce the likelihood of such situations occurring, or 
escalating, can be designed to break the sequence at some point or lead to 
de-escalation. Figure 1.1 emphasises the influence of the social and physical 
environment on the interaction, and manipulation of these can produce 
conditions that discourage aggressive interactions. 
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Figure 1.1 Escalation of aggressive incidents (adapted from Leather, 
Lawrence, Beale & Maxwell, 1996a). 
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Factors that may contribute to the interpretation of trigger events, and the 
selection of particular behaviours in reponse, will not be enumerated here, 
rather, influences such as cultural norms, deindividuation, frustration, 
group and audience effects etc. will be introduced as required for the 
interpretation of results or the translation of findings into recommendations 
for intervention. Detailed consideration of such influences can be found in 
Geen (1990), Felson and Tedeschi (1993a) and Lawrence and Leather 
(1999), among others. 
Each of the stages of the developing situation provide an opportunity that 
can be targeted by: 
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" reducing the number of trigger events that occur, for example by 
instigating fair and obvious queuing procedures to minimise 
competition between waiting customers; 
" increasing the likelihood that people's thoughts will be more 
positive if problems do occur, for example by building up a good 
relationship between, on the one hand, the staff and the 
organisation as a whole and, on the other hand, the customers or 
clients; 
" providing a social setting and physical environment in which 
people are comfortable and at ease, so are less likely to feel 
frustrated, afraid or angry; 
" suggesting alternative, non-aggressive behaviours for both staff 
and customers when such problems do occur, for example by 
providing accessible and effective enquiry, complaints or referral 
procedures. 
1.2.2 Situational analysis 
Features that affect the development and the outcome of an aggressive 
interaction, as described, fall within two broad categories concerning the 
persons involved and the situation, as shown diagrammatically in Figure 
1.2. 
Figure 1.2 Features affecting the development and outcome of an aggressive 
interaction 
Situation factors, e. g. 
Task 
Social environment 
Physical environment 
Developing 
Outcome, e. g. 
interaction psychological, physical, etc. 
Person factors, e. g. 
Previous experiences 
Attributional bias 
Problem-solving ability 
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Over recent years, it has become generally accepted that situational factors 
are more useful in predicting violence than are the traits of individuals. 
This is occurring even within the field of psychiatry where it might be 
expected that individual traits would be given greatest weight. This change 
in attitude has been endorsed by Hiday (1997: 411): 
"Although psychiatrists recognize that violent behavior derives from 
causes other than mental illness 
..., 
the medical model's individual 
focus has resulted too often in physically aggressive behavior being 
incorrectly attributed to the mentally ill person, and resulted in the 
mentally ill person's legitimate fears being incorrectly attributed to 
psychotic symptoms. " 
Borum, 'Fein, Vossekuil & Berglund (1999: 324) explain that such a change 
has, in fact, occurred: 
"Over the past 20 years 
... 
there has been a shift from the violence 
prediction model, where dangerousness was viewed as dispositional 
(residing within the individual), static (not subject to change) and 
dichotomous (either present or not present) to the current risk 
assessment model where dangerousness or risk as a construct is now 
predominantly viewed as contextual (highly dependent on situations 
and circumstances), dynamic (subject to change) and continuous 
(varying along a continuum of probability). " 
This attitude ties in with the acknowledgement that almost anyone can 
become violent given the wrong set of circumstances. Cox and Leather 
(1994) have described how interactions may escalate from small annoyances 
or misunderstandings to physical violence. Andersson and Pearson (1999) 
have also looked at the incident as a process, using the concepts of the 
"incivility spiral" and the "tipping point" where the spiral escalates because 
of the overreaction of one party to other's incivility. 
Specifically regarding licensed premises, Stockwell, Lang and Rydon (1993) 
found, in a survey of Perth residents, that situational factors, such as the 
type of venue, assumed greater importance than individual demographic 
characteristics of the drinkers themselves in predicting drink-related harm 
including involvement in violence. Such evidence supports the work 
described in this thesis which attempts to obtain good quality information 
about the situations in which violent behaviour occurred. 
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1.2.3 The integrated organisational approach 
The SEP Group advocates, and has developed, an integrated organisational 
approach to the management of work-related violence (see Beale, Fletcher, 
Leather & Cox, 1998; Cox & Leather, 1994; Dickson, Leather, Beale & Cox, 
1994a; Leather, Cox, Beale & Fletcher, 1998). Such an approach considers 
that violence is an issue that should be addressed by all levels and 
groupings within an organisation, as is required by health and safety 
legislation. Measures introduced to reduce the risk should U) encompass 
preventative strategies and planning before incidents have occurred, 
reactive strategies when incidents are happening and rehabilitative 
strategies after incidents have occurred; (ii) involve action at the levels of 
the organisation, the work team and the individual; (iii) be incorporated in 
policies, implemented through systems and procedures, and enacted 
through practice and behaviour; and (iv) help to shape, and be reinforced by, 
a supportive organisational culture regarding work-related violence. This 
integrated organisational approach is illustrated in Figure 1.3. 
Figure 1.3. The integrated organisational approach 
Individual 
Team 
Prevention & 
preparation 
Timely reaction 
Organisational 
Organisation culture Rehabilitation 
\& 
learning 
Policies Procedures Practice & 
& systems behaviour 
1.2.4 The control cycle 
The control cycle (Dickson, Leather, Beale & Cox, 1994a) is a widely used 
model for operationalising risk management. It is based on the acquisition 
of knowledge about the problem to devise a working model, and use of a 
theoretical understanding of violence and aggression to devise strategies 
that are then translated into the design and implementation of systems, 
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procedures, guidelines and practice. Evaluation of these measures feeds 
back to provide a continuous reappraisal of the knowledge and strategies. 
The steps in the control cycle are shown in Figure 1.4. 
Figure 1.4 The control cycle for the management of risk 
Risk 
assessment 
1. Identification of the problem: 
analysis and assessment of risk 
2. Development of Ia 
working model 
I 
3. Design of guidance and 
intervention strategies 
I 
Feedback 
Risk 
reduction 
Effectiveness 
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I 
4. Planning for 
implementation of strategies 
5. Implementation of 
intervention strategies 
6. Monitoring 
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An incident reporting system, such as is considered in this thesis, is a tool 
that can contribute to this cycle at at least three stages. First, at Stage 1 in 
Figure 1.4, it provides statistical information about the number and 
characteristics of violent incidents which allows identification of the people 
at significant risk and the situations that contribute to that risk. Second, at 
Stage 2, it can be used to explore the nature of incidents and allow the 
construction of a working model that represents common contributory 
factors to incidents, and what happens before, during and after incidents. 
Construction of this model suggests areas to exploit for intervention 
measures to reduce the risk. Third, at Stage 6, it is a means of monitoring 
changes in the numbers and types of incidents that staff report, so providing 
information for evaluating the effectiveness of the risk reduction measures 
implemented. Results from this monitoring function are then fed back into 
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any of the previous stages to allow reassessment and refinement, so 
producing the continuous cycle of control. 
1.3 WORK-IRELATED VIOLENCE 
Since the work reported here began, in the late nineteen eighties, the 
phenomenon of work-related violence has become the object of increasing 
attention in the academic, professional and managerial literature. This is 
appropriate and welcome because of the adverse effects on individuals and 
organisations in terms of physical injury and damage, psychological iWury 
and financial costs. 
Workers directly involved in, or witnessing, aggressive or violent incidents 
related to their work obviously suffer varying degrees of immediate upset or 
injury. They may also suffer post-trauma reaction, irrespective of whether 
there has been any physical injury (Fitzpatrick & Wilson, 1999; Flannery, 
1996; Stockdale & Phillips, 1989). In addition, workers'health and 
behaviour may be adversely affected by the fear that they could become 
victims of attack in the course of their work (Cole, Grubb, Sauter, Swanson 
& Lawless, 1997; Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Dickson, 1997; LeBourdais, 
1995; Rey, 1996). As well as the personal cost to individuals, violence can 
have considerable commercial implications for organisations. Costs can 
include not only the direct costs such as sick pay and the cost of relief staff 
time, but also the hidden costs such as management time in investigating 
the incident, following up dmployee welfare, organising relief staff and 
liaising with police, as well as the victim employee's time in working with 
decreased efficiency while recovering, attending hospital, reporting the 
incident, making statements to police and attending court as witness. 
Additional costs can cover administrative time, loss of expertise if staff 
leave, recruitment and training of replacement staff, legal costs, and the 
loss of customer confidence (Bulatao & VandenBos, 1996; Health and Safety 
Executive, 1993b). 
1.3.1 Defining work-related violence 
'Me generally accepted definitions of work-related violence invariably 
require a worker to be threatened or attacked in some way, either physically 
or verbally. The SEP Group use the defffiftion agreed by the European 
Commission (EC) DG-V: 
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"Incidents where persons are abused, threatened or assaulted in 
circumstances related to their work, involving an explicit or implicit 
challenge to their safety, well-being or health. " 
(Wynne, Clarldn, Cox & Griffiths, 1997) 
This definition allows for the full range of circumstances in which a worker 
might be attacked while at work or on duty, either in a fixed or mobile 
location, or while not on duty but in circumstances relating to theirjob. It 
also takes account of psychological, as well as physical, violence and harm. 
Some researchers, such as Kraus, Blander & McArthur (1995), have focused 
only upon actual or attempted physical assault, irrespective of the identity 
and status of the perpetrator, while others (e. g. Folger & Baron, 1996) focus 
on workplace aggression including any form of behaviour by staff that is 
intended to harm current or previous co-workers, or their organisation, 
including spreading negative rumours, withholding information or resources 
and purposely failing to return telephone calls. 
There has been much discussion in the literature about the difference 
between violence and aggression (see, for example, Bulatao, & VandenBos, 
1996; Howard & Voss, 1996; OLearyý-Kelly, Griffin & Glew, 1996a, b; 
Pearson-Woodd, 1998) sometimes making the distinction that violence has 
to involve physical injury whereas aggression is an action made with the 
intention of causing harm (OLeary-Kelly, Griffin & Glew, 1996a). Often the 
distinction is that violence has to involve a physical assault whereas 
aggression may be a verbal or postural threat, or abuse. While such 
distinctions are necessary in certain situations, such as defining and 
limiting the scope of incidents that have to be reported nationally (RIDDOR 
95), or determining whether a criminal act has been committed, they are 
less helpful when trying to manage the problem within an organisation. 
Although Berkowitz (1993: 11) distinguishes aggression as "some kind of 
behaviour that is carried out with the intention to harm someone" and 
violence as an extreme form of aggression, "a deliberate attempt to do 
serious physical injury", he uses the terms almost interchangeably when 
discussing the general problem. This is fitting in that some acts of non- 
physical aggression can have more harmful consequences than some acts of 
physical violence and, therefore, warrant just as much attention in health 
and safety research. 
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It is important for organisations, not to limit their knowledge of incidents 
just to those that resulted in physical injury for three main reasons. First, 
workers may suffer serious psychological injury without having been 
physically injured, particularly if they are repeatedly subjected to 
aggressive incidents. Second, minor incidents may be the precursors of more 
serious incidents. Third, aggressive incidents form a continuous spectrum 
from the trivial to the extremely serious, and the greater the proportion of 
that spectrum that can be studied, the more accurate are likely to be the 
patterns and trends revealed. In addition, the range of incidents considered 
may need to be broadened beyond those included by the EC definition, as in 
the work reported here (see Appendix 2) for reasons explained in the 
following section. 
1.3.2 Types of work-related violence 
A number of types of work-related violence must be distinguished because 
different work situations are prone to different kinds of violence and the 
measures taken to manage the problem need to be appropriate to the 
violence encountered. The theoretical literature generally recognises two 
types of aggression and violence: instrumental and emotional/affective (e. g. 
Berkowitz, 1993). Instrumental violence is the planned use of threat or 
physical force as a tool to assist in achieving some other goal. Emotional or 
affective violence arises out of emotions such as frustration or anger and is 
largely unplanned. However, the distinction between the two is not always 
sufficiently clear cut (see, e. g., Lawrence & Leather, 1999) to be used in an 
organisational context, although the concepts are useful in understanding 
how different types of work-related violence arise and, therefore, how they 
should be managed. 
One widely used classification scheme is that proposed by the California 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (Cal/OSHA, 1995). Three 
broad categories of workplace violence are identified: 
Type I The agent has no legitimate business relationship to the 
workplace and usually enters the affected workplace to commit a 
robbery or other criminal act. 
Type II The agent is either the recipient, or the object, of a service 
provided by the affected workplace or the victim, e. g. the assailant 
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is a current or former client, patient, customer, passenger, 
criminal suspect, inmate or prisoner. 
Type III The agent has some employment-related involvement with the 
affected workplace. Usually this involves an assault by a current 
or former employee, supervisor or manager; by a current/former 
spouse or lover; a relative or friend; or some other person who has 
a dispute with an employee of the affected workplace. 
Tvne I incidents are assumed to involve mostly instrumental violence 
although, because people committing a criminal act are likely to be in a high 
state of arousal, emotional violence may also be involved, particularly if 
things start to go wrong for the perpetrators. Type II usually involves 
emotional violence brought on by circumstances involving the relationship 
between the service user and the service provider. However, it is not 
unheard of for service users, such as school pupils, deliberately to use abuse 
and aggression against a member of staff in order to humiliate them. Type 
III incidents similarly may involve emotional or instrumental violence. 
Emotional outbursts might occur when working under extreme pressure, or 
as retaliation for perceived injustice, whereas instrumental aggression 
might be used deliberately to undermine a colleague in order to gain 
personal advantage. 
While the Cal/OSHA scheme is a useful classification and has been widely 
adopted, it is over-simplified and incomplete. For example, violence from an 
acquaintdnce or family of a worker is a very different phenomenon, 
organisationally, from violence from a coworker. Additionally, in some types 
of work, including that in public houses and bars considered in this thesis, 
workers have to cope with a wider range of violent or aggressive incidents. 
Specifically, some workers have to manage violent incidents involving other 
people. This situation is encountered, for example, by teachers who have to 
separate fighting pupils, by police breaking up a fight outside a football 
ground, by a public house manager attempting to calm customers who are 
arguing, or a nurse managing aggression between psychiatric or elderly 
inpatients. Management of such incidents can be psychologically, as well as 
physically, bruising, as described by Chambers (1998). 
The types of violence that impinge on the workplace can be classified by who 
is the perpetrator and who is the victim. Both perpetrator and victim can be 
-13- 
W workers themselves; (ii) clients or customers; (iii) people related to a 
worker outside the workplace, such as family, friends or acquaintances; or 
Uv) total strangers who have no relationship to the particular worker or the 
workplace. Table 1.1 gives examples of the different types of violence in 
terms of the relationships of the perpetrator and victim. Those in italics do 
not fall into the EC definition of work-related violence but have implications 
for any consideration of such violence. 
As well as direct attacks on people, attacks on property also have to be 
included in an organisationally practical consideration of violence because 
they can be extremely fxightening for anyone present, and also because they 
can be closely associated with aggression towards people. Aggressors may 
vent their anger on a nearby object rather than attacking a person, or they 
may return later to attack property as retaliation following an altercation. 
Violence by Workers 
Worker on worker violence has attracted much attention, and has come to 
be almost synonymous with the term "workplace violence" in the American 
media (see Bulatao & VandenBos, 1996). Even in policies for managing the 
problem, concentration is expected to be on workers as the perpetrators. 
Bowman & Zigmond (1997), for example, looked at state policies for the 
management of problems regarding their own employees and made 
recommendations which concentrated on workers as the perpetrators of 
violence. However, workplace assaults and homicide perpetrated by a 
coworker are comparatively uncommon and trades union attitudes tend to 
emphasise that "management is hardly credible if it focuses on coworker 
incidents and ignores the much larger threat from those who enter the 
workplace fi-om outside" (King & Alexander, 1996). Similarly, Brakel (1998) 
belittles the problems from other types of workplace violence because most 
homicides are from stranger violence. 
Worker on worker violence encompasses inter-personal animosity from 
personality clashes or competition, bullying, harassment and retaliatory 
violence by workers who feel they have been unfairly treated by 
management or colleagues, as has occurred dramatically within the U. S. 
Postal Service in recent years (Andersson & Pearson, 1999; Baxter & 
Margavio, 1996; Fox and Levin, 1994; Jones and Boye, 1992; Pastor, 1995). 
Such retaliation might also include sabotage and attacks on company 
property. 
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These types of incident do not appear to be concentrated in particular 
occupations, but may occur in any organisation. However, those 
organisations that are very hierarchical and those that have a competitive 
or a "macho" culture may be particularly prone to these problems (see Beale, 
Lawrence, Smewing & Cox, 1999). 
Violence by workers on themselves in terms of committing suicide is a 
worrying trend particularly in the police (Mohandie & Hatcher, 1999; Reese, 
1986; Violanti, 1996), doctors (Frank & Dingle, 1999; Tyssen, Vaglum, 
Gronvold & Ekeberg, 2000) and farm workers (Hawton, Fagg, Simkin, 
Harriss, MaImberg & Smith, 1999). Work factors that increase the risk of 
suicide include high stress content, exposure to particular chemicals and the 
ready availability of the means of committing suicide (Boxer, Burnett & 
Swanson, 1995; Hawton, Fagg, Simkin, Harriss & Malmberg, 1998). 
Assaults, rough handling or verbal abuse by workers towards clients, 
customers or members of the public, as well as being undesirable in 
themselves, undoubtedly encourage retaliation against those workers or 
others associated with them. III treatment or abuse of vulnerable clients has 
hit the headlines regarding a small minority of child-care workers, 
psychiatric nurses, psychotherapists and carers in old people's homes (e. g. 
]Kendrick & Taylor, 2000; Perlow & Latham, 1993; Shaw, 1998). Over- 
zealous control can occur where the dividing line between reasonable and 
unreasonable force is overstepped by, for example, security personnel, the 
police, teachers or pub staff (e. g. Wells, Graham & West, 1998). 
A hidden problem is that of workers taking out their work-related 
frustrations on their family or friends. Problems at work may be deflected 
away from the workplace and manifest as domestic violence, partly because 
the sanctions against violent action appear to be less at home than at work, 
as discussed by Bjorkqvist, Osterman and Lagerspetz (1994) and by 
O'Leary-Kelly, Griffin and Glew (1996a). The most well known cases involve 
athletes in particular sports, such as basketball, football and boxing, who 
have battered their wives, as discussed by Rowe (1998). 
Violence by clients or customers 
Attacks on workers by their clients falls into two main types: (i) attacks by 
the recipient of a service because that service is perceived to be 
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unsatisfactory in some way, and (ii) protests against workers carrying out a 
control fimction. 
Attacks by a customer or client may occur because they are dissatisfied with 
some aspect of the way they have been treated. This often occurs when 
people's expectations are not met, for example if a flight is delayed for a long 
time, or a requested service has to be withheld. A worker's behaviour might 
affect the likelihood of violence occurring in terms of both the quality of 
service delivery determining customer satisfaction (Stockdale & Phillips, 
1989) and the way in which complaints and problems are handled, either 
calming or exacerbating the situation (Wells, Graham, & West, 1998). 
Included in this category are attacks by family or friends of a service 
recipient, as experienced for example in schools and healthcare settings (e. g. 
]Beale, Fletcher, Leather & Cox, 1998; Farrell, 1999; Leyden, 1999). 
Workers carrying out a control fiinction, such as the police, security and 
prison officers are always at some risk from people who do not want to 
comply with directions given. Getting the balance right between officious, or 
heavy handed, control and loss of control is part of the skill of the job. 
However, even with that balance correct, there are going to be situations 
where they become the targets of the anger or frustration of those they have 
to control. 
Some workers are open to both these problems, particularly those that fiAfil 
both a caring and a control function, such as social workers, psychiatric 
nurses and teachers. Sometimes attacks by clients may be displaced onto 
the family or friends of workers, particularly if they live on the premises, as 
often occurs with small businesses such as shops, hotels or public houses. 
Trouble between clients or customers can provide dangerous situations for 
staff- to manage. Such situations might be experienced by anyone who has 
control of premises either where clients or customers remain for any length 
of time, such as teachers, football stadium staff, pub or club staff and 
passenger transport workers, or where they are in competition for service, 
as in retail outlets or bars. Recent shootings of fellow students by children 
within their schools in the U. S. are particularly horrifying and dramatic 
examples (e. g. Whitworth, 2000). Domestic violence between customers may 
also have to be managed by staff providing social facilities such as hotels or bars. 
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Violence by family, friends or acquaintances 
Violent attacks on people at work by their family, friends or acquaintances, 
where the cause of the incident is not work-related, can been termed 
" overspill violence". The workplace is merely the scene of the incident but 
routine working is, inevitably, adversely affected, and the organisation has 
to deal with the aftermath. The U. S. Department of Justice (1994) reported 
that husbands and boyfriends commit around 13,000 acts of violence against 
women in the workplace annually. A further possibility is attack by a 
worker's partner on a coworker, if that partner knows, or suspects, that they 
are having an affair. 
In addition, the impact of domestic violence on wen-being and productivity, 
particularly of female workers, and thus on the workplace, is an issue 
attracting increased attention (e. g. Brownell, 1996; Friedman, Brown 
Tucker, Neville & Imperial, 1996; Johnson, & Indvik, 1999; Younger, 1994). 
It is particularly relevant to jobs where couples work as a team or live on 
the premises, so that domestic life and work life overlap. 
Workers' families or ftiends, with or without the workers themselves, may 
also be involved in exacting retribution against employers or coworkers, 
where they feel that the worker has been treated unfairly at work. 
Violence by Strangers 
Attacks by strangers, or outsiders, on workers are most usually allied to 
robbery, where the main target of the attack is cash or valuable goods, but 
threat and violence may be used as the means to obtain them. This 
manifests itself in the high rates of homicide in the U. S. retail industry 
(Peek-Asa, Erickson & Kraus, 1999). Less common are terrorist attacks, 
which are politically motivated and are targeted at organisations or 
personnel either for their high public profile and accessibility, as with the 
attacks on the Canary Wharf office development in east London in 1996 (e. g. 
Kyle, 1996) and on the federalbuilding in Oklahoma City in 1996 (e. g. 
Lewis, 2000), or for the work they carry out, such as abortion (Fitzpatrick & 
Wilson, 1999; Grimes, Forrest, Kirkman & Radford, 1991; LeBourdais, 
1995; Roberts, 1994). Occasionally, workers' families maybe the target of 
attacks or threat, or they might be kidnapped or held hostage, so that they 
can be used as bargaining tools for money or other demands. 
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Attacks by strangers on clients or customers also include the intruder 
violence such as occurred so tragically in the British schools at Dunblane 
and Wolverhampton (Leyden, 1999) and in shooting attacks in a Tasmanian 
cafe and in restaurants in Pittsburgh (e. g. Madntyre, 2000). Many 
published policies, procedures and guidelines are now to be found, for 
example on the Internet, relating to the prevention of such attacks by 
strangers. 
Another form of violence involving strangers is the phenomenon of people 
committing suicide by, for example, throwing themselves under trains or 
other heavy vehicles. Around 90 London Underground train drivers 
experience a person jumping or falling in front of their train each year 
(Tranah & Fanner, 1994). The effect on the drivers of these trains can be 
extremely serious, although they were quite powerless to prevent the 
incident. Being used as a tool to cause the death of another person may be 
quite devastating. 
The classification and measurement of the types and consequences of 
violence are important both for epidemiological purposes and for devising 
appropriate interventions for specific work situations depending on the 
relative frequency of different types of incident. The prevention and 
management of certain types of aggressive and violent situations are 
Possible (Cox & Leather, 1994) but they require measures tailored to the 
circumstances and dynamics of the particular forms of violence encountered. 
It should be pointed out, at this stage, that almost every type of violent 
incident discussed here was reported in the present study. 
1.3.3 Extent of the problem 
Some writers make workplace violence out to be a grotesquely serious 
problem. Chenier (1998: p. 557) states "The workplace has become a 
battleground for violence in society. 
... 
Employers will have to modify their 
hiring practices and transform the workplace into a virtual fortress to 
protect employees. 
... 
Like a deadly virus, crime in America is increasing at 
a tremendous rate. The workplace is not immune to this deadly disease 
penetrating our daily existence. Upon entering the workplace each day, the 
worker does not know if an offensive deadly act will occur. " She is 
overdramatising the situation for the vast mqjority of workers. This is illustrated by the fact that Cole et al. (1997) had to disregard physical 
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violence from their survey of 600 American workers because only 3% had 
experienced any physical violence in the preceding 12 months. 
However, concerns about violence have been noted in a wide variety of 
occupations and countries (see, for example, Flannery, 1996; Kraus & 
McArthur, 1996; Nigro & Waugh, 1996). In 1993, the U. S. National 
Institute of Safety and Health issued an alert for research to assist in 
preventing homicide in the workplace (NIOSH, 1993). Homicide causes 
around 20 workplace deaths each week in the U. S., the numbers having 
declined during the 1980s but increased again in the 1990s. It accounts for 
11% of all occupational injury deaths among males and 42% among females 
(Jenkins, 1996). Additionally, the U. S. Department of Justice National 
Crime Victimization Survey (Warchol, 1998) recorded an annual rate of 
more than two million violent victimisations in the workplace for the years 
1992-1996, around 12% of these causing injury. 
In Britain and Europe, there are fewer statistics available specifically about 
violence at work, as highlighted by Wynne and Clarkin (1995). However, the 
1992 British Crime Survey noted that assaults at work had more than 
doubled from 1981 to reach around 360,000 in 1991 (Mayhew, Aye Maung & 
Mirrlees-Black, 1993). All violence reported in the British Crime Surveys 
rose by 88% between 1981 and 1995, but fell by 17% between 1995 and 
1997, so that the overall rise between 1981 and 1997 was 56% (Mirrlees- 
Black, Budd, Partridge & Mayhew, 1998). Overall, the number of offences of 
violence against the person, recorded by the police, rose by an average 
annual rate of 9% from 1950 to 1987 (Field, 1990). More recent annual 
increases have generally been smaller; although for the year ending March 
1997, an increase of 11% over the previous year was reported. During the 
Year April 1997 to March 1998,352,900 violent offences were recorded by 
the police in England and Wales, 72.6% being violence against the person, 
17.8% robberies and 9.7% sexual offences (Povey & Prime, 1998). 
The 1996 International Crime Victimisation Survey (Mayhew & White, 
1997) showed that, during 1995 in England and Wales, and the USA, 4% of 
people were victims of contact crime, comprising robbery, assaults with 
force, and sexual assaults against women. This rate was about double that in Northern Ireland, Austria and the Netherlands. Sweden and Finland also had relatively high levels of contact crime. 
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There is little doubt that official figures underestimate the size of the 
problem for there is a gross lack of reporting of violence at both the national 
and organisatignal level (Painter, 1987). Estimates in the U. S. and the U. K. 
suggest that between 30% and 80% of physical assaults go unreported 
(Murphy, 1996). Moreover, homicide and severe physical assault represent 
only the extremes of work-related violence and are not the most typical. 
Bulatao and VandenBos (1996) estimated, using U. S. Government data, 
that only 1 in 650 workplace crimes of violence (i. e. 0.2%) involved homicide. 
Similarly, homicide offences accounted forjust 0.2% of all reported violent 
crime in the U. K. for the year ending March 1998 (Povey & Prime, 1998). In 
terms of non-physical violence, around 75% of Greenberg and Barling's 
(1999) sample of 136 men admitted to some form of psychological violence 
against co-workers, subordinates and supervisors, in contrast to 1.5% who 
reported using physical violence. However, the level of under-reporting of 
verbal abuse and threats of assault is thought to be much higher than for 
physical violence (Toscano & Weber, 1995). The problems of violence and 
aggression at work therefore remain largely unrecognised by employers and 
Government alike (Randall, 1997), but these figures provide the impetus for 
them to take the issue seriously and to find ways to safeguard people in 
their work. 
1.4 VIOLENCE IN BARS AND LICENSED PREMISES 
Surveys of public house licensees reveal that the mqjority of licensed 
premises experience little violence on a regular basis (Dickson, Leather, 
Beale & Cox, 1994b; I-Ellas, Cox & Higgins, 1988). However, staff within the 
licensed retail trade have to deal with the possibility of both robbery and 
inter-personal conflict involving their customers, that is they are vulnerable 
to both Cal/OSHA Type I and Type II violence. The violence that can occur 
in and around public houses and bars is a well recognised problem that 
poses a significant threat to the health and safety of staff and customers, as 
is demonstrated by a variety of statistics from different countries. 
In the U. S., the rate of workplace homicide for bartenders is over three 
tinies the national average for workers in general (Jenkins, 1996), while the 
National Crime Victimization Surveys show that, for 1992-1996, bartenders 
experienced the fifth highest rate of assault and threat (91 out of every 1000 
workers attacked), exceeded only by police, private security, taxi drivers and 
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prison staff (Warchol, 1998). Peek-Asa, Erickson & Kraus (1999) found that 
workers in drinking establishments experienced a greater increase in the 
number of traumatic deaths at work than any other category over the period 
1992-1996, having increased by almost 50% in 1996 compared with each of 
the four previous years. 
In New Zealand, Langley, Chalmers & Fanslow (1996) studied the victims 
of assault presenting at hospital emergency departments. They found that 
9% of the homicides and 10% of all assault resulting in hospitalisations 
occurred in or around licensed premises (18% of those where a place was 
specified). The hospitalisation rate for licensed premises was at least 7.5 per 
100,000 persons per year. In Australia, Stockwell, Lang and Rydon (1993) 
found that, for Perth residents, 74% of drink-related problems, such as 
assault or accidental injury, occurred following drinking in licensed 
premises rather than in private settings. 
Within the U. K., the HSE (1998) found that the only two fatal injuries to 
employees in the hotel and catering industry reported to local authorities in 
the year 1996/7 resulted from violence. There were also 58 mqjor injuries, 
and 68 over-3-day irVuries, to employees reported to be caused by acts of 
violence. The 1992 British Crime Survey (Mayhew, Aye Maung & Mirrlees- 
Black 1993) revealed that 16% of incidents of violence (420,000 assaults) 
occurred in pubs and clubs, and the 1996 British Crime Survey (Mirlees- 
Black, Mayhew & Percy, 1996) indicated that one third of assaults by 
strangers and one fifth of assaults by acquaintances occurred in or around 
licensed premises. The 1998 British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black, Budd, 
Partridge & Mayhew, 1998) found that the proportion of adults who were 
victims of violence during 1997 was related to the number of evenings they 
spent in a pub or wine bar. While just 2.9% of those making no visits per 
week were victims, 10.6% of those making three or more visits were victims. 
Also in the U. K., Shepherd, Scully, Shapland, Irish and Leslie (1988) 
reported that 39% of injuries from assault presenting at an inner-city 
hospital for treatment occurred in or around licensed premises. 
This weight of statistics, undoubtedly affected by under-reporting as already 
discussed, demonstrates the necessity for measures to be devised to attempt 
to reduce the amount of violence occurring in licensed premises, and to 
reduce the effect of any incidents that do occur. In order to do this, it is 
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necessary to appreciate the nature of the licensee's job and the public house 
environment. 
The job of public house staff, and licensees in particular, is very complex 
and involves providing a service to the public, conducting money 
transactions, controlling people, working late in the evening, working as 
part of a local community, and having responsibility for cash and valuable 
stock. In short, the job combines not only most of the kinds of interaction 
with the public that are most liable to become violent but also aspects of the 
work environment that are recognised by the HSE as increasing the 
vulnerability of staff (Poyner & Warne, 1988). 
Other factors in the pub environment further increase the risk of violence 
occurring. Licensees do not simply sell drinks and food, they also try to 
provide a social environment in which people want to spend their leisure 
time. Engels, Knibbe and Drop (1999), for instance, stress the symbolic 
meaning of the pub as a place for socialising in the life of late adolescents. 
Social interactions among customers are highly varied as they use the 
public house for a whole range of purposes, for talking quietly, for playing 
pub games, such as pool or darts, for watching sports matches on television, 
for holding celebrations, or for "drowning their sorrows". 
Interactions between staff and customers are also complex and varied, and 
may be repeated a number of times in one day as the customers remain on, 
or return to, the premises. For regular customers interactions are repeated 
on successive days. Interactions between customers or between staff and 
customers can spark off an aggressive incident at any time. In addition, 
there may be an increased amount of violence on the streets around licensed 
premises, particularly where these occur in high concentration (Felson, 
Berends, Richardson & Veno, 1997; Homel, Hauritz, Wortley, McIlwain & 
Carvolth, 1997). 
An additional factor is, of course, that pubs provide alcohol. The precise 
relationship between alcohol and aggression is unclear, but is certainly not 
straightforward. Hodge (1993) pointed out that despite a lengthy history of 
research into the relationship between alcohol and violence, there is still 
confusion about the exact nature of the relationship. Pernanen (1991) 
suggested that alcohol modifies both the way in which people evaluate 
situations (primary appraisal) and the ways in which they feel they can cope 
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with that situation (secondary appraisal), in such a way as to increase the 
chances of them acting in an aggressive manner (see also Gibbs, 1986). 
Pelson, Baccaglini and Gmelch (1986) suggest, for example, that control 
actions of public house staff might be interpreted by an intoxicated person 
as an affront so sparldng off retaliatory action. Bjorkqvist, Osterman and 
Lagerspetz (1994) suggest that, in choosing whether to commit a violent act, 
people take into account the ratio between the advantageous effect and the 
danger to themselves. It may be that alcohol affects their ability to estimate 
these and to appreciate the consequences of acting violently. 
Murdoch, Pihl and Ross (1990) make the point that alcohol, rather than 
directly causing violent behaviour, may cause people to behave in other 
bizarre ways that annoy others and therefore precipitate potentially violent 
situations. Homel, Tomsen and Thommeny (1992) point out that the 
association between public drinking and violence is not just a problem of 
people drinking alcohol. They make a distinction between the effects of 
ethanol, the substance, and the total environment of drinking and its 
regulation by management, the police and other public officials. The 
occurrence of violence is affected by situational factors within the licensed 
premises, such as patron mix, levels of comfort, boredom, intoxication and 
the behaviour of door control staff. Lang, Stockwell, Rydon & Lockwood 
(1995) found that the significant risk factors for alcohol-related harm, 
including being involved in a violent argument or fight, following visits to 
licensed premises included such environmental features as a predominance 
of males among the clientele at the venue, and the presence of music and/or 
dancing. 
Drug-related activity has also become a significant problem for public house 
licensees, and has been associated with violence and aggressive behaviour 
(MCM Research, 1993). Licensed premises usually have easy and open 
access, and are often noisy and crowded so can provide an ideal venue for 
illegal activities, such as drug dealing or usage. Violence can be linked with 
the effects of specific drugs, with arguments over financial transactions or 
with disputes between rival dealers. Licensees are legally required to 
ensure that their premises are not used for drug-related activity, so they are 
obliged to tackle any such activity they find. However, managing such 
Potentially violent elements may place licensees in dangerous situations 
demanding great care and skill to avoid repercussions. 
9A &d-Z 
Considering such a variety of factors, it is not surprising that licensees in 
the study by Cox and colleagues (I-Ellas et al., 1988) saw their job as 
multifaceted and with the potential for conflict constantly present. 
"I don't think [people] appreciate the job we face day in and day out. 
We are 24 hour watchmen and we have to be very good peacemakers. 
Our job involves being everything from a marriage counsellor to a 
champion boxer. With a lot of other occupations in between. " 
"A publican is "king" lawmaker, judge and policeman of his own self 
contained kingdom. Membership to his society is open to all. " 
The effects of any violence in a public house may be exacerbated because the 
mqjority of licensees live on the premises, around three quarters with 
partners and a third with children (Dickson et al., 1994b). Although this 
may not affect the likelihood of a violent incident occurring, it undoubtedly 
increases the potential for harm in terms of the involvement of the family 
and the home. Further, much of the work of licensees is directed towards 
creating an atmosphere in which people feel safe and comfortable, win want 
to stay and to return on a regular basis. A violent incident in the pub may 
discourage customers and therefore affect the profitability of the business 
and the livelihood of the licensee. As one of Hillas et al. 's (1988) sample of 
licensees put it: 
"(A violent incident] totally depresses the pub atmosphere and the 
manager, some customers will leave and will probably not return. De- 
motivation of all. " 
In Dickson et al. 's (1994b) survey, over a third of licensees (36.8%) indicated 
that they believed the business viability of their pub was highly at risk from 
the possibility of violence occurring in the pub. 
Despite all these aspects of the licensee's job and work environment, very 
little of the research into violence in licensed premises has considered how it 
affects licensees and their staff. The Social and Environmental Psychology 
(SEP) Group at Nottingham has studied the effects on licensees since 1986. 
A questionnaire-based stress audit in 1995, which made no direct reference 
to violence, revealed that violence was the fourth most frequently reported 
stressor facing licensees and the one most closely related to the negative 
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outcomes of reduced job satisfaction, poorer well-being and a greater 
intention to quit the job (Leather & Lee, 1995). 
A survey that asked more specifically about licensees' experiences of 
violence and aggression at their premises confirmed that those licensees 
who felt very much at risk and were very worried about violence 
experienced lower job satisfaction and lower organisational commitment, 
and felt more "wom ouV and more "up-tight" than their fellows (Dickson, 
Leather, Beale & Cox, 1994b). This illustrated the negative impact that fear 
of being the victim of violence can have on the well-being of workers 
(Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Dickson, 1997). The survey also revealed that 
the effects of exposure to violence could be ameliorated by the quality of 
support that licensees felt they received from the organisation, particularly 
their fine manager (Leather, Lawrence, Beale, Cox & Dickson, 1998). Such 
results highlight the importance of an organisation working actively, and 
being seen by their staff to be working actively, to tackle the problem of 
work-related violence. Part of this response has to be to investigate in detail 
the common factors that contribute to violent incidents so that effective 
measures can be implemented. 
Homel and his colleagues (Homel et al., 1997) provide an example of an 
initiative that successfully reduced the incidence of violence in and around 
the licensed premises of the Surfers Paradise area of Western Australia. 
They gathered information about the factors that contributed to the 
occurrence of violent incidents in the area, then introduced a series of 
initiatives including training of security staff and increased cooperation 
with the police. Licensees were asked to sign up to a code of practice which 
was displayed in all the outlets to provide information and increase 
awareness of staff and customer responsibility in maintaining a safe 
environment. Responsible practice in the advertising and sale of alcohol was 
also included. Fundamental to the success of this intervention was the 
initial acquisition of information. The next chapter addresses the problems 
connected with obtaining information about work-related violence. 
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CHAPTER 2: OBTAINING INFORMATION ABOUT 
WORK-RELATED VIOLENCE 
If effective measures are to be taken by organisations to reduce the risks 
from work-related violence, then the design of those interventions must be 
based on accurate information about the types of violent incident that are 
most likely to occur in the particularjob or work setting, and how those 
incidents arise and develop. However, the gathering of accurate information 
about violence and aggression is extremely difficult because of the illegality of 
violence and its general condemnation by society. The perpetrators, and 
sometimes the victims, will normally try to prevent knowledge of the violent 
incident getting to their employers, the police and, often, their own social 
group. Methodological issues surrounding the gathering of such information 
are discussed in this chapter. 
2.1 METHODS OF STUDYING VIOLENCE 
2.1.1 Laboratory studies of aggression versus real world studies 
Psychological research on aggression and violence has always faced the 
dilemma of whether to study aggression in the laboratory or in the field. 
Laboratory experimentation controls variables to allow testing of causal 
hypotheses through scientific method, but isolates the behaviour from its 
normal context thereby losing ecological validity and generalisability of the 
adings. Field studies examine the behaviour. in its naturally occurring social 
context, so losing experimental control over variables and limiting the 
conclusions that can be reached concerning causal factors, because of the 
possible existence of hidden confounding variables (see, for example, Archer & 
Drowne, 1989). ' 
7here is continuing debate about the relative merits of laboratory and field 
studies. Berkowitz (1993) defends the use of laboratory studies on the 
grounds that the controllability of the experiment allows very specific causal 
hypotheses to be tested and he, along with most writers, uses laboratory 
results to explain andjustify the fundamental theories about aggression. 
Tedeschi and Quigley (1996), on the other hand, question their value on a 
number of grounds, such as whether what has been measured is actually 
aggression or is largely compliance with the researchees cover story. 
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In addition, there are ethical issues that have to be considered in deliberately 
causing people to become aggressive, even when in the controlled conditions 
of a laboratory. If real aggression is generated, it could compromise the 
safety of both the subject and the research team. There can be no cast iron 
guarantee that debriefing will dissipate aggression, but may leave a 
resentment that could lead to later retaliation. Or a subject might be so upset 
as to walk out before proper debriefing can be given. 
Tedeschi and Quigley (1996: 175) also question whether results from 
artificially generated aggression in a safe laboratory environment generalise 
into the "real world". "The range of values 
- 
rewards and punishments 
- 
which 
can be manipulated in the laboratory is quite limited. 
... 
In everyday life 
outside the laboratory, the stakes at issue in social conflicts may be 
perceived as extraordinarily important, even life threatening. We do not know 
whether fimctions we find in laboratory studies under low value conditions 
generalize to situations where values are quite high. " 
Archer (1989) is concerned that laboratory experiments isolate the 
aggressive act away from the social context, rather than seeing it as part of 
social interaction and, in so doing, reinforce an ideology that seeks to isolate 
the violent act as a legal, medical or social problem. He argues that "the 
forms of violence which occur in our society are only understandable in terms 
of the social conditions and context in which they arise. " 
Naturalistic studies also have their problems, of course, such as accuracy of 
information, the representativeness of samples, and the formulation and 
testing of hypotheses under uncontrolled conditions, as discussed by Archer 
(1989). Some of these problems are discussed in detail in the following 
section. The main conclusion to be drawn fi-om the continuing debate is that 
there is no perfect way to study aggression and violence, and that a 
combination of methods needs to be used. Tedeschi and Quigley (1996: 175) 
advocate both triangulation of results and innovation in the study of the 
violent incident as a process: "To extrapolate from the laboratory it will be 
necessary to triangulate results from natural observations, field studies and 
data archives available from crime fighting organizations.... We need to move 
away from a set of neo-behavioristic laboratory paradigms for studying 
reactive aggression to new ways of examining the dynamic social processes 
that instigate the use of threats and punishments. " 
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The call for naturalistic studies such as those described in this thesis is 
compelling. Despite their limitations, the paramountjustification for the 
choice of such methods is that it is unlikely that alternative types of study 
could do a betterjob, and if they were not used it could mean that serious 
issues were neglected (Fox & Spector, 1999). 
2.1.2 Studies in the real world 
Many statistical studies have been carried out on national or state data sets 
in the United States, such as workers'compensation records (e. g. LaMar, 
Gerberich, Lohman & Zaidman, 1998) or the NationalTraumatic 
Occupational Fatalities surveillance system (e. g. Jenkins, 1996) and these 
provide a general overview. However, there are various drawbacks to this 
type of study, as discussed by White (1996). r1hey only capture incidents with 
relatively major consequences uch as death or injury that requires time off 
work. Additionally, they may be biased towards industries which have well 
developed systems for reporting such information to central government, 
such as the public sector. However, both Beale, Cox and Leather (1996) and 
Nigro and Waugh (1996) have argued that, although nationally collected data 
have many uses, data need to be gathered at an industry specific level and at 
the organisational level to produce information that is appropriate to inform 
the design of measures to combat problems. Hales, Seligman, Newman and 
71mbrook (1988) similarly note the requirement to study the specific industry 
or section of industry to get a true picture. They point out, for example, that 
within the grocery store industry, employees in large supermarkets may not 
be at the same risk from occupational violent crime as those in convenience 
food stores. 
A realistic picture of work-related violence requires studies at different levels 
of analysis and granularity, each informing the others. Information has been 
gathered by researchers at the level of individual incidents (e. g. Shaw, 1998: 
nursing home staff), individual work units (e. g. Macintyre & Homel, 1997: 
nightclubs), organisations (e. g. Whittington, Shuttleworth & Hill, 1996: a 
general hospital), industry sector (e. g. Jenkins, Rocke, McNicholl & Hughes, 
1998: hospital accident and emergency departments nationwide; HSAC, 
1987: healthcare nationwide), across professions (e. g. Royal College of 
Nursing (RCN), 1994; Breakwell & Rowed, 1989: social workers), by 
geographical area (Felson et al., 1997; Homel et al.; 1997: holiday nightspots) 
and nationally (Salminen, 1997: in Finland; Warchol, 1998: for the U. S. ). 
Court proceedings have also been used to study work-related violence across 
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all sectors of industry, but the samples are very selective. Allen and Lucero 
(1998), for example, looked at arbitration decisions on workers disciplined or 
dismissed for assaults on their superiors. 
Violent incidents are relatively infrequent so one of the problems of research 
using naturally occurring incidents is to get large enough samples to give 
statistical significance to results seen. Cole et al. (1997) for example, had to 
disregard physical violence from their survey of 600 US workers because 
only 3% had experienced such an attack in the preceding 12 months. Mein et 
al. (1997) noted that, for epidemiological research, the rarity of violence 
makes cohort studies problematic. 
2.1.3 Monitoring at organisational level 
Monitoring ofwork-related violence goes beyond simply investigating and 
dealing with the consequences of individual incidents, it is the provision of 
management information about the overall picture of aggression and violence 
within an organisation, a profession or a sector of industry. Reasons for 
monitoring violent incidents concerning people at work fall into two main 
categories: legal requirements and management good practice. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the legal requirements come under health and safety law. 
Within the U. K., employers have to report certain violent incidents to the 
HSE or the local authority under RIDDOR 95, so are obliged to establish a 
system for reporting and recording incidents. The Health and Safety at Work 
etc. Act 1974 requires employers to provide a safe working environment. 
Such provision obviously necessitates the employer being aware of any 
threats to that safety, including any incidents of violence. There is also a 
requirement under the Management of Health & Safety at Work Regulations 
1992, to carry out risk assessments for people at work. Assessing the risks 
from violence is a necessary part of that overall assessment. 
Monitoring of incidents provides management information to assist not only 
in safeguarding staff well-being but also in improving services to customers, 
estimating and reducing the costs incurred by violence, thereby increasing 
profitability, and for evaluating interventions implemented to reduce the risk 
from violence. Additionally, monitoring and keeping records of violent 
incidents provides evidence in case of any legal action. 
7he types of information that can be obtained from the monitoring concern W 
the numbers of incidents occurring, (ii) their nature in terms of, for example, 
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who was involved, when and where they occurred, (iii) the structure and the 
processed involved in what happened during the incidents, (iv) the effect of 
incidents in terms of physical injuries and damage, psychological injuries and 
effects, and the commercial implications, and (v) what actions were taken by 
the organisation. 
Identifying accurately the extent of violence that occurs in an organisation, 
or within a particular profession, can be extremely difficult. A number of 
factors come into play: 
0 people have varying ideas of what constitutes violence (Dickson, 
Leather, Beale & Cox, 1994b: licensees); 
0 some people may accept a degree of violence as "part of the job" 
(Painter, 1987: caring professions); 
some may not wish to admit to having experienced a violent 
incident because they feel that their inability to control the 
situation reflects on their professional competence (e. g. Breakwell 
& Rowett, 1989: social workers); 
some feel that there may be repercussions if they report an 
incident, either fi-om the perpetrator or from their employer (e. g. 
Arnetz, 1998: accident and emergency staff); 
0 other people may exaggerate the amount of violence they have to 
deal with to enhance a "macho" or "martyr" image. 
There is no one straightforward method for organisations to use in monitoring 
violent incidents. Incident reporting is now accepted as the fundamental 
requirement, recommended in sector guidance documents (e. g. HSAC, 1997: 
health services; HSE, 1995a: retail), but it has limitations that have to be 
recognised when using the information obtained for risk assessment. All 
methods of researching the problem of violence within an organisation have 
both advantages and limitations so that a variety of methods and multiple 
sources need to be used to complement each other, as demonstrated, for 
example, in studies by Eisele, Watldns & Matthews (1998), Leadbetter 
(1993), and Warren et al. (1999). Table 2.1 summ arises the types of 
information that can be obtained from different sources. 
Incident reporting system 
Reporting systems gather information soon after the incident has occurred so 
that memory deterioration effects are minimised. However, information is 
generally limited to the reporting employee's point of view. The amount of 
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detail recorded is variable, limited by the time it takes to fill in long forms. 
Staff are more likely to take that time for serious incidents than for minor 
ones. Reports include short term but not long term consequences in terms of 
physical or psychological injury. This method is used in a large number of 
studies (e. g. Arnetz, 1998; Jenkins et al., 1998). The limitations of reporting 
systems are discussed in detail in Section 2.2. 
0- Samplingstudies 
Sampling studies, as advocated by Beale, Cox & Leather (1996), are designed 
to overcome the reluctance of staff to report incidents because of the time it 
takes to fill in the standard forms. 7hey can utilise simple tick box "diaries", 
which are fidled in every day for a limited period, say 1 or 2 weeks, and 
repeated regularly, maybe every six months. Evidence for restricting the 
duration of this reporting is provided by Arnetz (1998) who found that, even 
with simple report forms designed to make reporting easy, reporting rates 
from hospital accident and emergency staff declined sharply after the first 
month. 
Since the recording of each incident takes a very short time in sampling 
studies, the information should reflect more accurately the numbers of 
relatively minor incidents than do formal reporting systems. Details are 
purposely kept to a minimum and are recorded soon after incidents, but again 
are limited to the reporting employee's point of view. Some short term effects 
may be recorded but no long term consequences. 
'D_ 
F ew other researchers have reported on, -or suggested, this type of study, 
although Leadbette? s (1993) research regarding assaults on social work staff 
included a two-week diary exercise for recording assaultive and abusive 
behaviours in adolescent residential units. A study of this kind is discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
Team manager summaries 
In diverse organisations with semi autonomous teams, such as retail chains 
or community health trusts, team manager summaries giving very brief 
details of all incidents dealt with by the work team, including relatively minor 
incidents, can overcome some of the problems of reporting for individuals 
remote from the health and safety department. This helps to give central 
management a more realistic view of any repeated "low level" violence where 
individual incidents are not rated as serious enough to be reported formally 
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but the cumulative effects can be very severe (Scott & Stradling, 1994). 
Detail is recorded soon after incidents but is purposely limited, and is from the 
team point of view only. Some short term effects may be given but notlong 
term consequences. This type of recording is recommended by the author and 
her colleagues in the national guidance for community health teams 
(Leather, Cox, Beale & Fletcher, 1998). 
Staffsurveys 
Anonymous surveys of staff might access incidents that otherwise would not 
be reported because of time constraints or staff not wanting management to 
know about individual incidents. A more accurate overall picture in terms of 
numbers of incidents might, therefore, be gained from surveys. However, 
accuracy can be affected by memory if, for example, people are asked to 
recall the numbers of incidents that have occurred during the past year. 
There may also be memory effects in recalling detail about any incidents if 
they occurred some time before the survey was carried out. 
One of the greatest benefits of staff surveys is that they can reveal longer 
term effects on, for example, staff well-being, job satisfaction and 
organisational commitment (e. g. Leather, Lawrence, Beale, Cox & Dickson, 
1997). In addition, changes over time can be detected if similar surveys are 
repeated at regular intervals. However, one drawback is that staff surveys 
miss people who have left the job because of violence. In other words, they 
miss those who have been most adversely affected either physically or 
psychologically. Staff surveys are used commonly in the literature (e. g. 
Arnetz, Arnetz & Pettersen, 1996; Farrell, 1999). A study of this kind is 
discussed in Section 3.2.2. 
Interviews 
Interviews of staff, individually or in groups, can provide a general overall 
picture of staff experience of, and concerns about, aggression and violence 
within an organisation or team, or at a national level (e. g. Beale, Fletcher, 
Leather & Cox, 1998; Breakwell & Rowett, 1989). Since this method is 
interactive, interviewers can adapt the questioning to explore at a general 
level or at a deeper level as the main issues emerge. Ms input is vital for 
good risk assessment and for designing effective questionnaires for larger 
studies that elicit an optimum amount of relevant information. Interviews do 
not, of course, give accurate numbers of incidents occurring. 
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It is necessary to be aware that all the methods mentioned so far rely on self- 
report which can suffer not only from memory effects but also from a "social 
desirability response bias". This means that people have a tendency to 
respond in a way that they perceive to be socially acceptable to those who 
will receive the information. In relation to interpersonal violence and 
aggression, people have a greater willingness to admit victimisation and a 
lowered tendency to admit perpetration with increasing severity of violence 
(Saunders, 1991). 
Company records 
Further information about violent incidents and their effects can be sought 
from other company records or procedures, such as absenteeism records, exit 
interviews, summary occupational health reports. Such methods are not 
systematic so cannot be expected to produce reliable numbers of incidents 
occurring, but they might access incidents that are not otherwise reported 
and may also discover some long term effects that other methods miss, 
particularly if people leave because of repeated "low level" violence in thejob. 
Some of the records give objective measures of behaviour resulting from 
violent incidents, such as number of days sick leave taken, or the proportion 
of visits to occupational health that result fi-om violence. Such methods are 
infrequently reported in the literature, although Eisele et al. (1998) used 
company records because no incident reports were available. 
Videorecordings 
Video recordings are used extensively for obtaining evidence about violent 
incidents and crimes, and they provide immediate objective information. 
However, they only record incidents that occur in observed areas, usually 
where a high incidence ofviolence is expected. In addition, people intent on 
causing trouble may take pains to avoid being caught on camera. For 
example, one licensee in the present study reported: 
"The situation is now out of hand. (Assailant) continues to threaten my 
family and staff. For fear of reprisals people win not give statements. 
(AssailanVs) actions always' take place out of the view of cameras and 
video recording equipment. " 
Video recordings provide a high level of detail when the action is in view, none 
at all when it is in an obscured area. They record some immediate physical 
effects but no long term consequences. Video recordings are much more 
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useful in enclosed settings, such as mental health wards (e. g. Crowner, 
Stepcic, Peric & Czobor, 1994), or very controlled premises, such as banks, 
than they are in open social settings or places where violence is relatively 
uncommon. 
Direct observation 
Direct observation has been used by a number of researchers, particularly 
within licensed premises (e. g. Graham, La Rocque, Yetman, Ross & Giustra, 
1980; Homel & Clarke, 1994; Homel, Tomsen & Thommeny, 1992). This 
type of research can provide very detailed information and reveal features of 
the incident that no other method can access. Wells, Graham & West (1998), 
for example, were able to study how staff behaviour initiated or exacerbated 
some aggressive incidents. 
However, there are a number of drawbacks to direct observational methods. 
Researchers may spend many hours of observation when no incidents occur. 
Homel et al. (1992) spent 300 hours of observation to collect 32 incidents. 
Such expenditure of time is only practicable for venues known to have a high 
frequency of violent incidents, but this has implications for observer safety. 
The presence of observers can also affect the environment or alter the 
dynamics of situations. Further, there may also be observer bias, or 
problems with seeing only part of the action from the observation position, as 
with video cameras. 
Police records 
Police records can provide a high level of detail aboutmidividual incidents as 
they contain evidence from all parties involved and other witnesses. Of 
course, they only provide information about incidents in which the police 
became involved, and many incidents are not reported to the police because 
they are not considered serious enough or because the victims fear reprisals 
from the assailants. This is"illustrated by comments made by licensees in the 
present study: 
"She is a member of the local family of troublemakers on the estate, 
which is why we di&t bother with the police. " 
"It? s very worrying these people are, Ive found out [that they are] 
always involved in trouble. You never know what they're going to do 
next. I've got the video of the knife being dropped and hidden, but I'm 
scared to hand it over to the police for fear of reprisals. " 
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Another illustration is provided by the Victorian Community Council Against 
Violence (1990) survey of nightclub patrons in Melbourne. This revealed that, 
while 22% of respondents who had been victims of actual violence in late 
night venues sought formal medical treatment, only 16% reported the 
incident to the police. 
In England and Wales, only around half (51%) the robberies and woundings, 
reported to the 1998 BCS were recorded by the police (Mrrlees-Black et al., 
1998). Reasons given by victims for not reporting acquaintance or stranger 
violent crime were that the incident was too trivial, that it was private and 
had been dealt with by the victims, that the victims felt the police would not 
be interested or could not do anything, that they feared reprisal, or that it 
was inconvenient to report. 
Police statistics can be useful in evaluating measures that are introduced by, 
or in collaboration with, the police. Burns, Flaherty, Ireland and Frances 
(1995), for example, unexpectedly found that frequent visits by police to 
licensed premises, instead of acting as a deterrent, actually increased the 
number of crimes that were recorded. 
Police records are, therefore, useful for investigating particular incidents, for 
reviewing security at individual premises, and for checking the effectiveness 
of measures relating to policing practice, but are too detailed for deriving 
overall principles and common ocmrrences. Further drawbacks of both the 
police records and video recordings for finding common patterns is the sheer 
time it would take to examine the volume of evidence for sufficient numbers 
of incidents to provide statistically valid results (see Felson & Steadman, 
1983: P. 62). 
2.2 INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEMS 
The use of incident reporting systems provides several pragmatic 
advantages in studying the nature of violent incidents. First, organisations 
are increasingly obliged to maintain such systems to comply with legal 
requirements. Second, there may be access to a large number of real 
incidents in a wide variety of locations. Third, each incident is reported soon 
after it occurs and potentially at a useful level of detail. 
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RIDDOR 95 requires employers to report, to either the HSE or the local 
authority, depending on industry sector, violence done to a person at work if it 
results in W workers suffering death or specified mqjor iWuries, being in 
hospital for more than 24 hours or being off work for three days or more, 
following an assault that has resulted in physical iWury, or (ii) any other 
person being taken to hospital from the scene. Employers also have to 
maintain their own records of such incidents. Compliance with this legislation 
requires that organisations have effective systems established to enable 
their staff to inform them that incidents have occurred, and to record 
sufficient information to pass on to the HSE or local authority. 
There has been disappointment with the requirements of RIDDOR 95. Beale, 
Cox and Leather (1996) make the criticism that reporting is entirely 
dependent on the physical outcome of the incident and not on its nature. This 
appears to undervalue the serious psychological damage and lasting distress 
that can be caused by an incident that was very ffightening but did not result 
in mqjor physical Wury. Further, while there is provision in the regulations 
for the reporting of "dangerous occurrences" that can shed light on the 
processes that can lead to accidents, these do not include potentially violent 
incidents. However, it would be unrealistic to expect all minor incidents to be 
reported nationally because of the unmanageable workload for the HSE, local 
authorities and some employing organisations, and a limit has to be set at 
some level. The mgjor benefit of RIDDOR 95 is that it has acted as an 
impetus for organisations to establish internal reporting and recording 
systems that can be used as a valuable learning resource. 
Incident reporting systems, then, have to be the mainstay of any monitoring 
systems. Although their limitations have to be recognised, and their findings 
supplemented by other methods, reporting systems can be designed to 
provide a wealth of information about patterns in violent incidents that can 
benefit organisations and týheir staff in reducing the risks from future violence 
(Beale, 1999). 
2.2.1 Design of reporting systems 
Incident reporting systems serve two main purposes: (i) to trigger help for 
staff involved in a violent incident, and (U) to record information about the 
incident. Effective reporting systems, therefore, have to incorporate two 
stages. The first extracts sufficient information for the organisation to 
provide timely assistance, the second extracts more detailed information to 
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determine further support required by the staff involved, to complete 
company records and to be used for future learning. Good systems allow 
employees involved in incidents to report at either of the two stages. 
Stage 1. If employees are asking for immediate help from the organisation, 
then obviously they enter the system at this stage, and facilities for rapid 
and appropriate action have to be in place. Employees need to be aware of 
how to access this help both inside and outside working hours. Once the 
immediate help has been provided, further details of the incident are recorded 
in Stage 2. 
Stage 2. If employees do not feel that they require immediate help, they can 
report at the second stage, providing details to the organisation so that 
relevant individuals, such as the health and safety advisers, can gain an 
accurate picture of the incidents that employees are encountering. The 
provision of such information may also be important at a later stage if the 
incident turns out to be more significant than first realised. For example, 
employees may develop physical or psychological symptoms at a later stage, 
or the incident may have repercussions leading to more serious violence, or it 
may be part of a pattern that can be identified. 
Good systems have well defined procedures to be followed when an incident is 
reported. These ensure that all relevant personnel can be informed so that 
they can take appropriate action. Relevant personnel include the line 
manager, the health and safety department, security, occupational health, 
ýerhap's auditors and estates departments. It is important for all the 
different departments to follow integrated and agreed procedures, so that 
action is co-ordinated rather than piecemeal, thus avoiding either duplication 
of action or lack of action. Discussion of appropriate actions is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but they have been outlined by the author and her 
colleagues elsewhere (Beale, Leather, Cox & Fletcher, 1998; Leather, Cox, 
Beale & Fletcher, 1998). 
Efficient systems require a designated initial contact point for the reporting 
of incidents, such as the health and safety department or a security 
monitoring station. However, it is also necessary for the system to have 
sufficient redundancy built in to ensure that if the incident is reported to 
someone else, for example, the line manager, then that person win trigger the 
whole system. Organisations cannot expect employees who have just 
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experienced a violent incident to have to contact more than one department. 
Care has to be taken, however, that information is not passed on that would 
breach confidentiality, for example from an occupational health consultation. 
Reporting instruments 
Reporting can be via paper forms or computer based, depending on access to 
computers and familiarity of reporting employees with computer systems. 
Even those that are familiar with the computer systems may need support 
while filling in the details because they are recounting what might have been 
a very painful experience. Support should always be available to help anyone 
upset by an incident to fill in a reporting form. 
The basic information required in incident reports forms is now determined by 
REDDOR 95 although most work published in the academic literature 
predates this. However, to provide the most useful information fi-om an 
organisation's point of view, forms need to be customised to extract 
information specific to the setting or type of work, as advocated by Nigro & 
Waugh (1996), for example. In addition, the questions and design of the form 
have to be tailored for any additional use that the organisation wants to 
make of the information, for example if it is to be used it for making insurance 
claims, or monitoring the action taken by the organisation following an 
incident. 
Analysis 
Analysis and design of forms are mutually dependent. The types of questions 
ask6d need to be designed t6produce information appropriate to the 
analytical techniques available and most suitable. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that it is rarely practicable to include sophisticated 
psychological measures in an operational reporting system because the 
person reporting the incident may be very upset as a result of the incident. 
Additionally, reporting might have to be done over the telephone for incidents 
that are not very serious and do not necessitate a visit to distant premises. 
This determines that questions have to be very straightforward and do not 
depend on a scale that has to be seen, or is long-winded to explain. 
Communication 
Other important aspects of incident reporting systems involve 
communicating with staff. Regular reminders are needed on how to report 
and the use made of reports. Staff have to be assured of confidentiality and 
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assistance in completing forms. Results have to be fed back to staff both to 
demonstrate that the organisation is taking the issue seriously and making 
use of their reports, and to provide staff with the information they need to 
reduce the risks from violence. 
2.2.2 Advantages of incident reporting 
Incident reporting has the obvious benefit for the staff involved that it should 
trigger help and support from the organisation. The advantages of incident 
reporting systems for the organisation, in terms of analysis of the 
information concern: 
" Identification of vulnerable people, places, times and situations; 
" Details of the nature and development of common incidents, 
providing input for the design of appropriate intervention 
strategies; 
0 Detection of changes in the frequency or nature of incidents over 
time, allowing some evaluation of measures implemented; 
Identification of new factors in incidents, such as an increase in the 
involvement of drugs, or factors becoming less important, such as 
a decrease in the involvement of football fans in incidents; 
Provision of relevant input into staff training in terms of both 
statistics and real (but usually anonymised) examples; 
Contemporaneous evidence about the incident for future reference, 
perhaps for legal or insurance purposes, or if there are unexpected 
developments or repercussions at a later date. 
1 2.2.3 Lhimitations of incident reporting 
It has to be recognised that detailed reporting systems can take years to 
establish uniformly throughout an organisation. They also take time to build 
up sufficient numbers of incidents for reliable statistics to be obtained. 
Results taken over a short time period are likely to be unrepresentative, 
giving undue import to some features or types of incidents while missing 
other important details. Reporting systems also suffer from a range of other 
limitations which demand that they should not be used alone in determining 
the extent or nature of violence or the assessment of risk. 
Subjective view ofthe members ofstaff 
One obvious criticism of incident reporting systems is that they usually 
represent only the subjective view of the members of staff involved in the 
incident. Týis is obviouslya'n, incomplete picture of the whole incident 
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because other parties, or witnesses, might have viewed it very differently. 
Further, the report may be affected by a social desirability response bias 
(Gosling, John, Craik & Robins, 1998; Saunders, 1991), as already discussed. 
However, when treating violence as a health and safety issue, rather than 
simply an objective academic subject, it is important to remember that it is 
the effect of incidents on members of staff that is of prime importance. Their 
perceptions of the event are important both in the way that they are treated 
after the incident and in how a repetition of the situation may be avoided. 
Reports may also suffer from eye-witness recall reliability problems such as 
selectivity, stereotypical assimilation, intergroup biases and the effects of 
increased arousal (Christianson & Hubinette, 1993; Hollin, 1984; Lindholm & 
Christianson, 1998a, 1998b). 
Amount ofdetail 
There will always be a conflict between the amount of information that is 
required for proper analysis of incidents by researchers and the amount of 
time that employees can afford to spend completing reports. A form that 
takes too long to complete will militate against less serious incidents being 
reported. A compromise has to be reached. 
Short term information only 
Reporting systems by themselves only record the consequences of incidents 
up to the time of reporting, which, under REDDOR 95, has to be within 10 
days. Serious physical injury or obvious damage can be followed up by the 
organisation's support systems, but consequences that are less obvious. at 
the time may be missed. The most likely outcome to be missed in this way is 
psychological damage, which may not become apparent until well after the 
mcident. 
Information on psychological harm 
The normal time scale for the reporting of incidents does not allow for a valid 
assessment of the consequent psychological harm. While physical U*v*ury is 
normally obvious within a short time, psychological harm, in the form of post 
trauma reactions and, more particularly, post traumatic stress disorder 
(PrMD), may not be evident until some considerable time later (Brady, 1999). 
This time delay undoubtedly results in the loss of information about this type 
of outcome in reporting systems. it is also likely that a "macho' 
organisational culture could make people reluctant to admit to psychological 
problems, as found by Kopel and Friedman (1997), for example, in the police. 
«A9 - Z" 
In addition, it is becoming increasingly recognised that repeated exposure to 
abuse, threats and minor acts of aggression can have a cumulative effect 
and may lead to prolonged duress stress disorder (PDSD) similar in nature to 
the more widely known PTSD (Scott & Stradling, 1994). However, the 
individual acts of aggression maybe considered too minor to report, and the 
threat to the psychological well-being of the employees goes unrecognised. It 
is in these situations, where aggression and violence constitute a chronic 
stressor, rather than an acute stressor, that sampling strategies that 
supplement on-going reporting become so valuable. 
Under-reporting 
It is well established in the literature that reporting of both accidents and 
violent incidents at work suffer from substantial under-reporting. Painter 
(1987) stated that "whenever a problem of violence has been recognised by 
employers or unions and whenever this has been investigated, there is 
considerable under-reporting ofviolence in the workplace. " 
There are a number of contributory factors involved in the under-reporting of 
incidents, such as W lack of knowledge about the reporting system, (H) time 
pressures, (iii) an unhelpful organisational culture or team climate, (iv) a 
professional culture of coping, (v) differing perceptions of what constitutes a 
violent incident, and (vi) fear of reprisals. 
Perhaps the most overlooked reason for under-reporting is that victims 
simply do not know how to report or, if they know how to report, they are not 
aware of the-purpose of reporting and what the reports are used for. 
Organisations have to ensure that staff understand the mechanics and 
purpose of the system, through training and awareness campaigns, and 
make reporting procedures easy and accessible, as suggested by Leather, 
Cox, Beale & Fletcher (1998). 
Employees often find that it is too time consuming to report incidents 
formally, particularly in occupations where there is a high frequency of minor 
incidents of violence. This has been found for healthcare staff, for example, 
both in the community (Beale, Fletcher, Leather & Cox, 1998) and in 
accident and emergency departments (Arnetz, 1998). 
Employees have to see some benefit to themselves to take the time and 
trouble to report an incident. 7he benefits are obvious for incidents where 
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there has been injury necessitating time off work, or damage requiring 
repairs, or where the police are involved and legal action may follow. Other 
incidents may have been equally upsetting for employees or customers but 
have had little physical outcome and require less obvious management 
action. Reporting of such incidents may elicit little in the way of immediate 
action or support from management, so may not be seen as worthwhile. 
More seriously, the organisational culture, or the team climate, may cause 
employees to expect that reporting will actually produce a negative reaction, 
such as questioning of their professional competence. Arnetz (1998) found 
that accident and emergency staff did not report all incidents because they 
were afraid of being blamed for allowing them to happen. George (1993) was 
unable fo use examples of assaults on social workers in his article because 
the victims were afraid of being recognised by their employers and 
jeopardising their careers. Breakwell and Rowett (1989) found that social 
workers considered the distinguishing characteristics of their colleagues who 
had been assaulted as "more provocative, incompetent, authoritarian and 
inexperienced", in other words they thought it was partly their own fault. 
Closely allied to this is a professional culture of coping in one of two ways. 
Victims might feel themselves that they have failed professionally in not 
being able to prevent the incident occurring, and are reluctant to admit to 
that failure. Alternatively, incidents of violence are thought of as inevitable in 
the job and professionals feel that they should not need to report incidents 
becausethey ought to be able to cope by themselves.. This latter occurs both 
in caring professions and in "macho" cultures where the attitude is that "if 
you caift stand the heat, get out of the kitchen! ". In other words, employees 
may accept a certain amount of violence as "part of the job" (Beale, Fletcher, 
Leather & Cox, 1998; Kopel & Friedman, 1997). 
People's ideas about, and tolerance of, violent behaviour varies widely. Some 
regard abuse and shouting as violence while, at the other extreme, some do 
not regard fighting as violence unless it involves a weapon or more than two 
people (Dickson et al., 1994b). Such differences of opinion inevitably affect 
employees' decisions about whether to report a particular event. Similarly, 
what they think their managers will regard as violence will also affect that 
decision, as highlighted by George (1993). Painter (1987) noted that 
employees within public services exercise a high level of tolerance towards 
those who abuse them at work, 
-citing such factors as unemployment, ill- 
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health, poverty, cuts in services, staff shortages and long queues as 
mitigating factors. Similarly, there is evidence that public house staff make 
allowances for the effects of alcohol, for special occasions, family 
circumstance or known character (Beale, Lawrence, Leather & Cox, 1997). 
In some service industries, employees might feel that taking further action 
would lose customers, particularly in areas with close-knit communities and 
strong family ties. 
Employees may be reluctant to report incidents for fear of reprisal, either 
from a violent customer or client, as already discussed regarding reporting to 
the police, or from other employees involved in the incident. This is especially 
salient where the aggressor is another employee. Research into bullying at 
work has cited this as a particular problem, because complainants are 
uncertain of how management will view their complaint (e. g. Quine, 1999; 
Rayner, 1997). 
Victims may also be uncertain of the correctness of their own conduct in an 
incident. As a social worker stated: "If you or a colleague have to deal with a 
violent client, iVs not clear whether you would bejustified in using physical 
violence to sort the problem out 
... 
It may not be possible to know whether or 
not you had used reasonable force until a case is heard before a court of law. " 
(George, 1993). 
All these causes of under reporting point to the importance of a supportive 
culture. that encourages mutual learning from problem occurrences rather 
than a condemnatory culture ofblame and recrimination. People will only 
report incidents if they feel safe to do so and if they feel they will get some 
benefilt from reporting. 
Reportingphenomena 
Many apparent trends seen in reporting of incidents may not reflect trends in 
the actual occurrence. Factors that can affect the number of incidents 
reported include awareness campaigns, widespread training about violence, 
changes in organisational structure, changes of personnel and changes of 
policy. Other factors that might affect reporting are increased media 
coverage of similar problems, civil and criminal court proceedings and 
changes in legislation. 
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Infor7nation on successful strategies 
Reporting systems usually only obtain information on situations where there 
has been a breakdown in acceptable behaviour and violence has resulted. 
They fail, in general, to gather information about situations that were 
potentially dangerous but were handled successfiffly and defused without 
violent outcome. Information of this type is essential in the design of effective 
organisational intervention strategies. Similar considerations apply in the 
reporting of accidents where the reporting of "near misses" gives insight into 
how accidents might occur and how they might successfully be avoided (van 
der Schaaf, Lucas & Hale, 1991). For this reason, some near misses are 
required to be reported under PJDDOR 95 as "dangerous occurrences". 
Reason (1991: 9) suggests that"while incident and accident reporting 
systems are a necessary part of any safety information system, they are, by 
themselves, insufficient to support effective safety management. The 
information they provide is both too little and too late for this longer-term 
purpose. " He suggests that incident reporting is the easy option in measuring 
the safety of staff, but is inadequate to inform proactive safety management. 
"Safety, like health, is a difficult notion to pin down and an even harder one to 
measure. By comparison, unsafe states (like diseases) are all too clearly 
signalled by fatalities, injuries, physical damage and financial losses. Each of 
these negative aspects readily translates into numbers of one kind or 
another. So should we not settle, as many organisations have, for assessing 
the relative safety of their various activities by the number and severity 
(actual or potential) of the incidents and accidents they sustain over a given 
period? " 
Pdzzo, Pasquia Di Nucci & Bagnara (2000) agree that many organisations 
take only a reactive approach to learning, based on the analysis of reports 
from accidents, incidents, and near misses. They consider this approach to be 
"too limited, too late, and too slow for supporting an efficient experience 
feedback7, and espouse "a proactive method tailored for introducing human 
factors in a safety critical company, which is based on a distributed 
knowledge view of the working processes". They claim that the method 
"stresses the positive face of safety" and "should allow a positive return of 
experience from the human practices". While such a proactive approach is 
much to be welcomed, and the practice of safety be positively reinforced in 
daily working, learning from those cases where things have gone wrong, to a 
lesser or greater extent, cannot be dismissed in this way. Good safety 
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practice utilises as many complementary sources of information as possible, 
optimising the benefits and recognising the limitations of each source. 
Good risk assessment takes account both of incidents that have occurred 
and of those that might occur. It is the potential for harm that must be 
anticipated and, if possible, eliminated (see, for example, Leather, Cox, Beale 
& Fletcher, 1998). Experienced staff commonly have insight into those 
situations , that could put them most at risk, often because they have been in 
such situations and felt that something almost went wrong, or would have 
gone wrong if one thing had been different. It is this insight that near miss 
reporting attempts to tap. 
Van der Schaaf (1991) describes the qualitative iceberg model, where actual 
accidents are the "tip of the iceberg" that has a much larger base made up of 
the numerous behavioural acts that constitute errors but are followed by 
recovery without an accident occurring, with the near misses in between. He 
suggests that near misses may provide an optimum between highly visible 
(and detectable) but rare accidents, and very frequent but almost invisible 
behavioural acts, and that they are therefore worthwhile collecting. An 
adaptation of this model forviolent incidents is given in Figure 2.1. 
Van der Schaaf (1991) points out that the utilisation of this model makes a 
number of assumptions. Adapted to the model for violence, these include that 
incidents progress from the bottom to the top, that is, from more minor 
behavioural acts to the serious aggressive actions that constitute a violent 
incident, so that the chances for preventing t6a violentincident decrease 
from bottom to top of the triangle. This accords with the model of escalation 
of aggressive incidents described in Section 1.2. It also assumes that both 
minor and serious incidents have similar origins and root causes. It would be 
appropriate, for example, when investigating violent arguments at a 
supermarket checkout, to examine any problems with customers at 
checkouts that have been resolved satisfactorily-, it is less likely to be 
appropriate when investigating armed hold-ups at supermarkets. 
A further assumption is that investigation will always try to get as far 
towards the bottom of the iceberg as possible and not stop at superficial 
descriptions of only the immediate events leading to a violent incident and its 
short term consequences. This accords with the theoretical perspective 
outlined in Section 1.2 which encourages examination of aspects of the social 
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Figure 2.1 A qualitative iceberg model of the relationships between violent 
incidents, near misses and behavioural acts (adapted from van der Schaaf, 
1991) 
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and physical environment and the normal working practices and procedures 
that could trigger aggression. 
In order for staff to be willing to report the minor incidents and the near 
misses, there has to be a supportive organisational culture, which 
encourages mutual learning, a high level of trust, and no fear of blame. 
Additionally, the number of incidents reported should not be used as a 
(negative) measurement of performance. Lucas (1991) points out that, for a 
near miss reporting system to work effectively, there must be assurance of 
anonymity, and/or forgiveness by management, and feedback of useful 
information to those supplying the reports. The Confidential Human Factors 
Incident Reporting Programme (CHIRP) run by the Royal Air Force Institute 
of Aviation Medicine, for example, depends on a guarantee of freedom from 
prosecution to encourage pilots to report the errors that might have led to 
accidents but had been recovered successfully (Lucas, 1991). 
Incidents that are reportable under RIDDOR 95 are well defined by their 
outcome in terms of injury. However, the boundaries between violent 
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incidents, minor incidents, near misses and behavioural acts that are 
potential precursors to violence are very ill defined. Effective systems have 
to be designed to encourage the reporting of events that cover as much of the 
range of incidents and behaviours as possible. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
Research using the reports of violent incidents compiled by an organisation, 
or across a particular industry, takes the middle ground between the broad 
brush of epidemiology and detailed psychological experimentation. The 
epidemiological approach of national reporting aims to categorise and 
quantify at a population level. The data demonstrate that there is a problem, 
and give some estimate of its extent, but they cannot provide sufflicient 
insight into the processes involved to suggest appropriate intervention 
strategies. At the other extreme, some insight into these processes can be 
obtained fi-om social psychological experiments but these often lack 
ecological validity and generalisability. 
Despite the acknowledged limitations of incident reporting systems, there is 
an abundance of information that can be obtained and used for organisational 
learning. There are also several pragmatic advantages in using incident 
reporting systems to study the nature of violent incidents. First, 
organisations are increasingly obliged to maintain such systems to comply 
with legal requirements. Secondthere maybe access to a large number of 
real incidents in a wide variety of locations. Third, each incident is reported 
soon after it occurs and potentially at a useful level of detail. 
Violent incident reporting and recording have been required since April 1996, 
under REDDOR 95. The following chapters describe work carried out using an 
incident reporting system, established and maintained by the author and her 
colleagues, which predated this requirement by eight years. The remainder of 
the thesis goes on to demonstrate that, if properly developed and explored in 
inventive ways, such a reporting system can be an invaluable learning tool 
within the wider system for obtaining information for risk assessment and 
risk management. 
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CELAPTER 3: ESTIMATING NUMBERS OF 
INCIDENTS 
Reporting systems essentially provide information concerning three aspects 
of violent incidents: the numbers of incidents occurring, the nature of 
incidents and the timing of incidents. These aspects are considered in this 
and subsequent chapters in relation to the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident 
Reporting System (EPP IRS) established and maintained by the author and 
her colleagues for the managed licensed premises owned by Allied Domecq 
Retailing (ADR). The 1KPP IRS operated between 1988 and 1998. The author 
worked on the reporting system from 1989 and had overall responsibility for 
developing the system from 1991. 
After outlining the operation of the 1KPP IRS, this chapter presents the 
numbers of incidents reported through the EPP IRS and then examines how 
accurately these reflect the numbers of incidents that actually occurred. It 
introduces a framework for assessing the accuracy of the reporting system 
as a diagnostic tool for the occurrence of violent incidents within licensed 
houses, and briefly describes two subsidiary studies utilised in this 
assessment. Finally, it explores the variation in the numbers of incidents 
reported according to their seriousness. The chapter also discusses some of 
the problems encountered in carrying out long-term research with a 
commercial organisation. 
The benefits and limitations of incident reporting systems have already 
been considered in Section 2.2. The acknowledged problem of 
underreporting of violent incidents to employing organisations (Section 
2.2.3) has to be expected in the licensed trade, as with other professions. 
This chapter discusses whether appreciable underreporting of violent 
incidents adversely impacted on the effectiveness of the incident reporting 
system as a diagnostic tool. It also examines the expectation that 
underreporting would be a lesser problem for serious incidents than for 
relatively minor incidents and, therefore, that the numbers of reported 
incidents that licensees regarded as serious would reflect more closely the 
number actually occurring than would the numbers of reported incidents 
regarded as minor. 
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3.1 THE KEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL INCIDENT REPORTING 
SYSTEM 
During the period covered by this study, Allied Domecq Retailing (ADR), the 
mqjor international food and drinks retailer, operated around 4500 licensed 
premises spread throughout England, Wales and Scotland. r1hese premises 
comprised a wide variety of public houses in terms of size, style, location 
and clientele. Approximately 2500 of these premises were run as managed 
houses, that is, the licensees and their staff were employees of the company. 
Initially, ADWs public house operation was organised through six semi- 
autonomous regional trading companies, but was reorganised in 1995 into 
two nation-wide trading companies according to the types of premises. 
Details are given in Appendix 2. 
The SEP Group worked with ADR from 1986 to 1999 to develop an 
integrated system to manage the problem of violence in their public houses 
as a risk to the health and safety of their staff. Following an initial violence 
audit, the SEP Group made a. mimber of recommendations including the 
establishment of an enhanced incident reporting system. The SEP Group 
designed and implemented the KPP IRS to facilitate the reporting of violent 
incidents that occurred in the managed houses of ADR. They maintained 
the system from 1988 to 1998.7he IKPP IRS, its history and its function 
within the integrated organisational strategy for ADR are described in 
detail in Appendix 2. 
When a violent, or potentially violent, incident occurred at an ADR 
managed house, the licensee was expected to contact the company and 
report the incident. After theP'rovision of any immediate assistance 
required, a regional security manager talked to the licensee either by 
visiting the premises, for a more serious incident, or by telephone, for an 
obviously minor incident. The regional security manager was responsible for 
completion of the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report Form (KPP IRF) 
either directly by the licensee, or by himself in consultation with the 
licensee and any other staff involved in the incident. A copy of the completed 
EPP IRF was sent to the Incident Report Centre at the University of 
Nottingham where data from the report forms were coded and analysed. 
Dissemination of results, and their implications for ADR, was via summary 
and focused reports for ADR management (see Appendix 1), response to 
specific queries for interrogation of the data, and incorporation of results 
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into the on-going training for licensees (Leather, Beale, Lawrence 
MaxweU, 1996). 
The definition of violence that was adopted for the reporting of incidents 
(Farnsworth, Beale & Cox, 1989) was: 
Any behaviour deliberately intended to damage staff or customers 
(or pub/brewery property) either physically or psychologically 
(through abuse or threat). 
This definition was intended to generate information about as wide a range 
of incidents as possible by focusing on behaviour rather than just on 
outcome, in contrast to RIDDOR 95, as discussed in Section 2.2. It was 
hoped that this would encourage licensees to report some "near misses", 
that is, potentially violent incidents that were managed successfully, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3 and explained in the leaflet circulated to licensees 
(see Appendix 3). The definition specifically included non-physical violence, 
in order to encourage a recognition of the importance of psychological 
damage as well as the more obvious physical iWury. It also included attacks 
on property as well as on people, since these can be closely associated, as 
discussed in Section 1.3.2. 
3.2 NUMBERS OF INCIDENTS REPORTED THROUGH 1KPP IRS 
r1he numbers of violent incidents reported through the IKPP IRS are given in 
Table 3.1. The wide variation in the numbers for the different years 
suggests that they cannot be taken to represent exactly the numbers of 
incidents actually occurring but that other explanations for this variation 
must be sought. The numbers can be seen to reflect, to some extent, the 
development of the system and organisational changes within ADR, which 
are explained in detail in Appendix 2. The numbers increased during the 
establishment of the system throughout the six trading companies of ADR 
between 1989 and 1991, then suffered a setback during 1991 due to the long 
term illness of a key security manager. Reporting increased in parallel with 
increased publicity and licensee training to reach and maintain a relatively 
stable state of 300-400 incidents per year between the beginning of 1992 
and the middle of 1995. 
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The disruption caused by the mqjor reorganisation of ADR in autumn 1995 
is reflected in the numbers for 1995, but the system was re-established at 
the beginning of 1996. The effect of an internal reporting system running in 
parallel from April 1996, following implementation of REDDOR 95, can be 
seen in the decline in numbers reported through the KPP IRS in 1997 and 
1998. EPP IRS was terminated in the summer of 1998 and incorporated into 
an enhanced reporting system internal to ADR. This fluctuation in the 
numbers over time serves to illustrate the dynamic nature of a reporting 
system, particularly within a widely dispersed organisation, and the 
dependence on factors other than simply the numbers of incidents actually 
occurring. 
Table 3.1 The numbers of incidents reported through EPP IRS by year of 
occurrence 
Year Number of 
reported incidents 
before 1989 163 
1989 91 
1990 138 
1991 112 
1992 374 
1993 398 
1994 308 
1995 232 
1996 316 
1997 250 
1998 101 
Total 2483 
The years 1992 to 1994, when both the system and the organisation were at 
their most stable, provided the optimum period for examining the numbers 
of incidents reported, estimating how those reflected the numbers actually 
occurring, and calculating the proportion of houses reporting and 
experiencing violent incidents. The numbers of managed houses within ADR 
for the three years were 2596,2380 and 2333. Table 3.2 gives a breakdown 
of the numbers of houses reporting incidents in each of those years. 
Incidents were reported by at least 283 (10.9% of managed houses), 300 
(12.6%) and 245 (10.5%) houses for the three years, giving an average of 
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Table 3.2 Numbers of incidents reported per house for each year 1992 to 
1994 
Number of houses Number of reported 
reporting incidents incidents 
Number of reported 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 
incidents per house 
1 224 242 210 224 242 210 
2 45 39 26 90 78 52 
3 10 12 7 30 36 21 
4 230 8 12 0 
5 122 5 10 10 
6 120 6 12 0 
Total 
uniclentified 
283 300 245 363 
11 
390 
8 
293 
15 
Total 374 398 308 
Table 3.3 Numbers of incidents reported per house for the 3-year period 
1992 to 1994 
Number of reported 
incidents per house 
Number of houses 
reporting incidents 
1992-1994 
Number of reported 
incidents 
1992-1994 
1 465 465 
2 133 266 
3 54 162 
4 13 52 
5 6 30 
6 3 18 
7 1 7 
8 1 8 
9 3 27 
11 1 11 
Total 680 1046 
unidentified 34 
Total 1080 
- 
;u- qjý 
11.3% per year. 'Ihe maximum number of incidents reported by any one 
house in any one year was 6. 
Over the three-year period 1992 to 1994,1080 incidents were reported, as 
shown in Table 3.3. Of these, 1046 were reported by 680 (27.9%) houses, 
while 34 occurred in houses that were not completely identified. The 
maximum number of incidents reported by any one house was 11 in the 
three years. On average, ADR managed houses reported 0.15 incidents per 
year. 
Probability ofstaffsustaining physical i? ýury 
For two of ADIVs regional trading companies, it was possible to make a 
rough estimate of the percentages of monthly paid staff (i. e. managers, 
assistant managers and relief managers) that sustained physical i1vury in 
reported incidents during 1992 to 1994. The figures are given in Table 3.4. 
The percentages in brackets refer to the individual results for the two 
trading companies, and are provided to illustrate the consistency across the 
companies. 
Table 3.4 IzVuries to montbly paid staff reported during 1992 to 1994 for 
two ADR trading companies. 
No. reported No. fuH time Percentage montWy paid 
Year Wuries to monthly equivalent monthly staff reportingi ' Umury 
paid staff paid staff (for the two separate 
trading companies) 
1992 101 2030 5%(5%, 5%) 
1993 108 1994 5%(6%, 5%) 
1994 61 1811 3%(4%, 3%) 
The percentage of monthly paid staff sustaining physical i 'ury in a IM 
reported violent incident in 1992 or 1993 was 5%, and in 1994 was 3%. 
Whether this was a real improvement of the situation or a change in 
reporting behaviour was difficult to determine. Extensive KPP training was 
talcing place within these two companies, so it is feasible that a real 
improvement did occur. Similar calculations for other staff were not possible 
because the casual and fluid nature of much of the workforce in the licensed 
trade prevented reliable numbers of employees being obtained. 
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3.3 EPP ERS AS A DIAGNOSTIC TOOL 
3.3.1 Accuracy of a diagnostic test 
It was important to assess the power of the KPP IRS as a means of 
quantifying the problem of violent incidents, in order to use the results 
properly in risk assessment. In medicine, particularly epidemiology, the 
accuracy of a diagnostic test for a disease or condition is assessed using the 
criteria of sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value and negative 
predictive value (Fletcher, Fletcher & Wagner, 1988). These are explained 
in Table 3.5. The different criteria assume greater or less importance 
according to the context in which the test is being selected or used, and the 
consequences for the patient of a positive or negative test result. This idea is 
developed further in Section 3.3.3. 
Table 3.5 Criteria for the assessment of diagnostic tests 
Criterion Meaning in medicine Meaning in relation to 
incident reporting 
Sensitivity Proportion of patients 
having the disease who 
tested positive 
Proportion of houses 
experiencing incidents 
that reported incidents 
Specificity 
Positive predictive 
value 
Negative predictive 
value 
Proportion of patients 
not having the disease 
who tested negative 
Proportion of patients 
testing positive who 
actually had the disease 
Proportion of houses not 
experiencing incidents 
that did not report 
incidents 
Proportion of houses 
reporting incidents that 
actually experienced 
incidents 
Proportion of patients Proportion of houses not 
testing negative who did reporting incidents that 
not have the disease did not experience 
incidents 
These criteria can be adapted for the assessment of incident reporting as a 
diagnostic test for the occurrence of violent incidents at a public house, as 
shown in Table 3.5. The public house was used as the unit for calculation of 
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these cziteria, and the grid shown in Table 3.6 was constructed. It should be 
noted that the incident cannot be used as the unit for this type of calculation 
because "the number of incidents that did not occur" is a meaningless 
concept. 
Table 3.6 Reporting as a diagnostic test for the occurrence of a violent 
incident at a particular venue 
Percentage of houses 
experiencing violent 
incident 
Percentage of houses 
not experiencing 
violent incident 
a b 
Percentage of houses Correct reporting Over-reporting 
reporting violent Known problem False problem 
incident (True positive) (False positive) 
C d 
Percentage of houses Under-reporting Reporting unnecessary 
not reporting violent Hidden problem No problem 
incident (False negative) (True negative) 
Sensitivity 
Percentage of houses 
Percentage of I 
a 
a+c 
ing incidents and 
Specificity 
Percentage of houses not 
Percentage of hoi 
d 
b+J 
Positive predictive value 
Percentage of houses e 
Percentage 
a i+b 
Negative predictive value 
Percentage of houses not 
Percentag 
d 
c+d 
incidents and not 
not 
iencing and reporting incidents 
ho, uses reporting 
and not reDortine incidents 
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For a perfect diagnostic test, the values of b (the false positive) and of c (the 
false negative) would be zero, and each of the four criteria be 1. However, 
few tests are perfect and incident reporting is no exception. 
In order to calculate these criteria, values for a, b, c and d need to be 
measured. The value of a+b is the percentage of houses reporting incidents 
through the incident reporting system. The value of b can be estimated by 
examination of the incident reports, and the value of a, therefore, can also 
be determined. 
As with medical diagnostic tests, information on the negative tests (non- 
reporting), whether true negative, d, or false negative, c, is much less 
complete than that for the positive tests (reporting). The value of c+d, the 
percentage of houses that have not reported incidents, is simply 100-(a+b). 
However, the problem comes in distinguishing whether a house not 
reporting any incidents should fall into cell d or cell c, that is, whether 
there was no problem and reporting was unnecessary, or whether there 
were incidents at the house but the licensee did not report, constituting a 
hidden problem (underreporting). One of the main dMiculties in 
determining the extent of underreporting is that the boundary between c 
and d is not clear cut because of varying perceptions of what constitutes an 
incident that warrants reporting. Subsidiary studies are generally required 
to explore these perceptions and the extent of underreporting. 
Underreporting was expected for the 1KPP IRS in common with most other 
incident and accident reporting systems, as discussed in Section 2.2.3. 
Direct evidence for underreporting came from two main sources. First, 
incident reports sometimes mentioned previous incidents at the house that 
had not been reported. Second, comments from licensees at EPP training 
workshops run by the SEP Group (see Appendix 2) revealed that some of the 
houses experiencing the highest numbers of violent incidents did not report 
any incidents because of the time taken by reporting. Other methods needed 
to be used to estimate the amount of underreporting and to explore 
licensees' perceptions of violence. Two studies, a questionnaire survey and a 
sampling study, were carried out by the author, and by other members of 
the SEP Group, in an attempt to quantify the amount of violence 
experienced in the licensed houses of ADR. 
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3.3.2 Questionnaire survey 
The survey Working in Public Houses: A Study of the Licensee's Job was 
carried out largely by other members of the SEP Group in 1994 (Dickson, 
Leather, Beale & Cox, 1994b). The author was involved only in the later 
stages of the study, that is, in cleaning up and analysing the data, and 
completing the final report. The survey was not designed specifically to 
evaluate the performance of the incident reporting system, rather, the 
questionnaire was developed following discussions with ADR personnel and 
a pilot study undertaken on licensees in the Nottingham and Derby region. 
The study is described briefly here. 
Questionnaires were mailed to the licensees of all 479 houses in the London 
area of ADR. Licensees were assured that the questionnaire was 
confidential and that individual responses would not be made known to 
anyone within the organisation. A stamped addressed envelope was 
included for the return of the questionnaire directly to the research team. 
242 questionnaires were returned, giving a response rate of 51%. Of the 
respondents, 76% were male and 24% female with ages ranging fi-om 20 
years to 62 years (M = 38, SD = 10). Total experience of working in the 
licensed trade ranged from 6 months to 32 years (M = 11, SD = 7), with 
tenure in the present unit ranging from 1 month to 17 years (M = 2.5, SD 
3). The distribution of pub category for the respondent licensees reflected 
the distribution of ADR pubs as a whole, almost half (48%) being broad 
based locals. 
Frequency of occurrence of aggressive incidents 
As a small part of that questionnaire, licensees were asked to indicate how 
often six different types of aggressive incident occurred in their public 
house. The results are given in Table 3.7. The most obvious result is that 
the frequency of occurrence of incidents decreased markedly as the physical 
component and use of weapons increased. In summary, the survey revealed 
that: 
55% of respondent licensees reported experiencing shouting or 
abusive language at least once a month; 
26% reported experiencing incidents of pushing and shoving at 
least once a month; 
11% reported experiencing fights without weapons at least once a 
month; 
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1% reported experiencing fights involving weapons at least once a 
month; 
only 6% of reporting licensees said that they had never 
experienced any of these types of incidents, but 32% had never 
experienced a fight. 
Licensees were also asked how often they faced physical attack fi-om their 
customers. Unfortunately, this wording of the question was somewhat 
ambiguous so that the results were felt to be unreliable and are not included 
here. 
Underreporting of incidents 
The licensees were asked whether incidents had ever occurred in their 
public house that they had not reported to ADR, and what the main reasons 
were for not reporting. 62% said they had failed to report incidents that had 
taken place. Typical examples of the reasons given are shown in Table 3.8. 
They mirror those found in other studies and discussed in Section 2.2.3, 
falling into six broad categories concerning the severity of incidents, 
perceived lack of support from the company, ability to handle the situation 
locally, handling violence being seen as part of the job, lack of knowledge 
about the system, and time constraints. 
Variation in definitions of violence 
A variation in views about what should be reported was evident in that 
some licensees used the criterion of no one being hurt ("Not considered 
major enough if someone pushed but not hurt"), others of no one needing 
hospital treatment ("Didn't feel necessary to report as no hospital cases"). 
To explore such variation, licensees were asked which of the six types of 
aggressive incident given in Table 3.7 best represented their own personal 
definition of violence. The responses were that: 
0 21% of the respondent licensees thought that abuse and shouting 
was violence; 
0a further 15% thought that pushing and shoving was violence; 
0a further 36% agreed that a one to one fight was violence; but 
0 14% required there to be a weapon or more than two people 
involved in a fight to regard an incident as violence. 
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Table 3.8 Reasons given by licensees for not reporting violent incidents 
'D- 
Iwason Examples 
Incident not "Not considered mqjor enough if someone pushed 
considered serious but not hurt" 
enough(37%) "Didn't feel necessary to report as no hospital cases" 
"Police not involved, no damage to property or 
injury caused" 
Lack of support from "No action would be taken" 
company perceived "A lot of talk, no real help" 
(20%) "Sometimes its not really worth telling the area 
manager, he's not really concerned about daily 
problems" 
"Because it happens so often you could not be 
bothered and they don't want to know anyway" 
"Definite feeling that [company] do not regard too 
many reports as a sign of positive management" 
"Seen by upper management as inability to control 
customers" 
Incident handled "Handled it myself' 
locally (13%) "Satisfied with own action" 
"Dealt with at time by people on site" 
"Usually sorted out without needing assistance" 
Dealing with violence "I feel that ejecting or asking customers whose 
considered as part of behaviour is unacceptable to leave is the Manager's 
the job (6%) responsibility" 
"Part and parcel of the job" 
"Doing what I am paid to do" 
Faulty understanding "Did not know I had to" 
of reporting system "I would not know who to report it to" 
(5%) "Don't think its necessary to report every incident 
to [the company] 
- 
report to area manager should be 
sufficient" 
Reporting too time "I would never be off the phone" 
consuming (4%) "Not worth the bureaucracy" 
Aclo 
- 
V. Q .
These results serve to illustrate the wide range of views about what 
constitutes violence, and the consequent difficulties of determining what 
should or should not be reported. 
To allow this exploration of licensees'perceptions of violence, the survey did 
not give the licensees the definition of violence used in the EPP IRS. This 
meant that the survey results could not be used as a direct measure of 
underreporting, that is as a direct measure of the value c in Table 3.5. r1he 
figure of 62% of respondents who had failed to report incidents is rather a 
high figure for several reasons: 
the question about failure to report was not related to any 
particular time period, but to any time in the past; 
it was not possible to tell what proportion of the licensees who 
said that they had failed to report an incident had reported other 
incidents; and 
the underreporting might relate mainly to the apparently milder 
forms of aggression given in Table 3.7, particularly since the 
question regarding underreporting followed closely the questions 
about the different types of incident. 
Consequently, the figure of 62% can be taken as above the maximum in a 
range of possible values for c. A minimum for the range can be roughly 
estimated if the fight is taken as the criterion for reporting. 30% of the 
licensees stated that they experienced at least 2 fights per year, so, at a 
conservative estimate, 30% of houses should have been expected to report 
incidents through 1KPP IRS in one year. This gives a minimum vale for a+c 
of 30%. 
Licensees were also asked how much they felt personally at risk fi-om 
violence. On a scale from 0 ("not at all at risk") to 50 ("extremely at risle), 
24% of respondents indicated that they felt highly at risk from violence, 
scoring 41-50, while 45% scored above the half-way point of the scale. 
Although this question did not ask about actual incidents, this 45% might 
be seen as a rough estimate of the percentage of licensees who felt there was 
a problem in their house, that is, as a rough estimate for the value of a+c in 
Table 3.5. Combining these three figures suggests a range for a+c of 
45*15%, i. e. 30-60%. The value of a (11%) is already known from the IKPP 
IRS , giving a range flor c of 19-49%. 
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3.3.3 Accuracy of EPP IRS as a diagnostic tool 
The above study and examination of the EPP IRFs allowed some 
assessment of the 1KPP IRS as a diagnostic tool using the criteria explained 
in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The corresponding grid for the KPP IRS is given in 
Table 3.9. The value of a+b, the total number of incidents reported, was 
taken as 11.3% directly from the 1KPP IRS (Section 3.3.1). Over-reporting, 
the false positive, b, might occur for two main reasons. First, licensees 
might be so sensitised by reports in the media or company publicity that 
they report trivial occurrences. Second, licensees might put in false reports 
in order to make fraudulent claims on the company or the insurance. In the 
absence of independent evidence that licensees were over-reacting or were 
making false claims, it has to be assumed that all reports were of real 
incidents. For the EPP IRS, few reported incidents appeared trivial and, in 
any case, people who were not present at an incident cannot make a valid 
judgement about how serious it was (see Section 5.2). In addition, security 
personnel have thrown doubt on the veracity of only a very small number of 
reports (3-5). Thus, the value of b can be taken as less than 0.5%, giving a 
value for a of approximately 11%. 
The value of c+d, the number of houses not reporting incidents, was the 
total number of licensed houses less the number reporting through KPP IRS 
(i. e. 89%). Underreporting, the false negative, c, was very roughly 
determined from the questionnaire study, probably in the range 19-49%. 
This lack of accuracy was caused by the interpretation of what ought to be 
reported (i. e. the boundary between c and d), and the shortcomings of the 
particular study. Taking c (19-49%) from c+d (89%) gives a value for d in 
the range 40-70%. 
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Table 3.9 EPP IRS as a diagnostic test for the occurrence of violent 
incidents at public houses in a one-year period 
Percentage of houses Percentage of houses 
experiencing violent not experiencing 
incident violent 'incident 
Percentage of houses a b 
reporting violent 11% <0.5% 
incident 
Percentage of houses C d 
not reporting violent -19-49% -40-70% 
incident 
Sensitivity 
Percen 
a 
a+c 
Specificity 
Percen 
d 
b+il 
of houses 
11 11 
60 ' 30 
incidents and rel 
iencing incident 
- 
. 
18 to 
. 
37 
age of houses not mexiench 
Percentage of houses not e3 
40 70 
40.5 w 70.5 
Positive predictive value 
Percentage of houses exDezý 
Percentage of 
a 11 
a+b 11.5 
Negative predictive value 
Percentage of houses not 
Percentage of hoi 
d 40 
to 
70 
c+d 89 89 = . 45 to . 79 
incidents 
The specificity and the positive predictive value of 1KPP IRS are seen to be 
very high, approaching unity. However, the sensitivity and negative 
predictive value are low. In clinical medicine, the purpose for which the 
diagnostic test is to be used determines which criterion is the most 
important. A test to be administered to a large number of people in order to 
identify everyone with an easily treatable disease needs to be highly 
incidents and not 
=. 99 
and 
=. 96 
ing and not 
s not reiDo. 
ts 
incidents 
-65- 
sensitive (e. g. a tuberculin skin test). On the other hand, a test which, if 
positive, leads to invasive treatment such as mqjor surgery or chemotherapy 
needs to be highly specific (e. g. tissue diagnosis) (Fletcher et al., 1988). Once 
a test has been selected for use, the predictive values are the more 
important criteria since those utilising the test need to know how much 
reliance can be placed on the results. 
The main purposes of the incident reporting system were: W to trigger help 
for staff involved in a violent incident, (ii) to record information about 
incidents for company records and for external reporting, (iii) to provide 
information for risk assessment, and (iv) to provide information to feed into 
the design of intervention measures. 
Assuming that ADR personnel acted correctly to provide help when an 
incident report came in, the KPP IRS was effective in its role of triggering 
help for those houses reporting that actually needed help (high positive 
predictive value) and not triggering help for those who did not need it (high 
specificity). However, it was not effective in triggering help for all those who 
did need it Oow sensitivity). 
In terms of recording incidents, the high positive predictive value of 1KPP 
IRS provided that those reported fi-om all houses were worth recording, but 
the low sensitivity meant that there were many houses not reporting 
incidents that should have been recorded. Whether this applied to the 
incidents that would have met the criteria for external reporting under 
RIDDOR 95, had it been in effect during the period studied here, is 
considered in the Section 3.4. 
For risk assessment, the high positive predictive value of 1KPP IRS 
determined that assessment made from the reported incidents, as in Table 
3.4, could be taken as a minimum level of risk. However, the low sensitivity 
means that there may be additional levels of risk that have not been taken 
into account by the KPP IRS. It is clear that assessment of risk should not 
rely on incident reporting alone. In addition to the problems from 
underreporting possibly underestimating the risks of physical harm, 
incident reports cannot capture reliable information on psychological harm. 
Further, the wide variation in the numbers of incidents occurring in 
different licensed houses suggests that risk assessment should be carried 
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out, in part, at a local level, taking the organisation-wide figures into 
account. 
3.3.4 Sampling study 
Although the questionnaire study (Section 3.3.2) provided some measures of 
exposure to aggression and violence, and of underreporting, it was obviously 
unsatisfactory as an evaluation tool for the KPP IRS. A sampling study was 
designed to obtain some more direct measures of underreporting and to 
access those incidents that licensees did not consider serious enough to 
report through the EPP IRS, in order to get a realistic picture of the day6to- 
day problems that some licensees had to deal with. This study was due to 
take place in autumn 1995, involving a representative sample of 20% of the 
licensed houses in the largest of the trading companies. Unfortunately, the 
mqjor reorganisation of ADR (see Appendix 2) occurred just as the study 
began and it had to be abandoned. Although the SEP Group made a number 
of further attempts to conduct the study, organisational considerations 
within ADR prevented it. However, a pilot study was carried out in autumn 
1996. Its results provide some insight into the occurrence and reporting of 
incidents, but it was on too small a scale to provide the figures, required to 
assess the accuracy of IKPP IRS as a diagnostic tool. 
A very simple incident diary was completed by a sample of licensees over a 
period of a fortnight, recording all incidents, whether minor or more serious, 
independently of company personnel. The study was designed to overcome 
some of the problems of incident reporting and questionnaire surveys in a 
number of ways: 
0 Information was requested about minor as well as serious 
incidents; 
0 Recording was simple, quick and for a limited time period; 
Reporting was completely independent of company personnel; and 
Incidents were recorded on the day they happened, enhancing the 
reliability of numbers and details given. 
Method 
0- Sample: Incident diaries were sent to an opportunistic sample of 20 ADR 
licensees known to the SEP Group through KPP training courses. 13 of the 
licensees completed and returned the diary, giving a response rate of 65%. 
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Materials: The incident diary was designed in the form of a "tick sheet", for 
each day of the study, that allowed licensees to record very quic1dy brief 
details of any aggressive or violent incident that occurred at their premises. 
A sample diary is given in Appendix 7. It included columns for recording the 
time of any problem incident, who was involved in the incident, types of 
aggressive behaviour, injury sustained, any weapons involved and whether 
the incident had been reported through the normal reporting procedure. The 
categories were chosen to mirror and combine those used in the incident 
reporting system and in the questionnaire survey described above. Further 
comments about the incident could be added on a separate sheet. 
Procedure. Licensees were contacted by telephone, the study was explained 
and their agreement to take part was obtained. All the licensees approached 
agreed to participate. 7hey were each sent a diary pack comprising a letter 
from the author, a dated 2-week incident diary, completion instructions (see 
Appendix 7) that included the IKPP definition of violence, a sample 
completed diary sheet (see Appendix 7), a comment sheet and a pre-paid 
return envelope. 
Each licensee, or a designated member of stafL completed the diary each 
day simply by noting the time of any incident that had occurred, ticking the 
columns that most nearly described the incident, noting any item used as a 
weapon and recording whether the incident had been reported through the 
formal reporting system. The diary was completed for a period of two weeks 
and returned directly to the author. Licensees were asked to return the 
diary whether there had been any incidents or not. A reminder letter was 
sent to licensees whose incident diary had not been received one week after 
the end of the study period. A letter of acknowledgement was sent to each 
licensee on receipt of the incident diary. 
Results 
The 13 houses experienced a total of 27 incidents in the 14-day period. 7he 
maximum number of incidents for any house was 7. The mean number of 
incidents per house was 2. The maximum number of incidents on one day in 
any house was 4. None of the incidents recorded by these houses in the 14- 
day period was reported to ADR through the KPP IRS. None of the incidents 
was reportable under RIDDOR 95. 
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The types of aggressive behaviour recorded are given in Table 3.10. Verbal 
abuse was the most common, being recorded for 20 of the 27 incidents, in 10 
incidents by itself and in 10 in combination with other types of aggressive 
behaviour. Threats were made in 8 incidents, in 4 of these in combination 
with physical aggression. Physical aggression occurred in 9 incidents 
including 2 attacks on staff, and there were also 2 fights. 2 reported 
incidents involved objects used as weapons, although neither was a 
recognised weapon. One was a bottle and the other a cup of coffee thrown at 
the glass front door. No ftýuries to members of staff were reported. 
Customers were iWured in 1 incident and property was damaged in 2 
incidents. 
This study demonstrated, as expected, that many more violent or aggressive 
incidents occurred in licensed houses than were reported to ADR. However, 
the mqjority of incidents (52%) recorded in the diaries involved verbal abuse 
or threat but not physical violence, which occurred in 33% of incidents, in 
general agreement with the results from the questionnaire survey of 
licensees (Section 3.3.2. ). However, the study was much too small to get a 
generalisable picture of the amount and type of violence and aggression 
actually occurring. A much larger incident diary study, involving many 
more licensed houses, would be needed to make any meaningftil estimate of 
the extent of underreporting through KPP IRS. 
Table 3.10 Types of aggressive behaviour reported during incidents 
rlýrpe of agUessive behaviour Number of incidents_ 
Verbalabuse 20 
Threat 8 
Pushing, shoving 7 
Physical attack on staff 2 
Physical attack on customers 0 
Physical attack on property 0 
Fight between 2 people 2 
Fight involving more than 2 people 0 
Not specified 4 
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3.4 REPORTING OF INCIDENTS BY SERIOUSNESS 
The previous section demonstrated that many houses were not reporting, 
through KPP IRS, incidents that fulfilled the EPP definition. Whether this 
applied to the incidents that would meet the criteria for external reporting 
under REDDOR 95 required further consideration. The two subsidiary 
studies demonstrated, as expected, that: 
licensed houses experienced higher numbers of incidents 
involving apparently less serious forms of aggression, such as 
verbal abuse, than of those involving physical violence or 
weapons; and 
there was appreciable underreporting of aggressive and violent 
incidents, the most frequent reason given being that the incident 
was not considered serious enough. 
The incident report form (KPP IRF) contained a simple measure of the 
seriousness of the reported incident, as assessed by the licensee or other 
members of staff involved in the incident. This measure comprised a score 
from 0 to 10, where 0 represents "trivial" and 10 represents "the most 
serious you could ever imagine". The distribution of seriousness scores given 
for incidents reported during 1992 to 1994 is shown in Figure 3.1. It shows 
an increase in numbers of incidents with increasing seriousness score up to 
the mid-point (5), then a general decline in numbers towards the highest 
scores. This pattern can be explained as the balance between the decrease 
in numbers of incidents actually occurring with increasing seriousness, and 
an increase in the likelihood of reporting'With increasing seriousness, the 
lower end of the scale being dominated by underreporting, and the higher 
end of the scale being dominated by the numbers of incidents actually 
occurring. These competing trends resulted in a maximum number of 
reports at the mid-point score. This suggests that numbers of incidents 
reported more closely mirrored the numbers of incidents actually occurring 
for serious incidents than for less serious incidents. The seriousness of 
incidents is discussed in detail in Section 5.2. 
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Figure 3.1 Numbers of incidents reported by seriousness score for 1992 to 
1994. 
150 
i oo 
0- 
50 
0 
Seriousness rating 
3.5 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has attempted to assess the usefulness of the incident 
reporting system in providing numbers of violent incidents and its accuracy 
in identifying those houses that have experienced violent incidents. For the 
period 1992 to 1994, the ADR managed houses reported a mean of 0.15 
violent incidents per house per year with a maximum of 6 incidents reported 
in any one house in one year. Around 11% of houses reported incidents each 
year. The percentage of monthly paid staff reporting physical injury 
sustained in a violent incident in each year was seen to be around 5%. 
A questionnaire study confirmed, as expected, the uneven distribution of 
incident frequency over different houses. This agrees with the 1987 survey 
of ADR licensees which found that the mEkjority of public houses experienced 
little violence on a regular basis, but that some licensees were working and 
living under threat of violence even if it did not always materialise as actual 
physical assault (Cox, Boot, Higgins & Hillas, 1988; Hillas, Cox & Higgins, 
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1988). Around 8% of premises reported experiencing violent incidents at 
least once a month. The results are also in accord with, for example, 
Macintyre and Homel's (1997) finding of "hot spots" within a holiday area of 
Australia, where 18% of nightclubs accounted for 64% of incidents, while 
41% of nightclubs experienced just 3% of incidents. 
'D- 
1wsults from the 1KPP IRS and the subsidiary studies demonstrated 
appreciable underreporting of violent incidents that had some adverse 
effects on the incident reporting system as a diagnostic tool. The selection of 
a diagnostic test should take into account its sensitivity and its specificity. 
The 1KPP IRS was seen to be highly specific but not very sensitive. However, 
it is necessary to consider whether there are practical alternative tests that 
would be any more sensitive. In medicine, clinicians use a combination of 
screening tests and more specific tests to detect the presence of disease. The 
investigation of the occurrence of violent incidents similarly needs to utilise 
a combinations of different methods to exploit the strengths, and 
compensate for the weaknesses, of each of the methods, as advocated in 
Chapter 2. 
Once a test is selected, knowledge of its predictive Power becomes key to its 
correct interpretation. For the KPP IRS, the positive predictive value was 
good, in that all reported incidents were seen to require some sort of 
assistance, support or investigation. Sometimes dissatisfaction was 
expressed by licensees at the response, or lack of response, from the 
company to the reporting of an incident. Lessons need to be learned by 
management in that every incident report is worth taking seriously. The 
negative predictive value for the EPP IRS was fairly low, indicating, as 
expected, a need to use other means of detecting a problem of violence 
within a public house. A sampling study such as that piloted within ADR 
could be expected to provide a better picture of day6to-day problems of 
aggression and violence, in terms of the number of incidents that occur. 
The demonstrated underreporting in the KPP IRS affected its ability to 
provide complete information for the assessment of risk. This supports the 
argument that incident reporting systems should not be used as the sole 
basis for assessing the risk to staff from violent incidents, as has often been 
found by, for example, Beale, Fletcher, Leather and Cox (1998). Incident 
reporting should be supported by other methods of assessing the amount of 
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violence occurring (Leather, Cox, Beale & Fletcher, 1998). However, the 
reporting system is useful in providing minimum values for the level of risk. 
In terms of the seriousness of incidents, the subsidiary studies 
demonstrated that many more apparently minor incidents occurred than 
apparently more serious ones. However, the KPP IRS did not receive 
greater numbers of reports of less serious incidents. The seriousness scores 
from the KPP IRS indicated that numbers of incidents reported reflected 
more closely the numbers actually occurring for serious incidents than for 
minor incidents. 
These studies demonstrated the benefits and the limitations of an incident 
reporting system in terms of estimating numbers of incidents occurring. The 
limitations were particularly marked in the KPP IRS because of the 
diversity and scattered nature of the individual licensed houses, and the 
semi autonomous nature of the regional trading companies. These also 
impacted on the ability of the SEP Group to carry out the subsidiary studies 
effectively. The combination of methods, however, has illustrated what 
might be achieved by such complementary studies. This combination of 
methods could be used internally by organisations to assess more accurately 
the numbers of incidents actually occurring and, thus, to enhance the 
effectiveness of their reporting system as a tool in risk assessment and risk 
management, rather than just as a means of meeting their strict legal 
requirements under RMDOR 95. 
The difficulties encountered with the subsidiary studies illustrate the 
problems of working with commercial organisations. Studies cannot always 
be as systematic as researchers would wish because commercial concerns 
are given a higher priority than such research. This is particularly marked 
when the research is conducted over many years in a fluid organisation such 
as ADR. Changes in organisational structure, in priorities and in personnel, 
as well as geographical spread, impinge on the researcher's ability to 
sustain systematic research. 
Despite the problems outlined in this chapter, the incident reports provide a 
rich source of information about the nature of violent and aggressive 
incidents. The following three chapters examine the features occurring in 
reported incidents and explore the incidents as developing situations. 
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CHAPTER 4: EXAMINING THE NATURE OF 
REPORTED INCIDENTS 
This chapter begins to examine the nature of incidents reported through the 
reporting system (KPP IRS) within ADR. First, it describes briefly the 
structure of the Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report Form (KPP IRF) and 
the scheme for coding the data. It then outlines the types of information 
collected on the report forms and gives frequency data concerning some of the 
most salient features so as to provide an overall picture of the incidents that 
occurred. It also introduces the treatment of an incident as a developing 
situation, in accordance with the theoretical model described in Section 1.2. 
This consideration of an incident as a dynamic process is elaborated in later 
chapters. 
4.1 TBE INCIDENT REPORT FORM 
4.1.1 Structure of the form 
The IKPP IRF requested information from the reporting licensee regarding a 
range of features of the incidents. Closed questions, often with "tick boxes" for 
the answers, were used when"hard"information was required. Open 
questions were also used, with prompts to elicit detailed descriptive 
information about the incident. The form, based on the pilot form devised by 
the SEP Group in 1988, was adapted progressively by the author to increase 
the clarity of the system and to accommodate changes in the law, changes in 
the types of incident, and requirements of the company. 7he final version of 
the KPP ERF is given in Appendix 5 and its evolution described in Appendix 2. 
The structure of the KPP IRF was based on the theoretical position outlined 
in Section 1.2, asking for information regarding the situation, the people, the 
progress of the interaction and the outcome. Further information related to 
action required and taken by the company after the incident had occurred. A 
imple diagrammatic description of the information requested is given in 
Figure 4.1. The main features considered in this chapter relate to the time, 
the setting, the staff involved, the assailants, contributory aspects such as 
weapons or drugs, what happened during the incident and the outcome of the 
mcident. 
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4.1.2 Coding scheme 
The original coding scheme for EPP IRS was derived by Cook and Cox (1988) 
from the early reports of violent incidents using content analytical 
techniques. While it was appropriate at the time, this type of scheme does 
not cater for the evolving character of a long term reporting system. As the 
database grew, it became increasingly clear that an unacceptable amount of 
information about the nature of incidents was being lost in the coding. 
Furthermore, it was difficult to fit some incidents to the coding structure. In 
1992, the author completely reconstructed the coding scheme. 
This new coding scheme, given as Appendix 6B, was designed to capture as 
much of the descriptive detail as possible by extensive use of dichotomous 
variables signifying the presence or absence of features. This approach 
produced a more flexible, and easily extendible, coding scheme that enabled 
any combination of features to be entered into the database for any incident. 
The final version of the scheme included 236 different variables. This coding 
also facilitated the retrieval of information about incidents with particular 
features, or combinations of features, to satisfy enquiries fi-orn ADR 
personnel, for example concerning the relative effects of bottles and glasses 
used as weapons, or the problems of staff going outside. Furthermore, the 
coding relied less on thejudgement of coders and provided data suitable for 
use in a wider range of statistical techniques (e. g. Pearson-Woodd, 1998). Me 
derivation of the coding scheme is described in Appendix 2. Inter-rater 
reliability for coding of descriptive information is considered in Section 6.2.3 
4.2 DESCRIFTIVE FREQUENCY INFORMATION 
The first section of this chapter presents straightforward descriptive 
frequency information regarding reported incidents, of the type obtained from 
conventional incident reporting systems. It is not the intention to include 
mute details of all the variables but to provide a general picture covering 
the main features of reported incidents. The fine detail is of greatest use when 
interrogating the database to obtain the answers to specific queries and in 
providing descriptive information for company reports. The whole range of 
variables was examined critically by Pearson-Woodd (1998) using a sample 
of 410 of the incident reports. The frequencies given here are based on the 
1983 incidents reported to the KPP IRS as occurring from the beginning of 
1992 until reporting finished in the summer of 1998. 
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4.2.1 Timing 
The timings of reported incidents were examined in order to identify patterns 
that could assist in predicting the most likely times for incidents to occur. The 
simple frequencies over time are given here. A more complex pattern in 
timings is explored in Chapter 7. 
The only pattern that emerged regarding the months in which reported 
incidents occurred involved an increase around the Christmas period. Such 
an increase is generally expected by licensees. It was attributed by one 
member of ADR staff both to an increase in numbers of customers and to 
people unaccustomed to drinking much alcohol consuming more than usual 
at celebratory occasions. 
The distribution of reported incidents over the days of the week is shown in 
Figure 4.2. Almost two thirds of the incidents (64%) occurred at the weekend, 
that is, on Friday, Saturday or Sunday. Tuesday and Wednesday were the 
days on which the fewest incidents occurred. 
Figure 4.2 Days of the week on which reported incidents occurred (N = 1980) 
Sunday 
Monday 
Tuesday 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
Friday 
Saturday 
Number of reported incidents 
3 
Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of reported incidents over the hours of the 
day. Few incidents occurred between 2am and 3pm. During the afternoon and 
evening hours, the numbers of incidents increased steadily, rising sharply 
after 6pm and again after 9pm, to reach a peak between 10pm and midnight. 
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After midnight, numbers decreased dramatically. These timings were 
obviously determined to some extent by public house licensing hours, which 
most commonly were 11am to 11pm (12 noon to 10.30pm on Sundays) 
although there were regional variations, such as public houses staying open 
until midnight in Scotland. Many nightclubs stayed open until 2am and any 
public house could apply for an extension of opening hours for special events. 
rMese patterns in timings were not unexpected. Salminen (1997,1998), for 
example, noted an increased risk of work-related violence occurring in Finland 
during weekend nights and linked this to the consumption of alcohol. He found 
that the most hazardous time for assaults at work was 1 Ipm- lam on Friday 
and Saturday nights. Additionally, he noted that leisure time incidents were 
more common than work ones on F6day, Saturday and Sunday. Both these 
findings are likely to be affected by violence connected to drinking in licensed 
premises. 
Figure 4.3 'nmes of day at which reported incidents occurred (N = 1944) 
midnight to lam 
lam 
- 
2am 
**2am 
-1 lam 
1 lam 
- 
l2noon 
12noon 
-1 pm 
lpm 
- 
2pm 
V 2pm - 3pm 
3pm 
- 
4pm 
4pm 
- 
5pm 
5pm 
- 
6pm 
6pm 
- 
7pm 
7pm 
- 
8pm 
8pm 
- 
9pm 
9pm 
- 
lopm 
lopm 
- 
llpm 
1 pm 
- 
midnight 
Number of reported incidents 
** 9-hour period 
72 
68 
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The concentration of incidents around closing time is illustrated in more detail 
in Figure 4.4. In public houses, licensees call "last orders" a few minutes 
before closing time, to give customers adequate warning that serving is soon 
to finish, and then call "time" when they have to close the bar and stop 
serving. In law, customers are then allowed 20 minutes to finish their drinks 
and to leave the premises. It is the licensee's responsibility to ensure that 
this occurs, with his or her licence being put at risk of revocation by serious 
non-comphance. In practice, most public houses are dear of customers 
within 30 minutes of closing time. The two processes of satisfying the 
demand for final drinks and clearing the premises, when customers are 
reluctant to stop drinking and leave, can be problematic for licensees and 
their staff. Figure 4.4 shows that 3 1% of the incidents, for which the timing 
in relation to closing could be determined, occurred around closing time, that 
is, within a period of about 45 minutes. Of these, the majority occurred after 
time but while customers were still on the premises. The most obvious thing 
that marks out the time around closing is the change in the tasks to be 
carried out by the staff, from serving customers to finishing serving and 
clearing the premises. This change in task inevitably changes the 
relationship, or interaction, between the staff and customers from service to 
control, so introducing one of the risk factors for work-related violence cited 
by Poyner and Warne (1986,1988). 
Figure 4.4nming of reported incidents in relation to closing time (N = 1871) 
While clearing after time While pub closed (57) 
all customers gone (48) \4 
After time, customers 
still present (398) '%ý 
While open, within 
15 mins of closing 
time (190) 
KNI, 
hile open, well before 
)sing time (1178) 
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4.2.2 Settings for reported incidents 
Reported incidents occurred in all types of licensed premises, including locals 
(44%), young people's venues (21%), pool-based venues (18%) and quality 
branded premises (15%). Even houses specifically catering for families 
experienced a small number of incidents. The most common category 
occurring in incident reports was the local, but this reflected the much larger 
numbers of locals than of other categories within ADR. Comparative rates 
by category cannot be given because the numbers of houses in each category 
fluctuated considerably throughout the study period. 
The mE-kjority of reported incidents (62%) began in the bar areas, 14% 
occurred outside the pub, in the garden or car park, 9% occurred in a room or 
area used for playing pool or other games, and 4% occurred in the entrance or 
hallway. Although relatively few incidents (2%) occurred in the toilets, those 
incidents sometimes involved vicious attacks hidden from public view. A 
small number of reported incidents occurred off the premises, particularly 
when members of staff were banking the takings. The overall pattern is 
shown in Figure 4.5. 
Figure 4.5 Areas where incidents occurred (N = 1929) 
Other areas (116) 
Toilets (38) 
Hallway or entrance (86)., 
ý 
Pool or games 
area (175) 
Outside: in car park 
or garden (280) V-1 Bar areas (1234) 
For 66% of incidents, all occurring while the pub was open, information was 
given about the state of crowding in the pub at the time of the incident. Of 
these cases, 60% occurred when the pub was considered to be crowded and 
40% when it was not crowded. It has to be remembered, however, as 
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Macintyre and Homel (1997) pointed out, that crowding is a function of the 
physical layout of the premises as well as of the density of customers, such 
that certain areas produce increased customer contact because of 
competition for space or movement. The incident reports rarely give 
sufficiently detailed information to access this level of detail about crowding. 
4.2.3 People involved in incidents 
Members ofstaff 
The approximate ages of the members of staff involved in incidents are given 
in Figure 4.6; 60% were aged above 30. Where the gender of the member of 
staff was given, 75% were male and 25% female. 
Figure 4.6 Approximate age of member of staff involved (N = 1442) 
4) a= under 21 
6.21 
21 
-25 0 
E <0 
. -0 
26-30 
xE 31 
-40 Q- E CL Z 
-< 0 over 40 
Number of reported incidents 
482 
The jobs of the members of staff involved in incidents are shown in Figure 4.7. 
The great preponderance of licensees over other staff occurred largely 
because they were often called by more junior members of staff when 
problems arose. However, it became clear during coding that the 
demographic information on the KPP IERFs frequently related to the reporting 
licensees even though they had not been the people most directly involved in 
the incident. This occurred despite specific directions being given to those 
responsible for completing KPP IRFs. The information regarding members of 
staff was therefore deemed to be unreliable and was not used in further 
analyses. 
Assailants 
As shown in Figure 4.8,45% of the reported incidents involved a single 
assailant, 28% involved two or three assailants, and a further 27% involved 
four or more assailants, including 9% that involved ten or more assailants. 
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Figure 4.7 Job titles of members of staff involved in reported incidents 
(N 
= 
1641) 
Spouse, relative 
or friend (51) Other(24) 
Door staff (97) 
a 
Bar staff (148) 
'**, A 
Assistant manager 
(105) 
Relief manager 
(148) 
Licensee: manager 
or retail partner (1068) 
Figure 4.8 Number of assailants involved in incidents (N = 1928) 
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Figure 4.9 shows that, for incidents where the information was given, the 
main assailant was reported to be a regular customer in 27% of incidents, a 
non-regular customer in 55%, and a previously barred customer in 15%. In 
1% of incidents, the main assailant was reported to be a member of staff and, 
in a further 1%, to be an ex-member of staff. 
Figure 4.9 Relationship of main assailant to the premises (N= 1731) 
Ex member of staff (17) 
Member of staff (20) Family or friend (2) 
Previously barred 
customer (259) 
I_jw 
Regular customer (476) Non regular 
customer (957) 
For main assailants whose age was known or estimated, 78% were under 31 
years of age. The spread of ages is illustrated in Figure 4.10. While it has to 
be acknowledged that these estimates might be affected by stereotyping (e. g. 
Lindholm & Christianson, 1998a), the overall pattern is heavily weighted 
towards people in their twenties. The vast maýority of main assailants were 
men; only in 7% of incidents was the main assailant a woman. 
Figure 4.10 Estimated age of main assailant (N = 1682) 
M- under 21 0 16-0 0. C 
21 
-25 
-a «5 26-30 
Ec 31 
-40 
over 40 
Number of reported incidents 
583 
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These profiles of assailants tie in with the findings ofHomel, Tomsen and 
Thommeny (1992) that the presence of several groups of males increased the 
risk ofviolence occurring. In addition, Langley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996), 
in New Zealand, found that the proportion of the population hospitalised after 
being involved in assaults in licensed premises was much higher for males 
(14.3 per 100,000 persons per year) than for females (0.9 per 100,000 
persons per year). In addition, hospitalisation rates peaked for people in their 
mid-20s (at around 25 per 100,000 persons per year). While these figures do 
not relate specifically to assailants, they do relate to those involved in violent 
incidents. Bjorkqvist, Osterman and Lagerspetz (1994) emphasised that 
adolescent boys used physical aggression more than adolescent girls, 
whereas adolescent girls used indirect means of aggression more than 
adolescent boys. 
In 20% of incidents the main assailant was reported to be drunk. This is 
undoubtedly an underestimate as no specific question was asked about 
drunkenness until 1995. There was a deliberate decision not to ask this 
question in the early days of the incident reporting system because the 
relationship between violence and alcohol was then a sensitive issue with 
people in the licensed trade whose business was to sell alcoholic drink. 
4.2.4Weapons 
In 54% of reported incidents, a weapon of some kind was known to have been 
involved in the incident, used either as a threat or in a physical attack. In 
68% of incidents that did involve a weapon, ordinary objects obtained from 
the pub were used, typically glasses, bottles, finmiture; ashtrays and pool 
equipment, as shown in Figure 4.11, although objects as unlikely as potted 
plants, a mop bucket and a warming pan were used on occasion. In 37% of 
these incidents, it was reported that the assailants arrived at the premises 
intentionally armed with, for example, knives, guns, iron bars, baseball bats, 
CS gas, even a snake, or that they used vehicles or vehicle accessories such 
as ajack or a steering lock. Mie origins of weapons used are shown in Figure 
4.12. A full list of weapons involved in incidents is given as Appendix 9. 
4.2.5 Drug involvement 
A question regarding the involvement of drugs was introduced in 1992, 
following the increased concern within the industry about the use of licensed 
premises for drug-related activity (see Section 1.4). For the 1815 incidents 
whose report forms included a question about the involvement of drugs, 24% 
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Figure 4.11 Weapons involved in incidents (N 
= 
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Figure 4.12 Origin of weapons used (N = 1055) 
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were known or suspected to involve drug-related activity. Indications of drug 
involvement were that assailants appeared "high", were caught using drugs 
on the premises, were known users or known dealers or were involved with 
gangs known to deal in drugs. A small number of incidents involved the use of 
prescribed drugs which should have precluded the drinking of alcohol. 
Responses to the questions are depicted in Figure 4.13 and Table 4.1. 
Figure 4.13 Answers to questions relating to the involvement of drugs (N 
1815) 
Known involvement 
of drugs (415) N% 
Possible/suspected 
involvement (22) -00' 
Not known/ 
not sure (53) 
V-1 
ýo drug involvement 
3uspected (1263) 
Table 4.1 Answers to questions about the involvement of drugs (N = 1815) 
Answer Numbers of incidents 
No involvement 
Not known/not sure 
Total suspected or known: 
Possible Isuspected involvement 
Involvement (no details) 
Assailant appeared 'high' 
*Known user involved 
*Known dealer involved 
Person caught using drugs on premises 
Person had possession ofdrugs 
Evidence of use found on premises 
Member ofgroup involved in drugs 
Local problem 
Repercussions fi-om "clean-up" 
Prescribed drugs involved 
Other 
22 
23 
191 
100 
64 
42 
4 
6 
8 
23 
3 
12 
24 
No answer given 62 
"Known" did not necessarily mean known to staff prior to the incident. 
1263 
53 
437 
-86- 
Not stated (62) 
4 
4.3 THE INCIDENT AS A PROCESS 
In accordance with the theoretical model described in Section 1.2, which sees 
an aggressive incident as an escalating process, it was appropriate to explore 
the analysis of incidents as developing situations. The descriptive accounts 
given in the incident reports were not detailed enough to pick out every 
individual action, but they could be examined at a coarser level of granularity 
that provided information about the overall temporal structure of incidents. 
The variables were grouped according to the stages of initiation, development, 
culmination, ending and continuation after exiting. Satisfactory inter rater 
reliability for the coding of these variables was demonstrated, as will be 
explained in Section 6.2.3. 
4.3.1 Wtiation 
The events that initiated violent incidents are summarised in Figure 4.14 and 
given with more detail in Table 4.2. Only 8% of reported incidents were 
obviously pre-planned criminal activity, such as armed robberies or 
assailants coming in looking for victims. 
Figure 4.14 Events involved in initiation of reported incidents (N = 1983) 
Customer misbehaviour 
Conflict bet'n customers 
Planned attack 
Barred customer entering 
Misbehaviour re closing 
Argument customer/staff 
Repercussions 
Immediate attack 
Accident or misunderst'ng 
Argument between staff 
No obvious cause 
Number of reported incidents 
794 
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Table 4.2 Behaviour that initiated reported incidents (N = 1983) 
Initiating event Numbers of incidents 
Customer misbehaviour 
Abusive language 
Rowdy behaviour 
Annoying other customers 
Being intentionallyprovocative 
Attempting to steal 
Throwing things around 
Attempting toget behind bar or into private 
areas 
Interfering with equipment 
Caught using drugs 
Indecent behaviour 
Refusal to pay 
Other misbehaviours 
794 
262 
155 
iso 
87 
83 
76 
72 
Misbehaviour related to closing 
Rffiaing to drink up Ileave 
Demanding service after time 
Barred customer entering premises 
Conflict between customers 
Domestic Ifamily arguments 
Argument overpool 
Arguments over man/ woman Outside argument brought in 
Conflict between separate groups 
Racial conflict 
Conflict between rivalgangs 
Conflict between regulars & non-regulars 
Conflict between families 
Conflict between rival football fans 
Arguments involving members of staff 
Related to service 
Between 2 or more members ofstaff 
Pre-planned attacks 
Planned robberies /break-ins 
Assailant looking forparticular victim 
Repercussions from previous incidents 
Attack immediate on entering premises 
Accident or misunderstanding 
151 
155 
623 
49 
42 
29 
28 
110 
110 
51 
65 
55 
50 
48 
32 
30 
17 
17 
12 
8 
154 
140 
14 
165 
100 
65 
130 
75 
42 
No obvious cause 147 
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Most incidents started as the type of customer misbehaviour or argument 
that is encountered by many pub staff on a regular basis. This balance of 
incidents supports the adoption of the model of a violent incident as an 
escalating process when examining violence in a public house setting. A 
variety of misbehaviours on the part of customers was reported in the initial 
stages of 48% of incidents. These misbehaviours included, for example, 
refusing to co-operate at closing time, using abusive language, being rowdy, 
attempting to steal and refusing to pay, and are detailed in Table 4.2. A 
barred customer entering the premises initiated 8% of the incidents. 
Arguments or fights between customers initiated 31% of incidents. Details of 
the apparent cause of the argument, where this was known, are given in 
Table 4.2. Arguments between customers and members of staff, generally 
concerning service, preceded 7% of incidents while less than 1% involved 
arguments between two or more members of staff. 7% of incidents were 
stated to be direct repercussions from previous incidents at the premises, 
involving either the same people or their associates. For 7% of incidents, the 
licensee could see no obvious reason for the incident to have occurred. 
4.3.2 Development 
As incidents developed from the initial argument or misbehaviour, staff were 
reported to have intervened in 46% of incidents. Many of the interventions 
were unspecified, but some specific actions are itemised in Table 4.3. The 
most frequently recorded actions were requests to leave, which immediately 
preceded more violent behaviour in 28% of cases, and refusal of service, 
which was involved in 11% of incidents. Physical attack that followed was 
often directed towards the member of staff intervening or towards property. 
It is not often possible to infer from the incident reports whether staff 
intervention was sensitive or heavy6handed. 
4.3.3 Culmination 
Common events that happened at the climax of incidents are shown in Figure 
4.15. The most common form of physical violence, reported in 50% of 
incidents, was an attack on members of staff. Attacks on property occurred 
in 31% of incidents and attacks on customers in 26%. In 13% of incidents, the 
assailant made an attack while being ejected, having made no physical 
attack up to that point. Fights were reported in 23% of incidents, threats 
were recorded in 15% and verbal abuse in 14%. It might be supposed that the 
amount of verbal abuse recorded here is lower than in reality because people 
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Table 4.3 Interventions by members of staff (N = 918) 
_Action 
taken by staff 
Numbers of reported 
incidents 
Request to leave 563 
Barred c us tomer 104 
Refusal of service 211 
Barred customer 83 
Present behaviour 90 
Previous behaviour 19 
Underage customer 19 
Informing customers they were barred 41 
Refusal of entry 37 
Figure 4.15 Culmination of incidents (N = 1983) 
Attack on staff 
Attack on property 
Attack on customers 
Fight 
Threats 
Verbal abuse 
Attack during ejection 
Immediate attacK 
Assailant forced way in 
'Free for all' 
Assailant went berserk 
Accidental injury/damage 
Fire 
982 
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reporting incidents tended to concentrate on the more severe forms of 
aggression, such as physical attack, when describing what occurred. The 
type of physical attack, that is kicking, punching, head-butting, etc., was not 
specified sufficiently often in the description of the incidents to provide useful 
statistics. 
4.3.4 Ending 
The most common events that brought incidents to an end, shown in Figure 
4.16, were that the assailants left (42%) or were ejected (18%), the police 
arrived (25%), or the assailants knew that the police had been called (12%). 
Other factors mentioned as contributing to the ending of an incident were the 
assistance of customers, calming of assailants, the detaining of assailants 
until police arrived, escape of staff from the situation, injury to staff or 
customers and injury to the assailant. Descriptions of what brought an 
incident to an end were often unclear, and the information was thought not to 
be reliable enough to be used in analysis. It is included here for completeness. 
Figure 4.16 What brought the incident to an end (N = 1889) 
Assailant left 
Police arrived 
Assailant ejected 
70 
Police called 
Customers assisted 
Assailant calmed 
Assailant detained 
Number of reported incidents 
795 
4.3.5 Continuation 
In 25% of cases, the incident did not end when the assailants went outside or 
were ejected. The continuing actions are shown in Figure 4.17. In 9% of cases, 
the assailants attacked the outside of the building following ejection and, in 
5%, fights continued outside. In 12% of cases, the assailant returned later, 
sometimes bringing other people or additional weapons and, in a small 
number of cases, staff received threats following incidents. 
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Figure 4.17 Continuing action after assailants exited the premises (N = 1983) 
C: Assailant returned later 
After-attack on premises 
Fight continued outside 
Threats made after incident 
4.4 THE OUTCOME OF INCIDENTS 
As has been discussed in Section 2.2.3, incident report systems are generally 
effective in recording physical injury and damage to property, but not 
psychological injury. While the KPP IRF included the category "upset" in the 
question about type of injury, this only captured a small amount of the 
psychological harm incurred. The outcomes given here relate only to physical 
injury. 
4.4.1 Injuries 
Physical injury was caused to at least one person in 70% of reported 
incidents. The numbers of people injured are shown in Figure 4.18. Employees 
were injured in 49% of reported incidents, customers in 28%. In addition, 
police were reported to have been injured in 6 incidents. 
Figure 4.18 Numbers of people injured in reported incidents (N = 1983) 
1 
0 
0- 
02 
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4 
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0 200 400 600 800 
Number of reported incidents 
966 
1000 
-92- 
0 100 200 300 
Number of reported incidents 
At least 1952 people were known to have been injured in the 1983 reported 
incidents that occurred between 1992 and 1998, that is an average of around 
1 person per incident. In addition, unspecified numbers of customers were 
nVured in 22 incidents. Table 4.4 gives a breakdown of the persons injured in 
terms of their relationship to the licensed house, and their gender. 
Both men and women were seen to be injured in violent incidents. 
Approaching a quarter (23%) of the employees injured were women, as were 
11% of the customers for whom the gender was stated. 
Table 4.4 Numbers of people physically Mijured in reported incidents 
(N 
= 
1983) 
Gender 
Joblrole Male Female Unspecified Total 
Employees 
Customers 
929 
535 
284 
77 
19 
99 
1232 
711t 
Police 0099 
Total 1464 361 127 1952t 
t In addition unspecified numbers of customers were injured in 22 incidents 
Almost half the reported incidents (49%) resulted in iWury to members of 
staff, 27% in iWury requiring medical attention and 6% in-patient treatment. 
Many employees suffered multiple injuries as a result of assaults. Almost 
three quarters of the incidents, (74%) resulting in employee iWury produced 
irVuxies to the face, and half (54%) produced iWuries to the head. Areas of the 
body irVured are shown in Figure 4.19. A similar pattern was found for 
customer injuries. This finding ties in with that by Langley, Chalmers and Mi 
Fanslow (1996) who studied the victims of assault presenting at hospital 
emergency departments in New Zealand. They found that homicides and 
assaults around licensed premises were more likely to involve head ixVury 
than those that occurred in other locations. Strom's (1992) study of assaults 
reported to the police in Sweden, nearly half of-which occurred in places of 
public entertainment, found that almost three quarters of iWuries were to the 
head and neck, particularly to the left side of the face. 
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Figure 4.19 Area of body injured for employees (N = 1983) 
Face 
Head & neck 
>1 
-0 Arms & hands 0 
-0 %a- Trunk 
Legs & feet 
Number of reported incidents 
4.4.2 Damage to property 
Damage to property was reported in 60% of incidents. Such damage ranged 
from breakage of a few glasses to damage so extensive that individual items 
were not specified, for example, "entire lounge area damaged", "pub 
ransacked". The most frequently damaged items were glasses (17%), clothing 
(15%), windows (15%), furniture (9%) and doors (5%). 
4.5 THE SERIOUSNESS OF INCIDENTS 
As already mentioned in Section 3.4, the KPP IRF asks the respondent to 
rate how serious the incident was on a scale of 0-10, where 0 was "trivial" and 
10 was "the most serious you could ever imagine". This scale was chosen 
because it is a means of scoring familiar to most people. Further, it could be 
easily explained over the telephone and did not rely on a visual scale. 7be 
seriousness score gives a crude assessment of the severity and importance of 
the incident as appraised by those members of staff actually involved in it. 
Its usefulness and its limitations are considered in detail in Section 5.2. 
80% of incidents were scored in this way. The pattern for the whole period 
1992 to 1998 remained similar to that seen previously for the period 1992 to 
1994, showing an increase in numbers with increasing seriousness score up 
to the middle of the scale, then a general decrease going towards higher 
scores. The mean rating was 6.3, the median 6. The responses are shown in 
Figure 4.20. 
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Figure 4.20 Seriousness ratings for reported incidents (N = 1583). 
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4.6 DISCUSSION 
This chapter has provided a general overview of some of the features of 
incidents reported through the KPP IRS and has begun to consider their 
dynamic nature. Only 8% of incidents were planned criminal attacks. The 
great mRjority involved the behaviour of customers during normal drinking. A 
picture of typical incidents can be built up. 
The majority of incidents occurred at the weekend, half occurred late in the 
evenings, between 10pm and midnight, and the majority when the premises 
were crowded. The times of highest frequency fit with the busiest times most 
for public houses so this type of pattern would be expected simply on an 
incident to customer ratio basis. In addition, the socialising in groups that is 
so important for young people tends to occur particularly on weekend 
evenings (Engels, Knibbe & Drop, 1999; Felson, Baccaglini & Gmelch, 1986), 
so increasing the likelihood for group effects and inter group rivalries to come 
into play (Mummendey & Otten, 1993). This view is reflected in the fact that 
59% of incidents involved groups of men, and 18% mixed groups. When groups 
were involved, only those people who actually became aggressive were 
counted as assailants. Indeed, on occasion, other members of a group brought 
incidents to an end by calming or removing the person acting aggressively. 
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However, the involvement of groups is demonstrated in that over half the 
incidents involved more than one assailant or aggressor, and over a quarter 
involved four or more. The profiles of the assailants also reflected the 
involvement of people in their twenties. In two thirds of incidents the 
estimated age of the main assailant was between 21 and 30 years and the 
vast mqjority were male. In addition, more than half the main assailants 
were non-regular customers. These characteristics of assailants are in 
agreement with the findings of Felson, Baccaglini and Gmelch (1986) in Itish 
and American bars. 
The other factor affecting late evening is, of course, that the premises close 
and the customers have to leave. Almost one third of the reported incidents 
occurred around closing time, that is, within a pexiod of about 45 minutes. 
The tasks for the staff change at this time from serving customers to 
clearing the premises. The task for some customers may also change 
- 
to 
drinking as much alcohol as possible before leaving and trying to stay on the 
premises for as long as they can (Hillas, Cox & I-Eggins, 1988). This 
alteration in the relationship between the staff and customers is a ready 
source of conflict which requires careful managing (Leather, Beale, Lawrence 
& Maxwell, 1996). 
r1he amount of alcohol consumed by late evening is also likely to influence the 
possibility of conflict occurring and people reacting aggressively at that time 
(e. g. Murdoch, Pihl and Ross, 1990; Pemanen, 1991). In addition to the 
alcohol legitimately consumed, however, drugs were also thought or 
suspected to be affecting the behaviour of around 15% of main assailants. In 
total, around a quarter of incidents were known or suspected to involve drug- 
related activity of some kind. As discussed in Section 1.4, drugs provide 
danger for licensed house staff both in the unpredictability of the behaviour of 
people under the influence ofdrugs and in the likelihood of disputes occurring 
around drug dealing activity. This involvement of illegal drugs was seen to 
increase over the period of study. Indeed, it did not appear as an issue when 
the initial violence audit was carried out in 1987, and was not introduced to 
the EPP IERF until 1992. 
Almost half the reported incidents (48%) began as some kind of misbehaviour 
by customers. Sometimes this involved obviously illegal behaviour, such as 
stealing or using drugs on the premises. More often it involved behaviour that 
was deemed inappropriate by the staff, that is it broke the norms for 
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behaviour in those premises, for example by using abusive language or being 
too rowdy. Norm violation is one of the precursors to aggressive behaviour 
most often cited in the literature (see Geen, 1990; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993) 
including within licensed premises (Felson, Baccaglini & Gmelch, 1986). It 
provides a difficult problem for staff to manage because of the necessity to 
challenge the behaviour in some way, and the differences in perceptions of 
what constitutes acceptable behaviour. 
Around a third of incidents (3 1%) began as conflict between customers. 
Arguments involving close relationships, either within families or concerning 
a boyfriend or girlfriend, were common. Other conflict concerned "rules of the 
game" as in the playing of pool, or involved inter group differences such as 
regulars versus non-regulars, racial differences or gang rivalry. Management 
by staff in these cases often involved intervention to try to calm an already 
heated situation, posing rather a different problem from that of 
misbehaviour. 
Staff intervention was reported in almost half the incidents (46%). Whether 
the manner of the intervention was appropriate cannot often be ascertained 
from the reports, particularly as the people reporting were often the people 
who intervened, so that some social response bias has to be expected 
(Saunders, 1991). Of relevance to the manner of intervention is that around a 
quarter of incidents (22%) did not finish when the assailants exited the 
premises but continued in some form, such as an attack on the building, a 
fight outside or return at a later time to further the action. This suggests that 
intervention may not always have resolved the conflict satisfactorily for all 
parties but may have left grievances that led to continued or later aggressive 
action (see Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993; Skarlicki & Folger, 1997). Responses to 
aggressive incidents by staff in licensed premises was described by Wells, 
Graham & West (1998) as "the good, the bad and the ugly", emphasising the 
pivotal role of the manner of intervention in determining how incidents 
progress. 
Half the incidents (50%) involved a physical attack on members of staff, a 
quarter (26%) involved an attack on customers and a third (3 1%) an attack 
on property. In over half the incidents (54%), a weapon of some kind was 
either brandished as a threat or used in a physical attack. For 36% of 
incidents, these weapons were ordinary objects obtained from the premises, 
typically glasses, bottles, furniture, ashtrays and pool equipment. In 20% of 
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incidents, however, a weapon was brought into the premises, most commonly 
a knife, although a wide variety of other weapons was faced by licensees, as 
shown in Appendix 9. 
Physical injury was caused to some person in over two thirds of reported 
incidents (70%) and damage to property resulted fi-om 60% of incidents. Staff 
were irjured in half the incidents (49%), customers in over a quarter (28%). 
IrVury to members of staff requiring medical attention was incurred in a 
quarter of incidents (27%). The mqjority (59%) of iWuries were to the face and 
head, in line with theflindings ofLangley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996) and 
Str6m (1992). 
The rating of seriousness by the licensee, or other members of staff involved 
in the incident, was an innovative measure for incident reporting systems. 
Although it is a simple measure, it is important because, as Barling (1996) 
states, people's perceptions of events reflect psychological stress, and it is 
the stress thafultimately generates psychological strain. The important 
question of how the seriousness rating relates to the other features of the 
incident is investigated in the next chapter. 
Relationships between the different features of incidents are examined in the 
following chapters utilising both standard and innovative methodologies. 
Each chapter introduces different strategies that further the exploration of 
the incident as a developing process in line with the theoretical approach 
adopted in tl-As thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLORING THE OUTC030S AND 
SERIOUSNESS OF INCIDENTS 
One of the purposes of gathering information about violent incidents is to 
determine the possibility of relating the outcome of incidents to factors or 
events that occurred duzing the incident. Consideration of the incident as a 
process has already been introduced in Section 4.3. This chapter extends this 
thinking to examine the features of incidents that are most likely to affect 
the outcome as the incident progresses. This should provide information to 
enable risk reduction measures to be targeted, as far as possible, at features 
that occur early in problem incidents, so as to be preventative in preference 
to being reactive, -in accordance with the model of violence explained in 
Section 1.2. 
Some aspects of the incidents occurring within licensed premises seem, both 
intuitively and from the literature, to be likely to increase the severity of the 
outcome of those incidents. Such aspects include the amount of crowding, the 
number of assailants involved, the assailants being men rather than women, 
the involvement of weapons and of drugs. However, these assumptions 
needed to be tested in this context. It was suggested that the severity of the 
outcome of incidents would be increased by increased crowding, a higher 
number of assailants, men assailants rather than women, the involvement of 
weapons and the involvement of drugs. 
In accordance with the dynamic model of the incident as a developing 
situation, and in order to demonstrate the potential benefit of early 
intervention in problem situations, what happened early in incidents needed 
to be shown to affect the outcome of incidents. It was contended that 
relationships could be demonstrated to exist between the outcomes of 
incidents and events that happened at the early stages of incidents. 
In addition to the physical outcome of incidents, this chapter examines the 
appraisal outcome in terms of how serious the licensees, or their staff who 
were actually involved in the incidents, judged those incidents to have been. 
This is to challenge the view that the seriousness of incidents can be 
determined by the physical outcome alone, but to emphasise that incidents 
that were potentially dangerous but did not result in major physical izVury 
can be very distressing to those involved. Accordingly, it was anticipated that 
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analysis would reveal that, although licensees'appraisal of how serious 
incidents had been would be related to the physical outcomes, other, less 
obvious factors would also affect those appraisals. 
In order to test these hypotheses, the relationships between the physical 
outcomes and the features of incidents that were expected to affect those 
outcomes were examined initially. These same features plus the physical 
outcomes themselves were then examined in relation to the seriousness 
scores given by reporting licensees. 
5.1 DETEPJAINATTON OF PHYSICAL OUTCOMES 
5.1.1 Method 
Ilierarchical, multiple regression was chosen to determine features of 
incidents that were related to the outcome of incidents, as this allowed entry 
of the predictor (independent) variables into the regression equation according 
to progress through the incident. This is shown diagramrn atically in Figure 
5.1, based on the model developed in Section 1.2. 
The outcomes that were most readily identifiable from incident reports were 
physical injury and damage. Four outcome (dependent) variables were chosen 
relating to whether customers were iWured, whether members of staff were 
iWured, whether any person suffered injury that was serious enough to 
require medical attention, and whether property was damaged. Other 
outcomes, such as psychological damage or financial harm, could rarely be 
ascertained from incident reports as they would not be obvious, or not 
quantifiable, by the time the reports were completed, whereas physical 
outcomes were normally apparent immediately. 
Possible predictor variables to enter into the regression equations were 
selected on the basis of a number of different criteria. Some were selected 
because intuitively they would be expected to have an effect on the outcome 
of the incident. These included, for example, the number of assailants, 
whether a weapon was involved, whether the incident began as an argument 
between customers, whether a member of staff intervened, or whether there 
was an attack on a member of staff. 
-100- 
7a 
co 
91 
CL 
< E 
.8 
+ 
cri c z, co *ý q) E 
0 
>%., 
- 
= 
:3 
0. 
.. ý Z :2 zi CL 0 
0 
cts 
E 
c 0 
c (D co cri L6 
E CL Q Cts 
lz 
IR 0 75 
_q zz ca ýc 
C. )
S 
, + tIllz, 
Q lz 11 
I \ 
CL 
IZ 
a 0 C13 
49 
cz 
. Z: 
;e 
12ý 
r- 
-101- 
Other variables were selected to discover whether they had any effect on the 
outcome of incidents. Such variables included, for example, the day of the 
week and time of the day, the gender and age of the assailants, and the 
involvement of drug-related activity. 
Another criterion for selection of predictor variables was association with the 
occurrence of violence as found in the academic literature. However, such 
association often relates to the likelihood of involvement in violent incidents 
rather than to the outcome of those incidents. Situational variables chosen 
related to: 
Time of the day and of the week: These have been shown to be 
related to the occurrence of violence by, for example, Felson,, 
Baccaglini and Gmelch (1986) and Salminen (1997,1998); 
7ýrpe of premises: This reflects the influence of the physical and 
social environment in the occurrence of assaults in licensed 
premises (e. g. by Stockwell, Somerford & Lang, 1992); in particular 
the presence of pool tables has been found consistently to be 
related to the incidence of violence (Dickson, Leather, Beale & Cox, 
1994b; Graham et al., 1980; Hillas et al., 1988); 
Crowding: This might be expected to affect the likelihood of a more 
serious outcome for a number of reasons including (i) group effects, 
such as"deindividuation"(Zimbardo, 1970), and (ii) audience 
effects, as discussed by Mummendey and Otten (1993) and by 
Lawrence and Leather (1999), as well as (iii) an increased likelihood 
of transfer to third parties (Felson & Steadman, 1983) and (iv) ' 
increases in noise levels, temperature and number of invasions of 
personal space associated with increasing density (Macintyre & 
Homel, 1997). 
Person variables related to: 
Numbers of assailants: Homel, Tomsen and Thommeny (1992) 
demonstrated that the presence of Several groups of males 
increased the risk of violence occurring. 
Gender: In addition to the above finding by Homel et al. (1992), 
Langley, Chalmers and Fanslow (1996), in New Zealand, found 
that hospitalisation after involvement in assaults in licensed 
premises was much higher for males than for females. In addition, 
Lindholm and Christianson (1998a) found that eyewitnesses judged 
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males as more culpable than females in corresponding violent 
crime scenarios. 
Age: Felson et al. (1986) found that age of protagonists was the 
best predictor of occurrence of physical violence while Langley et 
al. (1996) found that hospitalisation rates after involvement in 
assaults peaked for people in their mid-20s. 
Variables that concemed existing interaction between the person and the 
situation related to: 
" Weapons having been brought in to the premises. 
" The involvement of drugs: This might pertain to the direct effects 
of some drugs to increase the propensity to behave violently, e. g. 
for amphetamines, crack or cocaine (Leather, Lawrence, Beale & 
Maxwell, 1996a), or to participation in the illegal traffic in drugs, as 
discussed in Section 1.4. 
" Assailant having previously been barred: Previous violence has 
been found to be a good predictor of future violence by, for example, 
Greenberg and Barling (1999). 
Also taken into account was the confidence placed in the accuracy of the 
information given. For example, details regarding the member of staff 
involved were rejected because it was noted that the details given on report 
forms often related to the licensee rather than to the member of staff most 
directly involved in the incident. Other variables relating to the presence or 
absence of a particular feature were rejected if the feature only occurred in a 
small number of incidents. 
Some variables were combined to give features at a coarser level of 
granularity-, for example, a number of types of unacceptable behaviour such 
as stealing, refusing to pay for drinks, being rowdy or acting indecently, were 
combined to produce the variable misbehaviour. Conversely, the variable 
regarding where a weapon was obtained provided two predictor variables 
relating to (i) whether a weapon was brought in and (ii) whether an object was 
obtained from the premises for use as a weapon. 
All the possible predictor variables and the physical outcome variables were 
manipulated to produce dichotomous variables, coded as 0-1, that could 
legitimately be employed in multiple regression (Bryman & Cramer, 1999: 
255; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 28 1). I-Herarchical multiple regression was 
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chosen in preference to logistic regression, which might have been the 
obvious choice at this stage since all the variables were in a dichotomous 
form. However, the appraisal outcome variable seriousness, which was 
included at a later stage, could be treated as approximating to normal 
distribution, as described in Section 5.2.2. Hierarchical multiple regression 
was chosen for consistency throughout. 
Details of the possible predictor variables and the outcome variables are 
given in Table 5.1. It can be seen fi-om the means that some of the 
dichotomous variables (i. e. assailanVs gender, misbehaviour re closing, 
argument involving staff, barred customer entering, pre-planned attack, 
repercussion) are split very unevenly with over 90% of responses falling into 
one category. However, it was decided to retain these variables of interest 
accepting that their correlation with other variables would be lowered (cf. 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 92). 
Predictor variables to enter into the regression equation for each outcome 
variable were then selected according to correlation with the outcome 
variables significant at the 
. 
05 level. Pearson product-moment correlation r 
could legitimately be used as the measure of association between the 
dichotomous variables as they were all coded 0-1 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996: 
814). 
Rationale for entering data 
A hierarchical approach was adopted for entering predictor variables into the 
regression equations. They were entered in four blocks for the physical 
outcome variables, following the development of the incident, as shown in 
Figure 5.1. Variables relating to the situation, the assailant(s) and conditions 
eidsting at the start of the incident were entered in the first block, initiation 
variables in the second block, development variables in the third block and 
culmination variables in the fourth block (see Table 5.5). 
The variables were generally straightforward to place in the different blocks. 
However, a few need some explanation. The variables relating to weapons 
come into different blocks on the basis that bringing a weapon intentionally 
into the premises is different, both qualitatively and temporally fi-om picking 
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up an object fi-orn the premises to use as a weapon once an incident has 
started. Qualitatively, bringing in a weapon is evidence of some sort of pre- 
existing expectation on the part of the assailant that violence will or may 
occur and a preparedness to act aggressively, whereas obtaining a weapon 
from the premises was more likely to have occurred on impulse as a reaction 
to events. Temporally, for the reported incidents, bringing in a weapon 
usually occurred before the incident started whereas obtaining a weapon 
from the premises normally occurred as the incident developed. Marked 
dissimilarity in measures of association for the two variables with the 
outcome variables (see Table 5.2) supported this separate treatment of the 
two ways of obtaining weapons. 
The number of assailants might also have been placed in the development 
block as it could be argued that, for some incidents, more people became 
involved as assailants as the incidents progressed. For other incidents, 
however, more than one assailant was involved from the start. It was 
decided, on balance, to treat the number of assailants as a descriptive 
variable rather than giving it any temporal quality. 
5.1.2 Results 
Table 5.2 gives the Pearson product-moment correlations between predictor 
and outcome variables, identifying those that were significant above the p< 
. 
05 level and, therefore, entered in the regression equation for the different 
outcome variables. No two predictor variables correlated above 
. 
69 so all met 
the criterion (r: g. 80, Bryman & Cramer, 1999: 254; r< 
. 
70, Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996: 86) for avoiding multicollinearity in the multiple regression 
analysis. However, because of the uneven split of some variables, output was 
examined carefully, particularly regarding predictor variables that correlated 
above 
. 
50, for example time and closing, assailant previously barred and 
barred person entering. 
Injury to staff 
The predictor variables entered in the regression equation for irVury to staff 
were: (Block 1) time, closing, assailanfs gender, drugs, weapon brought in; 
(Block 2) misbehaviour, misbehaviour re closing, argument between 
customers, argument involving staff-, (Block 3) intervention; (Block 4) threat, 
fight, attack on staff, attack on customer, attack on property, attack during 
ejection, further action. The variable closing was dropped from the analysis 
because, although the correlation with time was only. 61, time and closing 
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Table 5.2 Pearson product-moment correlation r between outcome variables 
and possible predictor variables (N = 1983) 
Predictor 
variables 
Injuryto 
staff 
Outcome variables 
IWuryto Iwury Damage to 
customers (medical) property 
Seriousness 
Situational demographics and existing conditions 
Day 
. 
027 
. 
069** 
. 
073** 
-. 
055* 
. 
012 
lime 
. 
072** 
. 
029 
. 
066** 
-. 
031 
-. 
020 
Closing 
. 
070** 
. 
014 
. 
067** 
-. 
016 
-. 
021 
Pool venue 
-. 
036 
. 
044 
. 
011 
. 
034 
. 
089*** 
AssailanVs 
-. 
018 
-. 
012 
. 
002 
-. 
049* 
. 
000 
age 
AssailanVs 
-. 
099*** 
-. 
004 
. 
005 
. 
005 
. 
053* 
gender 
Assailant 
. 
018 
-. 
128*** 
-. 
048* 
-. 
006 
. 
025 
barred 
Drugs 
. 
063** 
-. 
037 
. 
014 
. 
049* 
. 
132*** 
Weapon 
. 
031 
-. 
019 
. 
049* 
. 
250*** 
broughtin, 
Number of 
. 
021 
. 
106*** 
. 
067** 
. 
087*** 
. 
120*** 
assailants 
Crowding 
-. 
017 
. 
088** 
-. 
001 
-. 
014 
. 
004 
Initiation 
Misbehaviour 
. 
123*** 
-. 
132*** 
-. 
016 
. 
032 
-. 
011 
Misbehaviour 
. 
111*** 
-. 
097*** 
. 
032 
-. 
004 
. 
017 
re dosing 
Argument 
-. 
197*** 
. 
367*** 
. 
062** 
-. 
049* 
-. 
049 
between 
customers 
Argument 
. 
119*** 
-. 
105*** 
. 
018 
-. 
015 
-. 
047 
involving 
staff 
Barred person 
. 
034 
-. 
147*** 
-. 
051* 
-. 
021 
-. 
004 
entering 
Pre-planned 
-. 
001 
-. 
023 
-. 
009 
. 
073*** 
. 
178*** 
attack 
Repercussion 
. 
039 
.. 
090*** 
-. 
016 
-. 
014 
. 
105*** 
* p! -.. 05, ** p: r.. Ol, *** p! -. 
. 
001 
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Table 5.2 (continued) Pearson product-moment correlation between outcome 
variables and possible predictor variables (N = 1983) 
Outcome variables 
Predictor Injury to Injury to Injury Damage to Seriousness 
variables staff customers (medical) property 
Development 
Intervention 
. 
238*** 
-. 
114*** 
. 
039 
-. 
014 
-. 
042 
Weapon from 
-. 
010 
. 
134*** 
. 
109*** 
. 
313*** 
. 
092*** 
premises 
Culmination 
Threat 
-. 
135*** 
-. 
148*** 
-. 
166*** 
-. 
037 100*** 
Fight 
-. 
088*** 
. 
277*** 
. 
062** 
. 
014 
-. 
008 
Attack on 
. 
689*** 
-. 
336*** 
. 
176*** 
-. 
075** 
. 
069** 
staff 
Attack on 
-. 
244*** 
. 
616*** 
. 
207*** 
-. 
074** 
. 
017 
customers 
Attack on 
-. 
147*** 
-. 
194*** 
-. 
230*** 
. 
487*** 
-. 
010 
property 
Attack during 
. 
210*** 
.. 
100*** 
. 
040 
-. 
060** 
-. 
036 
ejection 
Further 
-. 
080*** 
. 
030 
-. 
028 
. 
116*** 
. 
001 
action 
- 
Outcome 
IWury to staff 
- -. 
288*** 
. 
311*** 
-. 
034 
. 
113*** 
ury to 
. 
341*** 
-. 
067** 
. 
096*** 
customers 
Injury 
-. 
040 
. 
278*** 
(medical) 
Damage to 065** 
DrODertv 
* p: 9.05, ** ps-. 01, *** p: r.. 001 
- 
ill 
- 
were obviously preventing each others'contributions from reaching 
significance. Of the two, time provided the greater contribution when the 
analysis was rerun. The final results of the regression are presented in Table 
5.3. 
These predictors entered in the regression equation explained a total of 50% 
of the variance in ixVury to staff. The demographics and pre-existing 
conditions accounted for 3% of the variance. The time being between 10pm 
and 2am, a female main assailant and the involvement of drug-related 
behaviour all showed small but significant positive effects on injury to staff 
while the presence of a weapon brought into the premises produced a 
significant negative effect. 
Initiation accounted for 5% of the variance. Arguments involving staff and 
misbehaviour related to closing each showed a small but significant positive 
effect on Wury to staff while argument between customers produced a 
significant negative effect. 
The development of the incident accounted for a further 5% of the variance. 
This came entirely from intervention by staff which showed a significant 
positive effect. 
The culminating events accounted for 37% of the variance. An attack on 
staff showed the largest significant positive effect; a fight and an attack while 
being ejected both showed small positive effects. Threat and attack on 
property showed small negative effects. 
Comment. The positive effect of a female main assailant and the negative 
effect of a weapon brought into the premises on ir4ury to staff might be 
thought to be unexpected, but may be explained by attitudes to reporting 
based on awareness of danger. It could be argued that women were generally 
not thought to be dangerous, so problems with women were not reported 
unless they had a serious outcome. This attitude finds a parallel in the 
findings of Dyck (1980), albeit in Western Canad 
' 
a, where the involvement of 
women in violence was generally viewed with amusement rather than as a 
serious risk. Conversely, a weapon was recognised as dangerous so the 
incident was reported although no physical harm was done. In addition, 
people might be more careful when faced with a potential aggressor holding a 
weapon, so reducing the likelihood of escalation. 
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Table 5.3 Hierarchical multiple regression for iWury to staff (N = 1678) 
Cum M AR2 AF t 
Predictor variable entered R2 R2 
Demographics 
. 
031 
. 
029 
. 
031 13.48*** 
Time 
Assailant! s gender 
Drugs 
Weapon brought in 
Initiation 
Argument between 
customers 
Argument involving staff 
Misbehaviour 
Misbehaviour re closing 
Development 
Intervention 
. 
081 
. 
077 
. 
050 22.72*** 
. 
131 
. 
126 
. 
050 94.75*** 
. 
068 2.83** 
-. 
088 
-3.65*** 
. 
081 3.35*** 
-. 
115 
-4.73*** 
-. 
177 
-6.96*** 
. 
070 2.90** 
. 
037 1.51 ns 
. 
049 1.97* 
. 
231 9.73*** 
Culmination 
. 
498 
. 
493 
. 
367 173.63*** 
7hreat 
-. 
063 
-3.36*** 
Fight 
. 
071 3.58*** 
Attack on staff 
. 
623 29.47*** 
Attack on customer 
-. 
022 
-1.08 ns 
Attack on property 
-. 
058 
-2.99** 
Attack during ejection 
. 
043 2.31* 
Further action 
-. 
019 
-1.05 ns 
* p: r.. 05, ** p: 5.01, *** p: r.. 001 
The effects of the initiation variables were as expected in that those directly 
involving staff and/or their control function (i. e. arguments involving staff and 
misbehaviour re closing) are obviously more likely to be hazardous in terms 
of staff personal safety than those involving only customers. 
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Not unexpectedly, the variable having the greatest individual effect on injury 
to staff, apart from direct physical attack on the staff, was intervention by 
staff during the development of the incident. Intervention was thus seen to be 
hazardous to staff irrespective of how the incident began. 
The culmination variables showed the expected effects in that attack on staff 
had by far the greatest effect on injury to staff. However, fights and attacks 
during ejection were more likely to be associated with injury to staff than 
were threats and attacks on property. 
I? jury to customers 
The predictor variables entered in the regression equation for injury to 
customers were: (Block 1) day, assailant barred, number of assailants, 
crowding-, (Block 2) misbehaviour, misbehaviour re closing, argument 
between customers, argument involving staff, barred person entering, 
repercussion; (Block 3) intervention, weapon fi-om premises; (Block 4) threat, 
fight, attack on staff, attack on customer, attack on property, attack during 
ejection. The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 5.4. 
Ihese predictors entered in the regression equation explained a total of 44% 
of the variance in injury to customers. rIhe demographics and pre-existing 
conditions accounted for 3% of the variance. The presence of more than one 
assailant and the premises being crowded showed small but significant 
positive effects on injury to customers while the assailant being barred 
previously produced a significant negative effect. 
Initiation accounted for 12% of the variance. Argument between customers 
showed a significant positive effect on iWury to customers- while 
misbehaviour, misbehaviour re dosing and barred person entering all 
produced small but significant negative effects. Although barred person 
entering correlated at. 62 with assailant barred (deflated by uneven split on 
barred person entering) it demonstrated a separate contribution at the point 
of entry into the equation. 
The development of the incident accounted for a further 3% of the variance. 
Obtaining a weapon fi-om the premises showed a small but significant 
positive effect while intervention by staff showed a significant negative 
effect. 
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Table 5.4 Regression analysis for iWury to customers (N = 1289) 
Cum M AR2 AF t 
Predictor variable entered R2 R2 
Demographics 
. 
033 
. 
030 
. 
033 11.06*** 
Day 
Assailant barred 
Number of assailants 
Crowding 
Initiation 
Msbehaviour 
. 
155 
. 
148 
. 
122 30.68*** 
Misbehaviour re 
closing 
Argument between 
customers 
Argument involving 
staff 
Barred person 
entering 
Repercussion 
Development 
Intervention 
Weapon fi-om premises 
Culmination 
Threat 
. 
021 0.76 ns 
-. 
134 
-4.87*** 
. 
071 2.56* 
. 
077 2.75** 
-. 
100 
-3.61*** 
-. 
074 
-2.72** 
. 
268 9.11*** 
-. 
042 
-1.58 ns 
-. 
092 
-2.69** 
-. 
038 
-1.46 ns 
-. 
138 
-5.29*** 
. 
093 3.62*** 
-. 
075 
-3.37*** 
Fight 
. 
091 3.65*** 
Attack on staff 
-. 
155 
-5.99*** 
Attack on customer 
. 
484 19.41*** 
Attack on property 
-. 
101 
-4.31*** 
Attack durine eiection 
. 
018 0.82 ns 
* p: 5.05, ** p r-. 01, *** p! -.. 001 
. 
182 
. 
174 
. 
026 20.64*** 
. 
443 
. 
435 
. 
261 99.28*** 
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The culminating events accounted for 26% of the variance. An attack on 
customers and a fight showed significant positive effects. Attack on staff, 
attack on property and threat showed significant negative effects. 
Comment. 7he demographics and pre-existing conditions that predicted iWury 
to customers were completely different from those predicting iWury to staff. 
I-Egher numbers ofpeople present (crowding) and/or involved in the incident 
i as assailants made injury to customers more likely. The fact that an 
assailant being barred had a negative effect can be explained in that the 
barring is more likely to be an issue for the staff than for other customers. 
The effects of the initiation variables were as expected, in that argument 
between customers was obviously more likely to result in irýury to customers 
than were the various customer misbehaviours. 
r1he development variables demonstrated the adverse effect of the utilisation 
of objects found on the premises, such as glasses and ashtrays, as weapons. 
The intervention of staff was seen to have a beneficial effect on customer 
injury, in contrast to its detrimental effect on staff injury. In other words, 
staff appeared to be protecting their customers but putting themselves at 
risk. 
The culminating events showed expected results in that direct attack on 
customers had the largest single predictive effect on i1vury to customers. 
Fights also had a small positive effect, whereas threats and attacks directed 
elsewhere, that is towards staff or property, lessened the likelihood of 
customers being iiýured. 
Injury requinng medical attention 
The predictor variables entered in the regression equation for injury requiring 
medical attention were: (Block 1) day, time, closing, assailant barred, number 
of assailants; (Block 2) argument between customers, barred person 
entering; (Block 3) weapon from premises; (Block 4) threat, fight, attack on 
staff, attack on customer, attack on property. As with ixVury to staff, time 
and closing were obviously preventing each others'contributions fi-om, 
reaching significance. Of the two, closing provided the greater contribution 
when the analysis was rerun, so time was dropped. Further consideration 
was given to the effect of the variable assailant barred on barred person 
entering. The variable assailant ban-ed was dropped because, although it did 
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not allow the variable barred person entering, by itself, to reach significance, 
it did enable the block of initiation variables to reach significance. Similar 
consideration was given to the effect of the variable argument between 
customers on the variables fight and attack on customers. However, the 
overall results were better with argument between customers retained. The 
results of the final regression analysis are presented in Table 5.5. 
These predictors entered in the regression equation explained a total of 16% 
of the variance in injury requiring medical attention. The demographics and 
pre-existing conditions accounted forjust 1% of the variance. The presence of 
more than one assailant, the day being at the weekend and occurrence 
around closing time all showed small but significant positive effects on injury 
requiring medical attention. 
Initiation accounted for less than 1% of the variance. No initiating event 
produced a significant effect and only argument between customers 
approached significance. 
The development of the incident accounted for a further 1% of the variance. 
obtaining a weapon from the premises showed a significant positive effect. 
rIhe culminating events accounted for 13% of the variance. Attack on staff 
and attack on customers showed significant positive effects and fight a small 
but significant positive effect. Attack on property and threat showed 
significant negative effects. 
Comment. More serious injury to any person was predicted much less 
effectively than were iqjury of any severity to staff or to customers when 
considered separately. Mis is to be expected in that a number of the 
predictor variables related to the involvement of either staff or customers. It 
is likely that the actual physical act, such as kicking, pushing or headbutting, 
would be more useful in predicting the severity of the iWury. 
Among the demographics and pre-existing conditions, the likelihood ofmore 
serious iWury was increased at the weekend and around closing time. The 
data do not provide explanation for these findings in terms of people being 
drunk or the premises being crowded at around closing time on weekend 
evenings. However, the fact that the number of assailants also shows a 
positive effect points to the importance of socialising in groups (Engels, 
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Knibbe & Drop, 1999), which tends to occur particularly on weekend 
evenings, and the effects of groups in reducing self-restraint (see Lawrence & 
Leather, 1999). 
Table 5.5 Regression analysis for injury requiring medical attention 
(N 
= 
1822) 
Cum Adi AR2 AF 
Predictor variable entered R2 R2 
Demographics 
Day 
Closing 
Number of assailants 
Initiation 
Argument between 
customers 
Barred person 
entering 
Development 
Weapon from premises 
Culmination 
Threat 
Fight 
Attack on staff 
Attack on customer 
. 
071 3.05** 
. 
059 2.54* 
. 
061 2.62** 
. 
043 1.81t 
-. 
032 
-1.35 ns 
. 
104 4.46*** 
-. 
093 
-4.15*** 
. 
054 2.13* 
. 
222 8.82*** 
0223 8.89*** 
Attack on property 
-. 
163 
-6.88*** 
p: 5.06 *p 
--e.. 
05, ** p: r.. Ol, *** p 
--. 
ý. Ooj 
How the incident started had little effect on the prediction of serious iWury. 
During the incident, intervention by staff had no effect at all, perhaps 
because a decrease in the likelihood of iWury to customers was balanced by 
an increase in likelihood of iWury to staff, as shown in the two preceding 
sections. However, the acquisition of an object from the premises for use as a 
weapon showed the largest positive effect, apart from direct attacks on 
. 
014 
. 
012 
. 
014 8.60*** 
. 
017 
. 
015 
. 
003 3.02* 
. 
028 
. 
025 
. 
011 19.90*** 
. 
158 
. 
153 
. 
130 56.07*** 
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people. As would be expected, direct attacks on both staff and customers 
showed the highest likelihood ofProducing serious iWury. 
In New Zealand, Langley, Chalmers & Fanslow (1996) studied the victims of 
assault presenting at hospital emergency departments. IWuries sustained in 
licensed premises did not tend to be less serious than those elsewhere even 
though they were more likely to involve unarmed combat or brawls. 
Damage to property 
The predictor variables entered in the regression equation for damage to 
property were: (Block 1) day, assailanVs age, drugs, weapon brought in, 
number of assailants; (Block 2) argument between customers, pre-planned 
attack; (Block 3) weapon fi-om premises; (Block 4) attack on staft attack on 
customer, attack on property, attack during ejection, further action. The 
results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 5.6 
These predictors entered in the regression equation explained a total of 30% 
of the variance in damage to property. The demographics and pre-e1jisting 
conditions accounted for 1% of the variance. The presence of more than one 
assailant showed a small but significant positive effect on damage to 
property. 
Initiation accounted for less than 1% of the variance. Argument between 
customers produced a small but significant positive effect. 
r1he development of the incident accounted for 11% of the variance. Obtaining 
a weapon fi-om the premises showed a significant positive effect. 
' The culminating events accounted for 17% of the variance. Attack on 
property showed a significant positive effect. Attack during ejection showed a 
small but significant negative effect. 
'Ihe demographics and events occurring at the beginning of incidents had 
little predictive effect on damage to property, only the number of assailants 
increasing the likelihood of damage. It was not surprising that the use of 
objects from the premises as weapons had an appreciable effect as these 
weapons could not only be effective in causing damage to their targets but 
also prone to being damaged themselves in the process. It was inevitable 
that the predictor showing the largest effect was attack on property. 
-119- 
Table 5.6 Regression analysis for damage to property (AT = 1545) 
Cum Agi AR2 AF t 
Predictor variable entered R2 R2 
Demographics 
. 
012 
. 
009 
. 
012 3.67** 
Day 
Assailanfs age 
Drugs 
Weapon brought in 
Number of assailants 
Initiation 
Argument between 
customers 
Pre-planned attack 
Development 
Weapon fi-om premises 
Culmination 
Attack on staff 
Attack on customer 
Attack on property 
Attack duaing ejection 
Further action 
. 
017 
. 
012 
. 
005 3.83* 
-. 
038 
-1.49 ns 
-. 
022 
-0.86 ns 
. 
040 1.57 ns 
. 
028 1.11 ns 
. 
084 3.28*** 
-. 
059 
-2.26* 
. 
035 1.34 ns 
. 
122 
. 
117 
. 
105 183.90*** 
. 
290 
. 
284 
. 
168 72.42*** 
. 
331 13.56*** 
-. 
040 
-1.62 ns 
. 
031 1.24 ns 
. 
419 17.31*** 
-. 
057 
- 
-2.52* 
. 
018 0.82 ns 
* p: 5.05, )** p-: 5.01, *** p 5.001 
5.2 DETERMINATION OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF INCIDENT'S 
Very little published research on work-related violence has asked the workers 
involved in violent incidents about their appraisals of the seriousness of those 
incidents. It would seem to be important to understand more about what 
features of incidents determine how serious an incident appeared to those 
involved, in order to anticipate some of the psychological upset of workers. 
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Some researchers have used a seriousness core, but that score has been 
determined by the researchers, for example by Allen & Lucero (1998) 
examining reports of arbitration decisions. They do not reveal anything about 
what caused victims or those having to manage an incident to rate it as 
serious or not. Lawrence (1997) has studied licensees'ratings of aspects of 
violent incidents in public houses. However, because this study used artificial 
scenarios in experimental conditions, it cannot be assumed that such 
judgements would contribute to how the licensees would rate the seriousness 
of a real incident when they were personally involved. 
AA ssumptions have been made about the severity of incidents. Barling (1996: 
38), for example, stated "It is assumed that the severity of workplace 
violence is related to the severity of the psychological and physiological 
outcomes. In the most literal sense, the more violent the crime, the more 
severe the direct physical threat to person, property or both. " However, he 
agrees that workers' perceptions of events are more predictive of 
, 
psychological harm. 
"A more productive approach would emphasize individuals'perceptions 
of workplace events, which would be consistent with a traditional work 
stress framework... in which objective quantifiable workplace events 
are stressors; individuals' interpretations and perceptions of the events 
reflect psychological stress; and it is the stress that ultimately 
generates psychological or physical strain. " (Barling, 1996: 36) 
The KPP IRS was seen as a medium that could gather information regarding 
how licensees perceived large numbers of incidents that they had 
experienced. The measure had to be simple, easily explained over the 
telephone and not reliant on a visual scale. r1he scale of 0-10, outlined in 
Section 4.5, was chosen as being a method of scoring familiar to most people. 
This is a rather crude scale in psychological research terms, but it is not 
sensible or considerate to include complex measures in an operational 
reporting system. It is unreasonable to expect people who have just 
experienced a violent incident to answer such questions. Indeed, security 
personnel responsible for overseeing the completion of the 1KPP IRF were 
instructed not to ask people to give a seriousness score if they suspected that 
it might upset them further, but simply to make a note of relevant 
comments. Concern for people's immediate well-being had to override 
research considerations. 
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5.2.2 Method 
A similar methodology was used for the multiple regression analysis for the 
outcome variable seriousness as was used for the physical outcome 
variables, explained in Section 5.1. In addition, the physical outcome 
variables were entered into the regression equation as a fifth block of 
predictor variables. The variable seriousness was treated as normally 
distributed because the skewness and kurtosis fell within acceptable limits 
(N 
= 
1583, kurtosis = -. 707, skewness = -. 144). 
5.2.3 Results 
Pearson correlation coefficients for agreement between the seriousness 
rating and the predictor variables were given in Table 5.2. The predictor 
variables entered in the regression equation for seriousness were: (Block 1) 
pool venue, assailanCs gender, drugs, weapon brought in, number of 
assailants; (Block 2) pre-planned attack, repercussion; (Block 3) weapon 
from premises; (Block 4) threat, attack on staff-, (Block 5) ixýury to staff, 
iWury to customers, iWury (medical), damage to property. Various 
combinations of variables for irVury to staff, iWury to customer, any irVury to 
any person and iWury to any person requiring medical attention were tried in 
the regression equation but the eidsting combination was found to be optimal. 
The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 5.7. 
These predictors entered in the regression equation explained a total of 22% 
of the variance in seriousness score. The demographics and pre-existing 
conditions accounted for 10% of the variance. A weapon brought in, the 
involvement of drug-relat6d activity and the presence of more than one 
assailant all showed significant positive effects on the seriousness score, and 
a pool venue showed a small but significant positive effect. 
Initiation accounted for 2% of the variance. A pre-planned attack produced a 
significant positive effect and repercussions showed a small but significant 
positive effect. 
The development of the incident accounted for 2% of the variance. Obtaining 
a weapon from the premises showed a significant positive effect. 
The culminating events accounted forjust 1% of the variance. Threat and 
attack on staff both showed small but significant positive effects. 
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The physical outcome of incidents accounted for 8% of the variance in the 
seriousness score. The largest effect was iWury to any person requiring 
medical attention. Injury to staff also produced a small but significant 
positive effect. 
Table 5.7 Regression analysis for seriousness score (N = 1487) 
Cum Adj AR2 AF t 
Predictor variable entered R2 R2 
Demographics 
. 
096 
. 
093 
. 
096 3140*** 
Poolvenue 
. 
063 2.52* 
AA 
. 
ssailant! s gender 
Drugs 
Weapon brought in 
Number of assailants 
Initiation 
Pre-planned attack 
Repercussion 
Development 
Weapon fi-om. premises 
Culmination 
Threat 
Attack on staff 
Physical outcome 
IrVury to staff 
IWury to customers 
IWury(medical) 
. 
114 
. 
110 
. 
018 15.03*** 
. 
129 
. 
125 
. 
016,26.43*** 
. 
143 
. 
137 
. 
013 11.53*** 
. 
218 
. 
211 
. 
075 35.49*** 
. 
026 1.06 ns 
. 
108 4.35*** 
0£" 032 9.27*** 
. 
122 4.93*** 
. 
112 
. 
069 2.80** 
. 
128 
. 
064 2.56** 
. 
107 4.34*** 
. 
073 2.15* 
. 
047 1.60 ns 
. 
248 8.99*** 
Damage to property 
. 
021 0.84 ns 
* p! ý. 05, ** p: r.. Ol, *** p: r.. 001 
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Comment: The variables displaying the largest effects on the seriousness 
score were a weapon being brought into the premises and injury requiring 
medical attention. Effects were also shown by an object being obtained from 
the premises for use as a weapon, the involvement of drugs, the number of 
assailants, an attack on staff and whether the attack was pre-planned. 
However, the regression equation for seriousness score predicted only 22% of 
the variance, the physical outcome only 8%. This is evidence that there are 
other features affecting the assessment of the incident apart from the 
obvious factors, such as the physical outcome. 
Some of these were illustrated by the com m ents that licensees made 
regarding the seriousness of the incident. It has to be remembered that these 
comments are not considered responses to a question in a survey, but are 
additional comments made by some of the people who have recently 
experienced a violent incident, during operational reporting of that incident. 
The comments displayed recurring themes which are shown in Table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 Recurring themes in the comments made by licensees regarding 
the seriousness of reported incidents 
What thepub *the type of pub 
environment was like 9 the nature of the local area 
*the previous history of violence at the premises 
Why or how the incident *the apparent reason for the incident, how and why 
started it started 
*the perceived intent of the assailants, e. g. just 
high spirits or intentionally vicious 
*any connection to previous incidents at the 
premises 
Whatactually *the content and manner of threats made 
happened uring the *the involvement of weapons and where they were 
incident obtained 
*how long the incident lasted 
*how quiddy the police arrived 
*the type of people who were affected, e. g. children, 
old people, women 
(continued) 
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Table 5.8 (continued) 
What the assailants *the number of assailants involved 
were like 9 the physical stature of the assailants 
" the known previous history of violence of the 
assailants, e. g. did they have a record for violence 
or was it out of character 
" the involvement of drugs 
What the potential *the fear experienced during the incident, i. e. what 
outcome might have people thought was going happen, e. g. if they 
been thought someone would die 
e how much they felt in control during the incident 
*the danger posed to others 
*the potential outcome if circumstances had been 
different, e. g. if the pub had been crowded or if the 
police had not happened to be present 
*the potential outcome if staff had not intervened 
successfully 
What the actual *the physical outcome in terms of injury or damage 
outcome was othe nature of the clearing up, e. g. washing away 
blood, repairs 
What happened, or *any follow up action, e. g. assailants returning or 
mighthappen, threats being made after the incident 
afterwards *the potential for future repercussions, particularly 
involving local families or gangs regarded as 
dangerous 
How the staffand their *the previous experience ofviolent incidents of the 
families were affected staff involved (which might either mitigate or 
exacerbate the effect on the person) 
*the effect on licensee's family 
*how the licensee felt the incident was handled by 
the staff 
ohow the staff felt and reacted afterwards 
How customers were *the reaction of customers 
affected *the effect on trade 
*the reputation of the pub 
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Most re'spondents cited a combination of a number of these factors. The fact 
that so many different features were taken into account has implications in 
particular for managers when dealing with staff who have been involved in 
aggressive incidents, in that their psychological state might not reflect only 
the physical consequences of the incident. People maybe more distressed 
than the visible results of the incident would suggest. 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
In the regression analyses reported in this chapter, many of the individual 
features of incidents displayed effects that, although significant, were small. 
However, in combination, the features were able to predict respectable 
percentages of the variance for the outcome measures. Moreover, for this 
type of field study concerning such a wide variety of incidents, only small 
effects could be expected for most of the features. This is illustrated by 
Macintyre & Homel (1997), who in their study of violence in licensed 
premises, made "a fundamental assumption 
... 
that no single factor 
- 
not 
even levels of intoxication 
- 
is of preeminent importance as a predictor of 
aggression. Violent occasions are characterised by subtle interactions of 
several variables. " Taking this view into consideration, the fact that features 
occurring right from the start of the incident had some bearing on the 
outcome supports the design of risk reduction measures that seek to target 
the process at all stages, as argued in Section 1.2. 
The assumptions'regarding situational and person features expected to affect 
the physical outcome of incidents, were supported for some of the features 
but not for others. Crowding produced a small increase in the likelihood of 
ijVury to customers, which maybe explained through a number of effects, 
such as audience and group effects, perhaps reducing self-monitoring of 
behaviour and encouraging participants not to lose face (Mummendey & 
Otten, 1993; Lawrence & Leather, 1999). In addition, when premises are 
crowded there is an increased likelihood of incidental irVury to customers who 
are not directly involved, simply through their proximity to the action. 
Similarly, there maybe an increased likelihood of transfer of any dispute to 
third parties (Felson & Steadman, 1983), so that other customers become 
involved. 7he ýole of other customers, once trouble had begun, was often seen 
to be crucially important. In particular, the friends or associates of the ain 
instigator were often instrumental in either defusing or escalating the 
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incident. This last point ties in with the number of assailants having a small 
positive effect on the likelihood of injury to customers. It had a similar effect 
on iiVury requiring medical attention and damage to property, and also 
showed a positive effect on the seriousness score. These are all 
understandable, particularly the last, as it is likely that licensees feel their 
ability to control an incident is reduced when more people are involved. 
In terms of time, late evening showed a small positive effect on injury to 
staff, while the weekend and closing showed a positive effect on izýjury to any 
person requiring medical attention. These findings might be explained by the 
socialising in groups which tends to occur particularly on weekend evenings 
and the effects of groups in reducing self-restraint (Engels, Knibbe & Drop, 
1999; Lawrence & Leather, 1999). The effects of drinking quantities of 
alcohol before the pub closes, which may also reduce self-restraint, and then 
having to vacate the premises, provide further explanation. Closing 
procedures were found to be very important in the incidence of violence in the 
survey by Hillas et al. (1988), where nearly 49% of licensees saw closing time 
as the flashpoint of the trouble. 
The only variable included in the regression that related to the social and 
physical environment, apart from crowding, was the premises being a pool 
venue. This was included because of consistent findings that the presence of 
pool tables was related to the incidence of violence (Dickson, Leather, Beale 
& Cox, 1994b; Graham et al., 1980; Hillas et al., 1988). This variable was 
unable to take into account the presence of pool tables in other types of 
premises. However, a p6ol venue showed no effect on the physical outcome of 
incidents but a small effect on the seriousness score given by the licensees. 
This might be explained by a higher awareness of the problem of violence by 
the pool venue licensees, who underwent specific training that emphasised 
the importance of the management of pool tables in reducing violence 
(Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996). 
The gender of the assailant had the opposite effect to that anticipated in that 
women assailants were more likely to produce injury to staff. This is probably 
a feature of reporting practice rather than actuality, as discussed in Section 
5.1.2. It can be argued that many staff may feel that women do not pose 
such a real threat as men, even when they become aggressive, and so do not 
think an incident worth reporting. It is only when women actually cause 
ix4ury that the incident is reported. This accords with research by Dyck 
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(1980) where the involvement of women in violence was generally viewed 
with amusement rather than as a serious risk. This explanation is also 
supported by the contribution of an incident's perceived potential for harm to 
the licensee's assessment of seriousness, as discussed in Section 5.2. 
In terms of other features relating to assailants, the only effect of the 
previous barring of an assailant was a negative effect on injury to customers. 
This is understandable in that the barring is more likely to be an issue for 
staff to address and would not necessarily involve any other customers. 
The involvement of drugs had just a small positive effect on ir4ury to staff, 
but no effect on the other physical outcomes. However, it had an effect on the 
seriousness score assigned by licensees. This may be for a number of 
reasons. The illegality of any association with drugs, either their use on the 
premises or involvement with dealing, would be expected to increase 
licensees' appraisal of the seriousness of the incident because of the threat to 
their licence. In addition, the "unreasonable, unpredictable behaviour" sited 
by licensees made customers under the influence of certain drugs at the time 
to be difficult to reason with or to control, e. g. 
"Male acted aggressively and during the struggle he had enormous 
strength, although he was not powerfully built. " 
Further, licensees are wary of the potential for violence associated with the 
traffic in illegal drugs, and some have been directly affected when trying to 
eliminate drug-related activity from their premises, e. g.:. 
"The gang are targeted by police for violence in relation to setting a 
protection racket with the sale of drugs being the end objective. " 
"(Relief licensee) has been involved with'cleaning up'the pub of drug 
dealers. He and staff have been threatened. Our manager has received 
malicious telephone calls during the early hours of the morning. " 
These results reinforce the necessity for licensees to have training and up-to- 
date information about the use and effects of different drugs so that they can 
be vigilant within and around their premises (Leather, Beale, Lawrence & 
Maxwell, 1996). Further, they need to foster a good relationship with the 
police to co-operate in combating the detrimental effect of drug use or dealing 
on or around their premises. 
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The involvement of weapons had two differing effects, supporting the 
inclusion of two different variables in the regression. Weapons brought into 
the premises actually showed a negative effect on injury to staff, but a 
positive effect on the seriousness score given by licensees. This might be 
explained in two ways, as discussed in Section 5.1.2. First, the licensees are 
aware of the potential for severe harm when recognised weapons, such as 
knives or guns, are present, and therefore feel that incidents should be 
reported irrespective of physical outcome. Second, it may be that people are 
much more cautious when they become aware that a potential aggressor is 
a rm ed, so keeping their distance and using calming and negotiating 
techniques to avert Wury. Such care and politeness in the face of a 
recognised potential for serious violence was noted by Cohen, Vandello, 
Puente and Rantilla (1999) in relation to the southern culture in the U. S. 
Objects obtained on the premises for use as weapons had no effect on iWury 
to staff but a detrimental effect on iWury to customers, on injury requiring 
medical attention, on damage to property and on the seriousness score. This 
rinding is generally in line with expectations and suggests that licensees 
should be advised to minimise the number of objects, such as glasses, that 
are available in the public house. Some very unexpected objects were used as 
weapons in reported incidents, examples being a galvanised mop bucket, a 
miner's lamp, Christmas decorations and a toilet seat. Staff may have to 
examine the premises carefully to reveal potential weapons, either removing 
them or fixing them securely to prevent such use. 
As anticipated, some relationships were revealed in the data between the 
outcomes of incidents and events that happened at the early stages of 
incidents. Initiation as an argument between customers, for example, 
demonstrated the expected effects of increasing the likelihood of Miury to 
customers, but decreasing the likelihood of injury to staff. Other initiating 
events (argument involving staff, misbehaviour, misbehaviour re closing) 
showed some small effects in the opposite direction. No one initiating event 
showed any significant effect on injury requiring medical attention. Pre- 
planned attacks and incidents involving an element of repercussion fi-oin 
previous problems both increased the seriousness score given by licensees, 
perhaps reflecting ficensees'concern for aggression that is directed 
specifically at themselves or their premises rather than occurring 
spontaneously. 
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As incidents developed, intervention by staff decreased the likelihood of Wury 
to customers but increased the likelihood of injury to staff. Staff appeared, 
therefore, to be protecting their customers but putting themselves at risk by 
intervening. This indicates that such intervention is a vital area to be 
examined in terms of the practice actually followed by licensees, so that 
procedures can be improved and licensees trained in safer intervention 
techniques. Such evidence fi-om the incident reporting system supported the 
inclusion oftiming and manner ofintervention within licensee training 
(Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996). 
The culmination of incidents displayed the greatest effects on physical 
outcome, as would be expected, but the earlier events were shown to have 
sufficient bearing on the outcomes to warrant further examination for 
strategies to reduce the risks from violence. Further analysis of pathways 
through incidents is described in the next chapter. Threats and attacks on 
staff were the two culminating events that showed a positive effect on the 
seriousness scores. 
Expectations regarding the prediction of seriousness scores were fulfilled. rMe 
physical outcomes, particularly to irVury requiring medical attention, were 
shown to be related to licensees' appraisals of how serious incidents had been, 
but they only accounted for 8% of the variance in the seriousness scores. 
Licensees' appraisals were also affected by other factors, particularly by a 
weapon being brought into the premises and, to a lesser extent, an object 
being obtained from the premises to be used as a weapon. Other features (the 
involvement of drugs, the number of assailants, a pre-planned attack, an 
attack on staff) also acted to increase the seriousness scores. 
However, the entire regression equation only accounted for 22% of the 
variance in the seriousness scores. This suggested strongly that other 
aspects of incidents, particularly the perceived potential for harm, were also 
important in how they were appraised by the people involved in them. Some 
indications of these considerations were obtained from the comments made 
by reporting licensees, as given in Table 5.8. They included the type of pub 
environment and its previous record of violence, the perceived intent of the 
assailants, why or how the incident started, the content and manner of any 
threats made, the fear experienced during the incident, what the potential 
outcome might have been, what happened, or might happen, afterwards, how 
staff and their families were affected, staff previous experience of violence, 
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and how customers were affected. Systematic research is required to explore 
more fully the relationship between features of incidents and perceived 
seriousness. What is evident, however, and important from an organisational 
point ofview, is that personnel dealing with licensees, their staff and families 
following an incident must not assume that, because there was little ixýury or 
damage, the incident was not serious and the pub staff do not need support. 
Managers providing support need to ensure that they ask the people directly 
involved both what was most significant to them and the type of support 
they would find most beneficial. 
This chapter has demonstrated the importance of examining the 
development of incidents when investigating their nature. The small size of 
some of the effects, however, suggests that a more detailed breakdown of the 
sequences followed in incidents might provide greater insight into the 
processes involved. The following chapter takes this approach further by 
analysing the progression ofindividual incidents over time in order to identify 
common pathways through the reported incidents, and the outcomes of these 
pathways. 
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CHAPTER 6: ANALYSING THE INCIDENT AS A 
DYNAMIC PROCESS 
6.1 PATEWAYS THROUGH INCIDENTS 
This chapter describes the extension of the treatment of a violent incident 
as a dynamic process by tracing the steps that individual incidents followed 
through the stages identified in the previous two chapters. Combining the 
sequence of steps, or pathways, for a number of individual incidents 
produces a visual form that displays the temporal architecture of incidents 
and allows the extraction of quantitative information. The innovative 
method of logical pathway modelling which is described here was devised by 
the author, and the work described here has been published in the Journal 
of Occupational Health Psychology (Beale, Cox, Clarke, Lawrence & 
Leather, 1998). 
Pernanen (1991: 199) called for a more general sequential view of "the 
process whereby violence develops from conflict incitement or frustration 
through arousal and overt aggression to the use of physical force, and finally 
ends in some form of resolution of the violence episode. " Incident reporting 
by itself cannot support analysis of detail at the level of individual actions, 
thoughts and feelings. Such detailed analysis requires close observational 
techniques as used by Clarke, Parry. 
-Jones, Gay & Smith (1981) 6 study 
disruptive incidents in school classrooms. However, it was considered that it 
could provide useful information on a macro level following the main phases 
of incidents and revealing common patterns. 
Sequence- analysis is a method for finding patterns in data that has been 
used in a wide variety of studies, as explained by Abbott (1995). However, in 
its pure inductive form, as described by Bakeman and Gottman (1986), it 
requires huge amounts of data to reveal extended sequences in complex 
situations. 7he logical pathway technique utilises certain key pathways, 
defined by a "logical pathway model", to focus the analysis and produce 
"empiriical pathway maps" that display the prominent pathways and their 
probabilities in a visual form. This adaptation of sequence analysis 
methodology was able to identify patterns within the reported violent 
incidents, producing a stable model from which to obtain reliable 
quantitative information about how incidents progressed. 
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6.2 METHOD 
6.2.1 Reported incidents 
Characteristics of reported incidents 
Three characteristics of the violent incident reports from the EPP IRS 
shaped the analysis and the resulting model. 
The great mgjoxity of reported incidents involved problems of 
customer behaviour during opening hours, rather than pre- 
planned criminal activity, as demonstrated in Section 4.3.1. 
Physically violent acts were generally well described in incident 
reports, whereas verbal or postural violence, such as abuse, 
intimidation and threat, was generally not weR reported, 
particularly when physical violence had also occurred, as 
discussed in Section 4.3.3. 
Although violent incidents may cause psychological, commercial 
and financial harm to the people involved, these are not 
immediately identifiable and were rarely mentioned in incident 
reports. Physical harm is usually obvious immediately and was 
generally well described in incident reports. 
These characteristics indicated that the attention should be focused on 
incidents that involved customer behaviour and physically violent acts, and 
that only physical harm could usefiffly be considered in the analysis. 
Incidents were included in the analysis if W they involved customers using 
the pub during trading times, or while the pub was being cleared after 
trading; (U) they involved some physically violent act, whether or not mury 
or damage occurred; and (iii) they were recorded in sufficient detail for 
useful analysis. 
Incidents were not included (i) if they were essentially planned criminal 
activity, such as armed robbery-, (ii) if they occurred off the premises; (iii) if 
they originated when the pub was closed; (iv) if they did not involve a 
physically violent act, for example threat only; (v) if they involved conflict 
between members of staff only-, or (vi) if they were not recorded in sufficient 
detail. 
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A random sample of 587 reported incidents was examined in detail. 543 
incidents (92.5%) had the appropriate characteristics for inclusion and 505 
of these (86.0% of the total) were reported in sufficient detail to be used in 
the analysis, as shown in Table 6.1. These 505 incidents were used to 
provide the data for constructing the logical pathway model and the 
empirical pathway maps. 
Table 6.1 Exclusion of incidents fi-om the analysis 
Number of incident reports 
Reasons for exclusion (N = 587) 
Wrong type of incident: 44(7.5%) 
No physically violent act involved 17 
Out ofpub hours 12 
Planned criminal activity 9 (8 also offpremises) 
Only staff involved in incident 2 
Random attack on outside 2 
Offpremises 
Equipment failure 
Insufficient detail 38(6.5%) 
Total number excluded 82 (14.001o) 
6.2.2 Logical pathway modelling 
The general case of the logical pathway model, shown in Figure 6.1, 
represents schematically the dynamic processes within incidents in terms of 
common conflict or problem situations, the violent behaviours to which they 
gave rise and the ensuing types of harm. The incident reports were 
examined to extract these situations, behaviours and types of harm, as 
revealed in Chapter 4. Each incident was then coded for the presence or 
absence of each step represented by an arrow and the frequencies of 
occurrence for the steps over many incidents was used to calculate the 
probabilities of each step occurring. Entering the frequency and probability 
information into the logical pathway model created a "map" which 
represents the pathways through the actual incidents in the data set. This 
map was termed an empirical pathway map. Removing steps of low 
probability produced more useful empirical pathway maps that allowed 
common steps and pathways through violent incidents to be identified 
readily, as represented in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.1 The logical pathway model for the general case. 
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Figure 6.2 An empirical pathway map for the general case. 
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Examination of the incident report database showed three main stages at 
which physically violent behaviour might occur. These were (a) directly fi-om 
the initiating problem, (b) after intervention by staff, and (c) after the 
assailants had exited the premises. Staff might be involved in the initiating 
Violent 
behaviour 
Ikr r 
-v, 
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problem or might become involved by intervening in a customer-only 
problem. Intervention in a customer-only problem could occur either before 
or after a violent act had taken place. For example, if two customers were 
arguing heatedly, a licensee might go over and speak to them while the 
exchange remained verbal, or might not intervene until the customers had 
come to blows. Similarly, a violent act after the assailants had exited the 
premises might follow either a physically violent act on the premises or a 
problem situation in which no physically violent act had occurred. For 
example, a customer objecting when asked to leave at closing time might 
head-butt a barman, then go outside and throw a brick through a window. 
Alternatively, the customer might simply throw verbal abuse at the barman 
before exiting and throwing the brick. 
Detailed inspection of the data enabled the general model of Figure 6.1 to be 
elaborated into the outline logical pathway model shown in Figure 6.3. Each 
arrow represents a possible "step" between two "events", where events 
include problem situations, physically violent acts and physical outcomes. It 
is likely that this outline model could equally well be applied to other work 
situations where there are customers, patients, clients, etc. on the premises. 
The next stage was to identify, from the data, the more specific events 
(problem situations, violent behaviour, harm caused) in the incidents and 
add these into the outline model to give the fully detailed model. The 
specific events used are given in Table 6.2. 
The specific events were inserted into the outline logical pathway model of 
Figure 6.3 and each arrow, or step, was replaced by between 3 and 16 
arrows, as each possible event within one box connects to each possible 
following event in the next box. (The one exception is that, by deflinition, 
"Immediate, intentional, no build up" has to be followed immediately by a 
violent act so cannot lead directly to "Intervention by staff", unlike the other 
initiating problems. ) In total there were 86 possible steps in the detailed 
model shown in Figure 6.4. Individual incidents were then coded as taking 
the appropriate steps in this model. 
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Table 6.2 Individual events in reported incidents 
Individual event Definition 
Problem situations 
Initiating event 
Customer-only behaviour 
"Immediate, intentional, Attack immediate as assailants entered; or 
no build-up" assailants stated intention to cause trouble. 
"Argument between Disagreement between two or more customers 
customers" (not annoying customers in general or at 
random). 
"Misbehaviour by Being drunk/rowdy, annoying others, stealing, 
customers" being indecent, using/selling drugs, entering 
private areas 
"Barred customer Individuals previously banned from using the 
entering premises" premises, coming into the pub. 
Customer behaviour 
- 
staff involved 
"Customer misbehaviour Specific disregard of closing procedures, e. g. 
re closing" demanding service after time, refusing to leave. 
"Argument involving Disagreement between customers and staff, e. g. 
member of staff" problems over service, refusal of entry or service. 
Later event 
"Intervention by staff" Staff trying to calm the situation, asking 
customers to stop or to leave, refusing service 
(not after time). 
"Continuation after Continued fighting, attack on outside, assailants 
exiting premises" or associates returning later to take further 
action. 
Physically violent acts 
"Fight" Fight/scuffle, aggressorstvictims not 
distinguishable. 
"Attack on staff" Physical attack: target perceived to be staff. 
"Attack on customers" Physical attack-. target perceived to be customer. 
"Attack on property" Physical attack: target perceived to be property. 
Physical outcomes 
"IrVury to staff" Physical injury to member of staff. 
"Injury to customers" Physical injury to customer. 
"Damage to property" Damage to, or theft of, personal or pub property. 
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6.2.3 Coding 
Coding utilised letters allocated to each event, as shown in Figure 6.4, so 
that each step was represented by a pair of letters. Each incident was coded 
for the presence or absence of each of the 86 steps in the detailed model, as 
well as for the severity of injuries. The following rules were applied to the 
coding of incidents. 
Only one initial problem (A, B, C, D, K, L) was permitted for each 
incident. 
A "customer-only problem" (A, B, C, D) could lead either to 
"intervention by staff" (J) or to one or more "physically violent 
acts prior to staff intervention" (E, F, G, H). 
Physically violent acts could lead to one or more physical 
outcomes; for example, what was primarily an "attack on staff" 
might have led to "injury to staff" and at the same time to 
"damage to property" if, for instance, glasses were broken as a by- 
product of the attack on staff. In this case both steps were coded 
as present. On the other hand, such an attack might have led to 
no injury or damage at all. In this case, all steps going from the 
attack to physical outcomes were coded as absent. 
Reliability pfcoding 
Individual incidents consisted of up to 14 steps (mean 3.7). Inter-rater 
reliability was estimated by calculating Cohen! s kappa (Cohen, 1960) for 46 
incidents (177 separate steps) that were coded independently by the author 
and another member of the SEP Group. The z scores and significance levels 
were determined following the procedure outlined by Bakeman and 
Gottman (1986) based on the sampling distribution of kappa described by 
Fleiss, Cohen and Everitt (1969). The procedure is outlined in Appendix 8. 
Agreement on the initial problem was straightforward to calculate, as there 
were 6 mutually exclusive categories. The agreement matrix is given in 
Appendix S. A value for Cohen's kappa of 0.74 (p<0001, z=9.84) was 
obtained. Agreement for the rest of the model was estimated using the 
presence or absence of the remaining 23 events. The agreement matrix is 
given in Appendix 8. A value for Cohen's kappa of 0.78 (p<0001, z=46.7) 
was obtained. Both kappas are statistically significant. 
Bakeman and Gottman (1986) regard a score for Cohen's kappa of 
. 
70 or 
above as acceptable; Fleiss (1981) regards a kappa of 
. 
60 to 
. 
75 as good and 
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of over 
. 
75 as excellent. The values obtained here can, therefore, be regarded 
as establishing good inter-rater reliability for the coding. 
6.2.4 Construction of empM*'cal pathway maps 
This coding allowed calculation of the number of incidents (a) taldng each 
individual step in the model; (b) taldng any series of steps, or pathway, 
through the model; (c) involving any one event, for example intervention by 
staff; (d) involving a particular violent act or outcome either at a particular 
stage, or at any stage of the incident; (e) involving any violent act or 
outcome at a particular stage of the incident; (f) involving some events but 
not others, for example a violent act after the assailant had exited, but no 
violent act prior to exiting. 
After all incidents had been coded, the cumulative frequencies for each step 
and each event were determined, as shown in Tables 6.3 to 6.5. 
Table 6.3 Numbers of incidents involving particular problem situations 
(N 
= 
505) 
No. incidents 
Event (or set of events) (percentage of total) 
Initiating events 
Customer-only problem 398(78.8%) 
"Immediate, intentional" 72(14.3%) 
"Argument between customers" 114(22.6%) 
"Misbehaviour by customers" 166(32.9%) 
"Barred customer entering premises" 46 (9.1%) 
Customer behaviour 
- 
staff involved 107(21.2%) 
"Customer misbehaviour re closing" 58(11.5%) 
"Argument involving member of staff" 49 (9.7%) 
Staff involvement 
Staff involvement 366(72.5%) 
Staff involvement in initiating problem 107(21.2%) 
Staff intervention 259(51.3%) 
"Intervention by staff" before any physically 191(37.8%) 
violent act 
"Intervention by staff" following a physically 68(13.5%) 
violent act 
Continuing action 
"Continuation after exiting premises" 140(27.7%) 
-141- 
Table 6.4 Numbers of incidents in which particular physically violent acts 
and physical outcomes occurred at different stages (N = 505) 
No. incidents (percentage of total) 
Prior to After staff After At any time 
Event staff involvement eidting 
involvement 
Physically violent acts 
Any violent act 205 (40.6%) 287 (56.8%) 132 (26.1%) 505 (100.0%) 
"Fight" 68 (13.5%) 48 (9.5%) 28(5.5%) 129(25.5%) 
"Attack on staff" 32 (6.3%) 203 (40.2%) 50(9.9%) 268(53.1%) 
"Attack on 77 (15.2%) 11 (2.2%) 24(4.8%) 107(21.2%) 
customers" 
"Attack on 54 (10.7%) 67 (13.3%) 55(10.9%) 162(32.1%) 
property" 
Physical outcomes 
Any i7&ry or 154 (30.5%) 259 (51.3%) 118(23.4%) 431(85.3%) 
damage 
"IrVury to staff" 37(7.3%) 191(37.8%) 53(10.5%) 275(54.5%) 
"Injury to 77 (15.2%) 26 (5.1%) 31(6.1%) 132(26.1%) 
customers" 
"Damage to 103 (20.4%) 158 (31.3%) 79(15.6%) 321(63.6%) 
property" 
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Table 6.5 Numbers of individual steps between events with forward 
Probabilities Pf (N = 505) 
Following event 
Earlier event E F G H i (number of 
occurrences) 
A (72) 10(. 14) 22(. 31) 33(. 46) 23(. 32) 
B (114) 50(. 44) 000) 38(. 33) V. 06) 24(. 21) 
C (166) 7(. 04) 9(. 05) 6(. 04) 20(. 12) 127(. 77) 
D (46) V. 02) 101) 0(. 00) 409) 40(. 87) 
i Q xi Yi zi 
E (68) 33(. 49) 5(. 07) V. 10) 16(. 24) 28(. 41) 
F (32) V. 22) 103) 25(. 78) 000) 10(. 31) 
G (77) 16(. 21) 4(. 05) 203) 58(. 75) 22(. 29) 
H (54) 16(. 30) V. 06) V. 06) V. 06) 47(. 87) 
M N 0 p Q 
j (259) 36(. 14) 131(. 51) 803) 42(. 16) 68(. 26) 
K (58) 1007) 39(. 67) 102) 14(. 24) 6(. 10) 
L (49) 2(. 04) 33(. 67) 204) 1104) 6(. 12) 
Q X2 Y2 Z2 
M (48) 14(. 29) 24(. 50) 9(. 19) 20(. 42) 
N (203) 28(. 14) 167(. 82) 8(. 04) 80(. 39) 
0 (11) 2 (J8) 0(. 00) 8(. 73) 2 (J8) 
P (67) 6(. 09) 4(. 06) 1(. 01) 64(. 96) 
R s T u 
Q (140) 28(. 20) 50(. 36) 24(17) 55(. 39) 
X3 Y3 Z3 
R (28) 5(. 18) 902) 6(. 21) 
s (50) 45(. 90) 2(. 04) 14(. 28) 
T (24) 208) 19(. 79) 803) 
u (55) 2(. 04) 2(. 04) 52(. 95) 
Note: Figures in brackets represent the forward probability pf for the step. 
Figures given in bold italic type are pf ý!: 
. 
15, the optimum cut-off probability. 
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Forward and backward probabilities 
There are two kinds of probability regarding a sequence of events. For two 
events occurring in succession, A then B, the first kind of probability 
concerns how likely B is to follow A. Here, this is termed the "forward 
probability" pýAB I A), i. e. the probability that, in the cases where A 
occurred, B followed. The second kind of probability concerns how likely A is 
to precede B. This is termed the "backward probability" pb(AB I B), i. e. the 
probability that, in the cases where B occurred, A preceded it. These 
probabilities do not have any causal implication, they simply refer to the 
order in which things occurred. 
The forward probability reflects the predictability of the pattern of events 
(what is likely to happen, given a particular event), and the backward 
probability reflects its comprehensibility (what is likely to have happened, 
given an outcome event). The predictability can be utilised to inform and 
facilitate the management of problematic incidents. Knowing what may 
happen next, in the light of what is happening now, is valuable information, 
even if the present event is not the cause of the next. The comprehensibility 
is more useful in investigating incidents with Particular outcomes that have 
already occurred. 
It is also important to note that the forward and backward probabilities do 
not necessarily correspond. They may turn out to be very similar or very 
different, reflecting the way that particular pattern of events is structured, 
rather than the reliability or consistency of measurement. For example, 
every win in a lottery is preceded by the purchase of a ticket, but very few 
ticket sales lead to a win. The differences in likelihood reflect the odds of the 
situation, not an error of measurement. 
The forward probability (pf) for each step was calculated as the proportion of 
incidents involving the first event of that step which actually took that step. 
For example, if 24 incidents started as "customer misbehaviour re closing" 
and of these 16 led to an "attack on staff", the forward probability for that 
step is 16 + 24 = 
. 
67. The forward probabilities pf are given in Table 6.5. It 
should be noted that the sum of the probabilities of all the steps starting 
from a particular event rarely equals 1 as each event may be followed by one 
other event, by more than one or by none, as explained previously. 
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This procedure created the fully detailed empirical pathway map, too 
elaborate to be usefully illustrated here. In order to produce a more 
interpretable map, it was necessary to remove steps of low probability. The 
cut-off probability was determined using split half reliability procedures. 
To establish the split-half reliability of the maps, two randomly selected sets 
of 200 incidents were separately analysed. The empirical pathway maps, 
created for the two sets of incidents at the same probability cut-off level, 
were compared in terms of the presence or absence of each of the 86 possible 
steps of the detailed logical pathway model. Agreement was estimated using 
Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 1960). Values of 
. 
05,. 10,. 15,. 20 and 
. 
25 were 
considered for the cut-off probability. More extreme values were not 
considered as they would remove too much or too little of the detail. r1he 
value of 
. 
15 was chosen as maximising the split-half reliability, as shown in 
Figure 6.5. This cut-off level produced an acceptable value for kappa of 
. 
80 
(p<0001, z=7.39). The agreement matrix is given in Appendix 8. 
Figure 6.5 Agreement between empirical pathway maps for two sets of 
incidents at different cut-off levels 
0.9 
0.8 
Cd 
ICL 
. 
CL 
0.7 
c 
0.6 
0.5 
Cut-off probability 
SI 
Is' 
Removing the steps for which the probability fell below the value of 
. 
15 
created the empirical pathway map illustrated in Figure 6.6. The retained 
steps are represented by arrows of different thicknesses indicating different 
probabil#y levels, the thick black arrows representing the most probable 
steps. 
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A second empirical pathway map was constructed using the backward 
probabilities Pb, that is the proportion of particular events which arose 
from, or followed, a particular previous event. For example, if there were 84 
attacks on staff after staff involvement and 16 of those arose fi-om problems 
re closing time, the backward probability pb for the step is 16 + 84 = 
. 
19. The 
backward probabilities pb are given in Table 6.6. 
The optimal cut-off probability was again found too be 
. 
15, as shown in 
Figure 6.5 and the Cohees kappa of 
. 
84 (p<0001 
,z =7.76) further 
established the reliability of the maps. The agreement matrix is given in 
Appendix 8. Removing the steps for which the probability fell below the 
value of 
. 
15 created the empirical pathway map illustrated in Figure 6.7. 
The similarity betwee 
*n 
the forward and backward maps for the entire 
sample was also estimated using Coherfs kappa, in this case as a measure 
of agreement rather than consistency. The agreement matrix is given in 
Appendix 8. The value for Cohen's kappa was 
. 
51 (p < 
. 
00ol, z=4.76), 
regarded, albeit in a different context, as "fair" agreement by Fleiss (1981). 
This demonstrated a basic similarity in the structure of the two maps but 
also indicated, as expected, a degree of difference which can be used to 
provide extra information about the incidents and the risk of n*V*ury. The 
forward map indicated what particular events are likely to lead to, while the 
backward map showed what particular events were likely to have been 
preceded by. - 
Simplified empirical pathway maps 
The usefulness of the backward map for detecting how most injuries and 
damage occurred is enhanced when simplified versions of the empirical 
pathway maps are constructed, as shown in Figures 6.8 and 6.9. The main 
difference between the two simplified maps is the greater prominence in the 
backward map (Figure 6.9) of the pathways connecting injury to customers 
to attack on customers to initial customer problems. These pathways were 
overshadowed in the forward map (Figure 6.8) by the greater numbers of 
injuries to staff reported. From Figure 6.9 it can be seen that attacks on, 
and injuries to, customers occurred much more often prior to, rather than 
after, staff involvement. 
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Table 6.6 Numbers of occurrences of individual steps between events with 
backward probabilities pb for those steps (N = 505) 
Following event (number of occurrences) 
Earlier event E (68) F (32) G (77) H (54) J (259) 
A 10(. 15) 22(. 69) 33(. 43) 23(. 43) 
B 50(. 74) 0(. 00) 38(. 49) 7(. 13) 24(. 09) 
c 7(. 10) 9(. 28) 6(. 08) 20(. 37) 127(. 49) 
D 101) 103) 0(. 00) 4(. 07) 40(. 15) 
J (259) Q (140) Xl. (37) Yl (77) Zl (103) 
E 33(. 13) 504) 7(19) 16(. 21) 28(. 27) 
F V. 03) 1(. 01) 25(. 68) 0(. 00) 10(. 10) 
G 16(. 06) 4(. 03) 2(. 05) 58(. 75) 22(. 21) 
H 16(. 06) V. 02) 3(. 08) 3(. 04) 47(. 46) 
M (48) N (203) 0(11) P (67) Q (140) 
36(. 75) 131(. 65) 8(. 73) 42(. 63) 68(. 49) 
K 10(. 21) 39 (J9) 1(. 09) 14(. 21) 6(. 04) 
L 2(. 04) 33(. 16) 2(. 18) 11(. 16) 6(. 04) 
Q (140) X2 (191) Y2 (26) Z2 (158) 
m 14(. 10) 24(. 13) 905) 20(. 13) 
N 28(. 20) 167(. 87) 8(. 31) 80(. 51) 
0 201) 000) 801) 2(. 01) 
p 6(. 04) 4(. 02) V. 04) 64(. 41) 
R (28) S (50) T (24) U (55) 
Q 28(1.00) 50U. 00) 24(1.00) 55(1.00) 
X3 (53) Y3 (31) Z3 (79) 
R 5(. 09) 9(. 29) 6(. 08) 
s 45(. 85) 2(. 06) 14(. 18) 
T 2(. 04) 19(. 61) 8(. 10) 
U 204) 206) 52(. 66) 
Note: Figures in brackets represent the backward probability for the step. 
Backward probabilities equalling or exceeding the cut-off probability of . 15 
are given in bold italic type. 
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6.2.5 Probabilities for longer pathways 
Probabilities derived from the logical pathway model give useful 
information whether considered for the individual steps or whether 
additionally calculated for short sequences of steps or for longer pathways 
which run right through incidents. However, caution must always be 
exercised when considering longer chains, as the probabilities defining short 
fragments may not show transitive relations that allow straightforward 
extrapolation to longer sequences pýABC I A) * pýAB I A) x ppC I B). 
Therefore probabilities for longer pathways are calculated directly from the 
data, not by taking the product of the probabilities of the individual steps. 
This can be illustrated by the single most common pathway through 
reported incidents, i. e. "Misbehaviour by customers" followed by 
"Intervention by staff" (before any physically violent act) producing an 
"Attack on staff" which resulted in "Injury to staff". This pathway was 
followed in 11.7% of incidents; its forward probability calculated straight 
from the data is 
. 
36, whereas the product of the probabilities of the 
individual steps (. 77 x 
. 
51 x 
. 
82, see Figure 6.6) gives a value of 
. 
32. 
6.3 ]RESULTS 
6.3.1 Events and steps at different stages of incidents 
Initial Stqges ' 
The most common initiating problems were misbehaviour by customers 
(32.9%), followed by arguments between customers (22.. 6%), immediate or 
intentional violent a6ts (14.3%), customer misbehaviour e closing (11.3%), 
arguments involving members of staff and customers (9.7%) and a barred 
customer entering the premises (9.1%), as shown in Table 6.3. Staff 
intervention before any violent act had occurred was most likely following 
both misbehaviour by customers (pf = 
. 
77) and a barred customer entering 
the premises (pf = 
. 
87). Arguments between customers, however, were more 
likely to lead to fights (pf = 
. 
44) or attacks on customers (pf = 
. 
33) before 
staff became involved. Immediate or intentional violent acts were likely to 
be attacks on customers (pf = 
. 
46), property (pf = 
. 
32) or staff (Pf = 
. 
31) 
rather than fights. In almost a third of the incidents (30.5%) n*v*ury or 
damage was incurred before staff intervened. Most common was damage to 
property (20.4%), followed by iWury to customers (15.2%) and injury to staff 
(7.3%) (see Figure 6.10 and Table 6.4). 
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Figure 6.10 Percentages of incidents involving different physical outcomes 
at different stages of reported incidents. 
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Once staff had become involved in these incidents, they were highly likely to 
be attacked (pf = 
. 
67 for both customer misbehaviour re closing and 
arguments involving a member of staff and pf = 
. 
51 following intervention 
by staff). Property was also attacked in around one fifth of these cases (pf 
. 
24 for customer misbehaviour re closing, pf = 
. 
22 for arguments involving a 
member of staff and pf = 
. 
16 following intervention by staff). In around a 
quarter of interventions by staff (pf = 
. 
26) the assailants left without 
committing any physically violent act, but then caused some sort of problem 
after exiting the premises. In over half the incidents (51.3%) H*V*ury or 
damage was incurred following staff involvement. Most common were iWury 
to staff (37.8%) and damage to property (31.3%). IWury to customers (5.1%) 
was not common at this stage (see Figure 6.10 and Table 6.4). 
Damage to property 
20.4% 
..... 
31.3% 
15.6% 
63.6% 
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Any injuty or damage 
Following Exit ofAssailants 
In more than a quarter of the reported incidents (27.7%) assailants 
continued to cause trouble after they had apparently left the premises, 
either immediately after exiting or on returning some time later. The type of 
physical violence at this stage was varied, but attacks on property (pf = 
. 
39) 
and attacks on staff (pf = 
. 
36) were rather more likely than fights (pf = 
. 
20) 
and attacks on customers (pf = 
. 
17). A quarter of incidents (23.4%) involved 
nVury or damage following exit. Most common was damage to property 
(15.6%) followed by iWury to staff (10.5%). Again, Mijury to customers (6.1%) 
was less common at this stage (see Figure 6.10 and Table 6.4). 
6.3.2 Outcome of Violent Acts 
Figure 6.8, the simplified forward map shows, not surprisingly, that attacks 
on staff usually led to irjury to staff (pf = 
. 
87, ratio serious: minor injury = 
3: 2), that attacks on customers usually led to injury to customers (pf = 
. 
79, 
ratio serious: minor irjury = 3: 1) and that attacks on property almost 
inevitably led to damage to property (pf = 
. 
96). Attacks on staff (pf = 
. 
39) and 
on customers (pf = 
. 
30) were also quite likely to produce damage to property. 
Fights produced damage to property (pf = 
. 
42), 1' UAJury to staff (pf = 
. 
28, ratio 
serious: minor injury = 1: 1) and injury to customers (pf = 
. 
26, ratio serious: 
minor iMury = 4: 3). The percentages of reported incidents which involved 
the different violent acts and physical outcomes are shown in Table 6.4. 
6.3.3 Origins of Injury and Damage 
Figure 6.9, the simplified backward map, indicates how most irVuries and 
damage were incurred. IWury to staff was highly likely to have resulted 
from attacks on staff (Pb = 
. 
84), often after they had become involved in a 
customer problem (Pb = 
. 
76), usually by intervention (Pb = 
. 
71) rather than 
being involved from the start of the problem (Pb = 
. 
29). This ties in with the 
acknowledged vulnerability of people whose job includes a controlling 
function (Poyner & Warne, 1988). 
IxVury to customers was most likely to have been incurred during an attack 
on customers (pb = 
. 
64), usually arising directly from the initial customer 
problem (Pb = 
. 
72). Such injury also occurred in fights (Pb = 
. 
26), again 
mostly arising from the initial customer problem (Pb = 
. 
53), but also 
happening after staff involvement (Pb = 
. 
37) and following exit (Pb = 
. 
22). 
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Damage to property was incurred from attacks on property (Pb = 
. 
48), 
attacks on staff (Pb = 
. 
32) and fights (Pb = 
. 
17). Attacks on property occurred 
almost equally at all stages of incidents (pb = 
. 
33 prior to staff involvement, 
pb =. 41 after staff involvement and pb =. 34 after exit from the premises). 
6.3.4 Longer pathways through incidents 
The most common pathway through reported incidents was misbehaviour 
by customers followed by intervention by staff (before any physically violent 
act) producing an attack on staff resulting in iWury to staff, as seen from 
Figure 6.6, and shown in Figure 6.11. 
Figure 6.11 Common pathways through reported incidents 
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Other common pathways included those emanating from arguments 
between customers, as shown in Figure 6.11. When staff did not intervene, 
such arguments were followed by attacks on customers or fights, both of 
which resulted in irýjury to customers. However, when staff intervened, this 
intervention was often followed by an attack on staff leading to injury to 
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staff. In other words, the intervention appears to have been successful in 
averting iWury to customers but at the cost of micurring iWury to staff. 
Another important sequence of events, seen in Figure 6.8 and shown in 
Figure 6.11 was some kind of customer problem followed by staff 
intervention. Subsequently, eidt of the aggressors from the premises was 
followed by some kind of physical attack, predominantly attack on staff or 
on property. 
6.4 DISCUSSION 
The reliability of the present analysis has been demonstrated, in terms of 
(a) the inter-rater reliability of the coding and (b) the split-half reliability of 
the derivation and structure of the empirical pathway maps. In other words, 
the logical pathway technique identified patterns within incidents and 
produced a stable model from which to obtain reliable quantitative 
information about how incidents progressed. The findings, therefore, can be 
taken to provide secure information on which to base strategies to manage 
violence in licensed premises. 
The results have to be interpreted in the light of two considerations, 
dictated by the information available from incident reports. First and most 
important, they were derived only from problem situations that staff 
recognised as having "gone wrong", not from those where problems had been 
successfiffly resolved. They do not take into account, for example, the many 
occasions on which intervention by staff has calmed a problem situation so 
that a potential incident was averted. Second, each incident has been 
considered in isolation, whereas other evidence and, indeed, thd model itself 
indicate that incidents are often linked to previous events at the premises. 
Several findings stand out from the empirical pathway maps. First, the 
most common initiating event was misbehaviour by customers (32.9%). 
Second, in over half the reported incidents (51.3%), some irjury or damage 
was sustained following staff intervention. Third, injury to staff was highly 
likely to have resulted fi-om attacks on staff (Pb = 
. 
84), often after they had 
become involved in a customer problem (Pb 
. 
76), usually by intervention 
(Pb 
= 
. 
71) rather than being involved from the start (pb = . 29). Fourth, the 
most prominent single pathway through incidents (11.7% of incidents), as 
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seen in Figure 6.6, was misbehaviour by customers followed by intervention 
by staff (before any physically violent act) producing an attack on staff that 
resulted in irýury to staff. 
These interrelated findings serve to suggest particular aspects to examine 
in greater detail in any attempt to design effective strategies for reducing 
the risks from violence in licensed premises. The first consideration is how 
the public house physical and social environment can best be managed to 
encourage acceptable behaviour. The second is whether, when and how staff 
should intervene when unacceptable behaviour occurs. The third is how 
staff can best be protected if they are attacked. The fourth is what help 
should be available to minimise the impact of any injuries that are 
sustained. Such issues have bearing on workplace design, working 
procedures and practices, and staff training, particularly regarding 
intervention skills and emergency procedures. 
A further important finding from the empirical pathway maps was that over 
a quarter (27.7%) of reported incidents included further action after the 
assailants had exited the premises and that, for almost all these incidents, 
it followed staff involvement, as shown in the simplified maps, Figures 6.8 
and 6.9, and in Figure 6.11. Further, the maps revealed that, in 11.5% of 
reported incidents, there was physical violence only after the assailants had 
exited. These findings indicate the importance of public house staff being 
aware that incidents are not always finished when the assailants have left 
the premises. They suggest the importance of training both in how to handle 
situations of conflict so that no-one leaves feeling aggiieved, and in being 
extra vigilant for further action following conflict situations whether 
physical violence had occurred or not (see Leather, Beale, Lawrence & 
Maxwell, 1996). 
The findings regarding further action after incidents had apparently 
finished prompted ffirther investigation to discover whether any longer term 
effects of incidents could be detected. The next chapter describes a study 
that sought such effects by examining the timings of reported incidents that 
occurred at the same premises. 
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CHAPTER 7: INVESTIGATING THE TIMING OF 
INCIDENTS 
The timing of the incidents reported through the KPP ERS was examined in 
Section 4.2.1 in terms of the distribution over months of the year, days of 
the week and times of the day. The increased numbers of incidents at the 
weekend and late in the evenings were as expected in that they followed the 
times of highest usage and socialisation in groups. No pattern was found 
regarding months of the year, except some increase in December, as would 
be expected around the Christmas period. Further patterns in the timing of 
incidents were sought, taking clues from two aspects of the nature of the 
incidents. 
First, Section 4.3.1 indicated that 7% of incidents were stated to involve 
some repercussions from previous incidents. Second, Section 4.3.5 and the 
work described in Chapter 6 demonstrated that around a quarter of 
reported incidents involved some follow-up or continued action after the 
assailants had exited the premises. This action usually occurred 
immediately, or soon after, the assailants exited the premises. These 
findings prompted questions about what happened in the longer term, 
particularly as the public house is a location to which many people return 
on a regular basis, as discussed in Section 1.4. The present chapter 
describes the investigation of any increase in likelihood of further violence 
for the days and weeks following reported incidents, either fi-om the original 
aggressors or from other sources. The work described here has been 
published in the Journal of Occupational Health Psychology'(Beale, Clarke, 
Cox, Leather & Lawrence, 1999) 
7.1 SYSTEM MEMORY 
Theoretical considerations uggest that the occurrence of one incident at a 
location would increase the likelihood of another incident occurring'via a 
number of mechanisms. First, there appears to be little reason to suggest 
that the escalation of aggressive interactions (Cox & Leather, 1994), while 
usually applied to situations where individual actions follow immediately 
from each other, should not apply over a longer time period. This is noted, 
for example, by Andersson and Pearson (1999) as the spiralling effect of 
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incivility. This would suggest that the people originally involved, either as 
assailants or as victims, might seek to continue the action at a later stage. 
Second, other people, either connected to the original participants in some 
way, or witnessing the incident, might perceive some injustice in the 
situation and seek to redress it (see Leather & Lawrence, 1995). Third, 
persons observing, or hearing about, an incident at a particular public house 
might assume that violent behaviour is the one of norms operating in that 
house so would be less inhibited in the use of aggression (Lawrence & 
Leather, 1999). 
The possibility of a system memory effect for violent incidents is suggested 
by social interactionist theory which makes the point that violence often 
originates in simple grievances and disputes that escalate over time into 
something more (Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993). The potential for violence, in 
other words, is a fact within the system of social relationships. The public 
house is an environment where the origin or escalation of disputes is 
particularly likely. 
However, system memory is a separate phenomenon from bias. Bias 
suggests that some licensed houses are more likely to experience violent 
incidents than others, an effect that is relatively constant over time. System 
memory, on the other hand, concerns an increase in the likelihood of an 
incident occurring at any one house following the occurrence of a previous 
incident. Evidence for the existence of system memory requires the 
demonstration of a change in likelihood of an incident occurring over time, 
that is that incidents occur bunched together more often than would be 
expected by chance (Clarke & Crossland, 1985). 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that violent incidents at a particular 
licensed house occur in clusters. For example, licensees surveyed by Hillas, 
Cox and Higgins (1988) stated that: "Violent outbursts tend to be grouped 
together, one often l6ading to another, thus I may have 3 incidents in a 
week, then none for a month. " and "Incidents tend to come and go in cycles. 
It's possible to go six months with no incident and then have three mi one 
week. " Such observations, however, are not necessarily evidence of memory 
because such groupings would occur as a result of random fluctuation and 
bias alone. It is necessary to test whether such groupings occur significantly 
more often than expected when bias has been taken into account. 
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These licensees also appeared to be aware that they were more likely than 
normal to experience another such incident in the near future: "Yes, people 
are afraid it may happen again. " "Nobody likes drinking in a rough pub 
where a fight can start any minute. " Further, they thought that trade was 
affected by such incidents, 45% of managers claiming that their takings 
dropped. "Bad reputation, 'goo& customers leave, creating a 'void', violence 
attracts violent people. " The mqjority of these stated that the effect only 
lasted for one or two nights but in some cases it lasted longer. 
Few researchers have considered the relative timings of incidents occurring 
at the same premises. Some studies have looked at the timings of repeat 
targeting of premises in robberies. However, these relate to planned 
criminal actiVityt rather than to incidents arising out of the psychosocial 
environment at the premises, as the madority of incidents in the present 
study do. The repetition of planned robberies is more likely to be affected by 
the success of previous attempts at the premises, determined largely by 
security measures (see Gill & Pease, 1998). 
Although there is a body of anecdotal evidence concerning the reoccurrence 
of incidents at particular venues, few hard data have been collected. The 
most closely related body of evidence regarding the reoccurrence of violent 
incidents concerns the victims of assault, who have been shown to be at 
. 
increased risk of suffering another attack. Dowd, Langley, Koepsell, 
Soderberg and Rivara (1996), for example, examined hospitalisations for 
injury in New Zealand and found that prior ixýjury was a significant risk 
factor for a repeated assault iWury. 
The 1992 British Crime Survey (Mayhew, Aye Maung, & Mirrlees-Black 
1993) revealed that, in approximately 1 year, 32% of victims of assaults in 
and around work and 39% of victims of pub fights were victimised more 
than once. Similarly, in the 1998 British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black, 
Budd, Partridge & Mayhew, 1998), 3 1% of victims of violence suffered more 
than one incident during 1997. However, there is no information in these 
surveys about the timings of the repeat victimisations in relation to 
previous victimisations. 
Brown, Bute and Ford (1986) reported that, in a postal survey of Ux. social 
workers, 29% reported being the victim of at least one assault over the 
preceding 3 years. Of these, 61% had been assaulted more than once, which 
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suggests that victims of one assault were more likely to be the victim of a 
further assault. Breakwell and Rowett (1989) found a similar effect in that, 
of the 25% of social workers who reported being assaulted at least once in 
the previous 5 years, 40% had been assaulted more than once. Again there 
is no information on the times between the assaults., 
Both theoretical considerations and anecdotal evidence suggested that the 
occurrence of one incident at a venue would increase the likelihood of 
further incidents occurring. It was contended, therefore, that data from the 
1KPP IRS would reveal an increased likelihood of reported incidents 
occurring in the days and weeks following previously reported incidents. 
The study described in this chapter examined reported violent incidents 
that were followed by a further such incident within 26 weeks (6 months). 
The primary objective was to identify pattems in the timing of those further 
incidents that indicated that a memory effect was at work. A secondary 
objective was to identify any features of initial incidents that increased the 
likelihood of reoccurrence and any common features of the subsequent 
incidents. 
7.2 TIMING OF THE REOCCURRENCE OF INCIDENTS 
The investigation was carzied out using a log-survival technique, which was 
originally devised to analyse ecological data, particularly life-span data 
(Clarke & Crossland, 1985; Hutchinson, 1978; Visscher & Dukas, 1997), and 
is well established in medical epidemiology (Lee & Go, 1997; Marubini & 
Valsecchi, 1995) and engineering (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980). The 
technique is applicable to aný set of data in which two well defined events 
follow each other with a measurable time interval between. These events 
may be different, such as death following birth or a particular operation, or 
failure of a piece of equipment following installation, or they may be similar, 
for example, the use of a particular letter or word in language, or the feeds 
taken by an animal. 
If the probability of the second event occurring is constant irrespective of 
the time since the first event (i. e. reoccurrence occurs at random) the plot of 
the percentage of survivors against time shows an exponential decline, so a 
plot of the log of the percentage of survivors against time is a straight line 
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with negative gradient. This can be referred to as the "memoryless property 
of the exponential distribution" (Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980); in other 
words, the timing of the second event is unaffected by what has occurred 
previously. Any section of the graph showing a steeper negative gradient 
indicates an increased likelihood of the second event occurring in that time 
period. Thus a concave plot (below the straight line), also termed positively 
skewed (Hutchinson, 1978), shows that the events are clumped, that is, 
short intervals are more common than in the random (constant likelihood) 
case (Clarke & Crossland, 1985). 
7.2.1 Method 
This investigation required the reporting system to be both well established 
and stable. From January 1992 to June 1995, the reporting system did 
remain relatively stable in terms of the numbers, types and geographical 
location of incidents reported. All incidents that were reported to have 
occurred during the 3-year period January 1992 to December 1994 were 
used as "initial incidents" in this study. Any incident that occurred at the 
same premises within 26 weeks of an initial incident was used as a 
"subsequent incident". Subsequent incidents, therefore, could occur from 
January 1992 to June 1995. To be considered as a subsequent incident, a 
separate report form had to have been received for the second incident, 
unlike the follow-up action considered in Chapter 6, which referred to action 
included in the same report. Subsequent incidents were included whether or 
not they were reported as being directly related to the initial incident. 
The terms "initial" and "subsequent" refer simply to the order of any pair of 
incidents occurring consecutively at the same premises. Thus, for example, 
if there are three incidents at the same premises within the study period, 
the second incident may be the subsequdnt incident in one pair and the 
initial incident of the next pair. This is appropriate for time interval 
analysis, which does not require the first event of the sequence under study 
to be special or different in any way. In log-survival analysis an initial event 
is simply the first of any pair of successive events, from which the time 
interval is measured to the next or subsequent event. That event may then 
be used in turn as the initial event of the next time interval, and so on. 
A 26-week (6-month) time limit for reoccurrence was chosen for two reasons, 
in that (a) it provided an optimum number of initial/subsequent incident 
pairs within the three-and-a-half-year period of stability for the reporting 
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system, and (b) it was a sufficiently long time period to display the expected 
patterns of reoccurrence. The results confirmed that the 26 week estimate 
was appropriate. 
The locations of all reported incidents that occurred from January 1992 to 
June 1995 were compared in order to calculate, for every incident that 
occurred between January 1992 and December 1994, the number of days 
until another incident occurred at the same premises. 
For each week, up to 26 weeks, following initial incidents, the log of the 
percentage that had not yet been followed by a subsequent incident was 
calculated. In this case logio was used, although the technique can utilise 
any base for the log. The log percentages were then plotted against the 
number of weeks. In addition, for each week after the u'u*tial incident a 
weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence was estimated by dividing the number 
of initial incidents surviving to the beginning of that week without 
reoccurrence by the number of subsequent incidents occurring during that 
week. 
When interesting results were obtained from the 26-week analysis, a 
similar analysis was carried out for the 15 days following each initial 
incident to obtain a more detailed picture for that period. Daily hazard rates 
for reoccurrence were also calculated for this period. ý 
7.2.2 Results 
There were 1082 reported incidents occurring between January 1992 and 
December 1994 in the 2440 managed houses, giving a mean weekly rate of 
occurrence per house of 0.0028. Of these reported incidents, 220 (20.3%) 
were followed by another reported incident at the same premises within 26 
weeks (6 months), at a mean weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence of 0.0087. 
The number of weeks from initial to subsequent incident at the same 
premises, the weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence and the log of the 
percentage of survivors (i. e. initial incidents that have not yet been followed 
by a subsequent incident) for each week are 
' 
shown in Table 7.1. The log of 
the percentage of survivors was plotted against the number of weeks since 
the initial incident. The resulting plot, shown in Figure 7.1, was concave, 
showing that reported incidents were clumped, that is, short intervals 
between incidents were more common than in the random case (Clarke & 
Crossland, 1985). The plot showed a steeper negative gradient than that of 
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Table 7.1 Times between initial and subsequent violent incidents at the 
same premises that occurred up to 26 weeks apart 
No. weeks 
since initial 
incident 
No. cases 
subsequent 
incident 
occurred 
No. cases 
subsequent 
incident not 
yet occurred 
Weekly hazard rate 
for reoccurrence 
(M 
= 
. 
0087; 
SD 
=. 
0065) 
Log 
percentage 
survival 
0 1082 2.0000 
1 38a 1044 
. 
0351*** 1.9845 
2 18 1026 
. 
0172t (**) 1.9769 
3 12 1014 
. 
0117 M 1.9718 
4 13 1001 
. 
0128 1.9662 
5 11 990 
. 
0110 1.9614 
6 10 980 
. 
0101 1.9570 
7 9 971 
. 
0092 1.9530 
8 5 966 
. 
0051 1.9507 
9 10 956 
. 
0104 1.9462 
10 7 949 
. 
0073 1.9430 
11 10 939 
. 
0105 1.9384 
12 9 930 
. 
0096 1.9342 
13 3 927 
. 
0032 1.9329 
14 6 921 
. 
0065 1.9300 
15 10 911 
. 
0109 1.9253 
16 5 906 
. 
0055 1.9229 
17 4 902 
. 
0044 1.9210 
18. 0 902 
. 
0000 1.9210 
19 5 897 
. 
0055 1.9186 
20 7 890 
. 
0078 1.9151 
21 6 884 
. 
0067 ý1.9122 
22 8 876 
. 
0090 1.9083 
23 5 871 
. 
0057 1.9058 
24 4 867 
. 
0046 1.9038 
25 2 865 
. 
0023 1.9028 
26 4 861 
. 
0046 1.9008 
Total 221 
aTUs figure does not include renewed violence that occurred as 'follow-up actioxe to the 
initial incident and was reported on the same report forin. 
tp! ýJ. *p::. 05. **pr.. Ol. ***pr.. 001. (One-tailed test). Symbols inbrackets indicate 
that the hazard rate is significantly different from those for larger intervals only. 
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Figure 7.1 The log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial 
incidents over a period of 26 weeks. 
2 (n 
1.97 
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0 1.96 
1.95 
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1.92 
CL 1.91 CP 0 
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Number of weeks from initial incident 
the straight line corresponding to random reoccurrence for around the first 
4 weeks, then had a similar gradient for weeks 5-12, then generally a less 
negative gradient for weeks 13-26. 
The weekly hazard rate for reoccurrence for the first week was significantly 
higher (p! 
-. 
. 
001) than for the other weeks and that for the second week 
approached significance (p: 5.1). When comparedjust with the weeks that 
followed, the rate for the second week was significantly higher (p: 5.01) as 
were the rates for the third week and fourth weeks (p : 5.05). It can be seen 
that the weekly hazard rates for week 1 (0.0351) was around 6 times as 
great as the mean weekly hazard rate for weeks 13-26 (0.0055) and around 
12 times as great as the overall mean weekly rate of occurrence per house 
(0.0028). It appears, then, that the risk of a reported incident occurring 
showed around a twelvefold increase for the first week following another 
reported incident at the same premises. If this week was survived without 
incident, this risk was halved for the second week and further reduced for 
subsequent weeks survived. 
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A similar procedure was applied to the 56 incidents (5.18%) that were 
followed by a subsequent incident within 15 days (a fortnight, counting the 
day of the initial incident as day 1) at a mean daily hazard rate of 
reoccurrence of 0.0035. The numbers of days from initial to subsequent 
incidents at the same premises are shown in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Times between initial and subsequent violent incidents at the 
same premises that occurred up to 15 days apart 
No. days No. cases No. cases Daily hazard rate Iog 
since initial subsequent subsequent for reoccurrence percentage 
incident incident incident not (M = 
. 
0035; survival 
occurred yet occurred SD =. 0021) 
0 1082 2.0000 
1 8a 1074 
. 
0074* 1.9968 
2 9 1065 
. 
0084** 1.9931 
3 4 1061 
. 
0038 1.9915 
4 5 1056 
. 
0047 1.9894 
5 4 1052 
. 
0038 1.9878 
6 2 1050 
. 
0019 1.9870 
7 1 1049 
. 
0010 1.9865 
8 5 1044 
. 
0048 M 1.9845 
9 2 1042 
. 
0019 1.9836 
10 2 1040 
. 
0019 1.9828 
11 3 1037 
. 
0029 1.9816 
12 1 1036 
. 
0010 1.9811 
13 3 1033 
. 
0029 1.9799 
14 3 1030 
. 
0029 1.9786 
15 4 1026 
. 
0039 1.9769 
Total 56 
aThis figure does not include renewed violence that occurred as "follow-up action7 to the 
initial incident and was reported on the same report form. 
*p!:. 05. **p! ý. 001. *** p r.. 0001. (One-tailed test). Symbols in brackets indicate that the 
hazard rate ill significantly different fi-om those for larger intervals only. 
The log percentage survival plot, shown in Figure 7.2, is again concave. 1he 
graph falls more steeply than the corresponding straight line graph for the 
first 3-4 days (including the day of the initial incident), the daily hazard 
rates for reoccurrence for the first two days being s ignificantly higher 
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Figure 7.2. The log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial 
incidents over a period of 15 days 
cn 2 
1.995 
1.99 
1.985 
1.975 
Number of days from initial incident 
(p: 5.01) than for the other days. The plot also displays an increased 
negative gradient for the eighth day (i. e. the same day of the following 
week). The increased daily hazard rate for reoccurrence for the eighth day 
becomes significant (p: 5.05) when compared to the days still to come. 
However, the numbers of incidents occurring per day, by this stage, are very 
small and the conclusions must be tentative. 
Together, these plots provide strong evidence of an increased risk of a 
subsequent violent incident being reported up to around 12 weeks following 
an initial incident. The risk of reoccurrence was higher in the first 2-4 
weeks and particularly high during the first 3-4 days and again 1 week after 
the initial incident. 
These results cannot be accounted for by the possible inclusion of a small 
number of premises that reported a very high frequency of reoccurrence 
throughout the study period. The average times between reported incidents 
for those houses that experienced 2 or more incidents are given in Table 7.3. 
It can be seen that only, 8 premises displayed an average time between 
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Table 7.3 Numbers of violent incidents for premises that experienced more 
than one incident during the study period 
No. incidents reported No. houses Average no. weeks 
during study period to reoccurrence 
2 130 78 
3 51 52 
4 19 39 
5 6 31 
6 2 26 
7 1 22 
8 2 20 
9 2 17 
11 1 14 
incidents within the 26-week reoccurrence time considered, and that none 
fell within a 15-day reoccurrence time. Further, when the 14 houses with 
the highest frequency of occurrence (i. e. 5 or more incidents in the study 
period) were excluded from the analysis, the pattern remained very similar 
in nature, as shown in Figures 7.3 & 7.4. 
Figure 7.3 Log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial incidents 
over a period of 26 weeks for houses experiencing 4 or less incidents 
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Figure 7.4 The log percentage survival without reoccurrence for initial 
incidents over a period of 15 days for houses experiencing 4 or less incidents 
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7.3 THE NATURE OF INITIAL AND SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS 
The second set of analyses aimed to explore the effect of any system memory 
found in the time interval analysis in terms of the nature of the initial and 
subsequent incidents in a pair. 
7.3.1 Method 
The same reported incidents were used to explore the nature of initial 
incidents that made a subsequent incident more likely. The characteristics 
of incidents that were followed by another incident within 26 weeks (initial 
[followedl) were compared to those that were not (initial [not followed]). To 
explore how the nature of incidents that followed other incidents might be 
affected, the characteristics of incidents that followed another incident 
within 26 weeks (subsequent) were compared to those that did not follow 
another incident within that time (not subsequent). To ensure accurate 
discrimination between subsequent and non-subsequent incidents within 
the study period, it was necessary to take account of incidents that occurred 
during the 6 months prior to the main study period, that is July to 
December 1991. 
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The characteristics of incidents were described in terms of 15 dichotomous 
variables, as shown in Table 7.4, that indicated the presence (1) or absence 
(0) of a particular feature in the report of an incident. These variables were 
chosen from those available from the system as representing general 
features of incidents in terms of what happened rather than characteristics 
of particular licensed houses or individuals involved. Also included was the 
seriousness score assigned by the reporting licensee. These variables are 
described in Table 7.4. The time between incidents at the same premises 
was represented by the variables "days to subsequent incideniV and "days 
since initial incident7. 
Two main analytical techniques were used: survival analysis and 
correlation procedures. Survival analysis was used to examine the whole 
sample of initial incidents and the rates over time at which they were 
followed by subsequent incidents. This analysis compared sets of incidents 
according to control variables and so identified any characteristics of 
incidents that displayed significantly different reoccurrence patterns over 
the 26-week period. The statistical package SPSSx, which was used for the 
analysis, employs the actuarial method described by Berkson and Gage 
(1950) to compute the survival functions and utilises the Wilcoxon (Gehan) 
statistic (see Cox & Oakes, 1984; Kalbfleisch & Prentice, 1980) to determine 
whether groups differ significantly in terms of survival. 
Pearson product moment correlation was used because all the variables 
were either dichotomous (0-1) (Bryman & Cram 
' 
er, 1990: 238; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 1996: 281) or their distribution approximated s ufficiently to normal 
to be treated in this way: seriousness (N = 746, kurtosis = -. 680, skewness 
-. 
105) and days to subsequent incident/days since initial incident (N = 220, 
kurtosis 
= -. 
886, skewness = 
. 
594). The variables that were examined are 
given in Table 7.4. It is important to note that the variable "repercussion" 
relates to whether the incident report stated that the incident was directly 
linked to a previous problem event at the premises. This previous event 
might be a reported incident or might be an event that was not reported, 
perhaps because it was not, of itself, sufficiently serious. 
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7.3.2 Results 
The nature of initial incidents 
Survival analysis produced information about the charactexistics of initial 
incidents that affected the rates of reoccurrence. It was found that the rate 
of reoccurrence was decreased (Wilcoxon statistic = 5.468, df =1Pp :g 
. 
05) for 
initial incidents in which the assailant made a physical attack while being 
ejected from the premises. 
Incidents that were followed by another incident within 26 weeks (inlitial 
Nollowed]) were less likely to involve an attack during ejection (r = -. 0716, N 
= 
1082, p :5 
. 
05) than were those that were not followed by another. 
Initial incidents that involved a threat (r = -. 1398, N= 220, p ! -. 
. 
05) or in 
which assailants returned later within the initial incident (r = -. 1340, N 
220, p 
.!:. 05) were followed by a subsequent incident within a shorter time. 
Initial incidents that involved damage to property (r = 
. 
1196, N= 220, ps- 
. 
1) were followed by a subsequent incident after a slightly longer interval. 
The nature ofsubsequent incidents 
Rates of reoccurrence were higher for those subsequent incidents that were 
reported as repercussions than for those that were not (Wilcoxon statistic 
20.198, df = 1, p 
--ý .001) and were lower for subsequent incidents that 
involved interventions by staff (Wilcoxon statistic = 4.079, df = 10 p ! -. 
. 
05)0 
attacks on staff (Wilcoxon statistic = 17.82 1, df = 1, p :5 
. 
001), attacks during 
ejection (Wilcoxon statistic = 3.822, df = 1, p! 5.05), i 'ury to staff (Wilcoxon 
statistic 7.615, df = 1, p :5 
.0 1), and iWury to customers (Wilcoxon statistic 
= 
3.689, df = 1, p: 5.05). 
Subsequent incidents were more likely to be reported as repercussions than 
were other incidents (r = 
. 
1332, N= 940, p :ý 
. 
001) and were given higher 
seriousness scores (r = 
. 
0936, N= 940, p : r. 
. 
01). They were less likely to 
involve an attack on staff (r = -. 1380, N= 940, p ! -, 
. 
001), an attack on the 
outside of the premises while leaving (r = -. 0863, N= 940, p: r.. 01) or Rury 
to staff (r = -. 0851, N= 940, p 
--r.. 
01) and were marginally less likely to 
involve planned criminal activity (r = -. 0609, N= 940, p:!!:. l), intervention 
by staff (r 
-. 
0615p N= 940, p :: 
. 
1) or an attack during ejection (r = 
-. 
0609p 
N= 940p p 
. 
1). 
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Subsequent incidents that occurred sooner were marginally more likely to 
be reported as repercussions (r = -. 1209, N= 220, p: 5.1), were less likely to 
involve fights (r 
= 
. 
2247, N= 220, p: r. 
. 
001) and were marginally less likely 
to involve fights that continued outside after the assailants had eidted (r = 
. 
1220, N= 220, p: 5.1). 
7.4 DISCUSSION 
As anticipated, the results clearly indicated that, when a violent incident 
was reported, there was an increased likelihood that a further incident 
would be reported within a few weeks. Although there can be no absolute 
certainty that this reflected the actual occurrence of incidents, as opposed to 
the way in which they were reported, the differences in character between 
the initial and subsequent incidents found in this study provide evidence 
that the results did not arise purely fi-om a reporting effect. 
Further, different reporting effects might have influenced the results in 
opposing ways. It might be argued, for example, that the increased 
reporting soon after an initial incident could be explained by a familiarity or 
accessibility effect, that is that a licensee who had recently been in touch, or 
was still in touch, with the security manager regarding one incident would 
be more familiar with'the process and would find it easier to report again 
something that might otherwise have gone unreported. This effect would be 
expected to diminish over time and thus cause an increased reporting of 
incidents in the short term. However, it could equally be argued that the 
converse might be true. Licensees who had recently reported an incident 
might feel that reporting another one very quicldy would give the 
impression that they'could not control the premises and therefore they 
would not report incidents that they might otherwise have done. 
Another explanation for the apparent clustering of incidents of violence 
could be specific periods or events that were triggering factors, such as 
Christmas or New Year. One licensee surveyed by Hillas et al. (1988), for 
example, stated that "The pub has a tradition for violence at Christmas. " 
This, however, cannot be the explanation for the results found in this study 
because for only two of the pairs of incidents did both occur within the 
Christmas to New Year period. 
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Leaving aside any reporting effect, the results provided clear evidence of an 
increased risk of the reoccurrence of violence within 6 months once an 
initial incident had occurred. One fifth (20.3%) of all the reported incidents 
were followed by a further incident within 6 months (26 weeks). The risk 
was particularly great in the first few days following an initial incident and 
exactly one week later. The increased risk was statistically significant for 
up to 4 weeks and remained detectable for up to 12 weeks but diminished as 
the weeks progressed. 
It has to be remembered that this increased risk demonstrated over the first 
few days was in addition to any continued or follow-up action reported on 
the same form as the initial incident. Such action has previously been 
shown to occur in around a quarter of reported incidents (Section 4.3.5). 
Taken together, these two sets of results provide an impetus to take very 
seriously the aftermath of violent incidents in terms of the increased 
likelihood that further violence will occur soon afterwards. 
The only features of initial incidents that appeared to increase the 
likelihood of reoccurrence were (a) threats of further action and (b) return of 
the assailants more or less immediately to cause more trouble which was 
reported as part of the original incident. Both these were associated with 
reoccurrence after a short time interval. These findings confirm that staff 
need to be particularly alert for reoccurrence if threats have been made, 
that is, not all threats are empty threats. Although, as Borurn et al. (1999) 
explain, there is a difference between making a threat and actually posing a 
threat, all threats need to be considered seriously. Ihe 
-finding that if 
assailants have returned within a few hours of the initial incideni to cause 
further trouble, they are likely to return again during the next few days 
reinforces the need for increasedand continued vigilance after incidents. 
The main features of initial incidents that were associated with a decrease 
in the likelihood of reoccurrence were an attack during ejection and an 
attack on property. Damage to property and an attack on the outside of the 
premises while leaving had marginal effects. These findings might be 
rationalised as assailants having their feelings of aggression satisfied by an 
immediate physical outburst on the premises or while leaving, then feeling 
no need to take it further, or, alternatively, being afraid or ashamed to 
return. This does not mean, however, that staff do not need to be vigilant 
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after such a physical outburst because the survival analysis still shows high 
weekly hazard rates for the weeks following such incidents. 
One salient feature of subsequent (reoccurrent) incidents was, not 
surprisingly, that they were more often seen as repercussions from previous 
problems at the premises than were other incidents. In general, they were 
also given higher seriousness scores than other incidents. The seriousness 
score is a useful, if crude, measure of the licensee's subjective evaluation of 
how serious the incident was. It might be speculated that there is a "mere 
frequency effect" in that licensees may begin to feel more vulnerable and at 
risk on the basis of repeated incidents, even though the subsequent 
incidents did not appear to be more severe on more objective grounds, such 
as attack on, or injury to, staff. From a practical point of view, this Mi 
reinforces the need, when considering the psychological health of people 
involved in violent incidents, to treat subjective evaluations as seriously as 
more objective ones, as emphasised by Wykes (1994) and discussed in 
Section 5.2. 
The finding that subsequent incidents were less likely to involve attacks on 
staff and injury to staff were a little surprising given that such incidents 
were more likely to be regarded as repercussions. Over the whole sample, 
correlation analysis indicated that incidents regarded as repercussions were 
marginally more likely to involve attacks on staff (r = 
. 
0553, N= 1091, ps- 
. 
1). This indicates that there must have been a number of reported incidents 
involving attacks on staff which were regarded as repercussions from 
previous problems that had nbt'themselves -been considered stifficiently 
serious to be reported. Such a finding emphasises the need for staff to be 
alert for repercussive action after apparently minor incidents as well as 
after more serious ones. 
Subsequent incidents were also less likely to involve iiýury to customers, 
interventions fi-om staff, attacks during ejection and, marginally, planned 
attacks and attacks on the outside of the premises while leaving. These 
features were all negatively associated with incidents regarded as 
repercussions, so these findings were more in line with expectation. They 
could indicate that staff were reluctant to get involved in problems, having 
already experienced a previous incident, or that some reoccurrent incidents 
which were also repercussions had no obvious build-up but occurred as soon 
as the assailants entered, so that staff did not have time to intervene. 
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This study succeeded in its primary objective to provide evidence that, 
following a reported violent incident at a particular venue, the likelihood of 
further violence occurring at that venue is not constant over time but is 
particularly high during the first few days and weeks following the incident 
and diminishes over time. In other words, violent incidents within the 
public house social environment exhibit system memory with respect to 
their timing. This finding can be used in the prevention of violence at work 
by alerting staff to the period when there is an increased likelihood of 
violence occurring, which maybe as long as 12 weeks after an initial 
incident. 
It was not always clear from the incident reports whether the second 
incident was directly related to the initial incident. As previously 
mentioned, there are a number of ways in which it might be expected that 
further violence could be engendered. First, the original aggressors (or their 
victims) might want to complete "unfinished business" or to retaliate for 
treatment they thought to be unfair (Bradfield & Aquino, 1999; Skarlicki & 
Folger, 1997; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993). Second, associates of either the 
aggressors or the victims might similarly retaliate. Third, other customers 
might "have a go" having been given the impression that this is a location 
where violent behaviour is the norm or can produce benefits to the 
perpetrator (Leather & Lawrence, 1995; Tedeschi & Nesler, 1993). Fourth, 
pub staff might be particularly anxious after an initial incident and 
overreact to any minor infringements of their house rules. 
This chapter has extended the treatment of the violent incident as a 
dynamic process with discrete beginning and ending to consider the longer 
term effects carrying over from one problem situation to influence what 
happens at the premises in the future. The next chapter draws these 
findings together with the findings from the other studies described in the 
thesis and suggests implications for those working in the licensed retail 
trade, for other organisations and for academic research. 
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CHAPTER 8: MAKING USE OF THE FINDINGS 
The research presented in this thesis pertains to the gathering, 
interpretation and use of information concerning work-related violence. It has 
considered incident reporting systems in particular, and has described work 
carried out by the author in an endeavour to maximise the usefulness of such 
a system. The KPP IRS, operating within the licensed retail trade, was 
established and developed by the author and her colleagues, the author 
having had overall responsibility for the system throughout the greater part 
of its existence (see Appendix 2). Research to extend the usefulness of the 
data obtained involved the adaptation of techniques fi-om other scientific 
disciplines to provide innovative methods of investigating the dynamic nature 
ofviolent incidents. The methods and findings have implications at three 
broad levels: for academic research, for the organisational management of 
work-related violence and for the day6to-day management of licensed 
premises. 
r1he information obtained has fallen into two categories, fulfilling the original 
. ms of the research. First, the work has produced information about the 
reporting system itself, about the types of data that might usefully be 
obtained concerning work-related violent incidents and about analytical 
techniques that can be applied to such a system. This information includes: 
the benefits and limitations of the system as a diagnostic tool for 
the occurýence of violent incidents, and its use in risk assessment 
(Chapters 2& 3); 
0 the use of comýlementary methods to enhance the effectiveness of 
the system (Chapter 2& 3); 
the utilisation of a more detailed report form than is required by 
national reporting, in order to extract information about the nature 
of reported incidents that is useful for the design of effective risk 
reduction measures (Chapters 2& 4); 
the evolution of a flexible and easily expandable coding scheme that 
makes extensive use of dichotomous variables to indicate the 
presence or absence of particular features (Chapter 4, Appendices 
2& 6B) 
the application of standard statistical techniques in exploring the 
nature of reported incidents (Chapters 4& 5); 
0 the treatment of violent incidents as developing situations 
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(Chapters 4,5 & 6); 
the usefulness of innovative pathway and survival techniques in 
extracting information about the development and timing of 
incidents (Chapters 6& 7); 
examination of the lasting influence of incidents in terms of 
reoccurrence (Chapter 7); 
consideration of the seriousness of incidents as rated by the staff 
involved (Chapters 3,4 & 5). 
Second, the system has provided information about violent incidents within 
public houses that can be utilised in devising strategies to reduce the risks to 
the health and safety of staff. In addition, the quality and usefulness of this 
second type of information provides, one means of assessing the benefits of 
the reporting system. Information obtained about incidents concerns: 
" numbers of incidents that occurred (Chapter 3); 
" characteristics of reported incidents (Chapter 4); 
the dynamic nature of reported incidents (Chapters 4,5,6 & 7); 
the relationship between the outcomes of incidents and their other 
features (Chapter 5); 
the seriousness of the reported incidents a's perceived by the people 
involved in the incidents (Chapter 5); 
common pathways through violent incidents (Chapter 6); 
the timing of incidents, including a system memory effect on the 
likelihood of reoccurrence of incidents at the same premises 
(Chapters 4& 7); 
8.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
All results have to be interpreted in light of the acknowledged limitations of 
incident reporting systems discussed in Section 2.2.3 including 
underreporting, the subjective viewpoint of the members of staff reporting, 
eye-witness reliability problems and the derivation of the information from 
problem situations that became aggressive or violent, not from those that 
were resolved successfully. 
8A. 1 Numbers of incidents occurring 
The limitations of an incident reporting system in terms of estimating 
numbers of incidents occurring were discussed in Chapter 2 and 
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demonstrated in Chapter 3 in relation to the KPP IRS. Appreciable 
underreporting of violent incidents was demonstrated via the subsidiary 
studies and had some adverse effects on the incident reporting system as a 
diagnostic tool. Although the specificity and positive predictive value were 
high, both the sensitivity and the negative predictive value were fairly low, 
indicating, as expected, a need to supplement incident reporting with other 
means of detecting a problem of violence within a public house. Sampling 
studies such as that piloted within ADR could be expected to provide a more 
complete picture of day-to-day problems of aggression and violence, in terms 
of the number of incidents that occur. 
The demonstrated underreporting in the KPP IRS affected its ability to 
provide complete information for the assessment of risk. This supports the 
argument given in Chapter 2 that incident reporting systems should not be 
used as the sole basis for assessing the risk to staff from violent incidents, 
but should be supported by other methods of investigation. However, the 
reporting system is invaluable in establishing minimum values for the level of 
risk. 
Subsidiary studies demonstrated that many more minor incidents occurred 
than more serious ones. The EPP IRS, however, did not receive greater 
numbers of reports of less serious incidents. Me seriousness scores from the 
KPP IRS indicated, as expected, that numbers of incidents reported reflected 
more closely the numbers actually occurring for serious incidents than for 
minorincidents. 
The limitations of incident reporting systems were particularly marked in the 
KPP IRS because of the diversity and scattered nature of the individual 
licensed houses, and the semi; autonomous nature of the regional trading 
companies within ADR. Although these factors also impacted on the ability 
of the SEP Group to carry out the subsidiary studies effectively, the 
combination of methods illustrated what might be achieved by such 
complementary studies. 
8.1.2 Nature bf incidents 
Chapter 4 provided a general overview of features of the incidents reported 
through the EPP IRS and began to consider their dynamic nature. Some of 
the conspicuous characteristics were: 
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the predominance of incidents occurring at the weekend, late in the 
evenings, between IOpm and midnight, and when the premises 
were crowded; 
the disproportionate number of incidents around closing time; 
the predominance of assailants who were male and were estimated 
to be in the 21-30 age group; 
0 the high level of weapon involvement, particularly ordinary objects 
obtained fi-om the pub; 
the increasing involvement of drug-related activity, through both 
usage and dealing-, 
the predominance of reported incidents that began as 
misbehaviour by customers or conflict between customers rather 
than as planned criminal attacks; 
the expected high level of staff intervention; 
the high number of physical attacks on members of staff, 
particularlyfollowing intervention; 
0 the proportion of incidents that did not finish when the assailants 
eidted the premises but continued in some form; 
0 the high level of physical irVury, Particularly to the face and head. 
In Chapter 5, some features expected, intuitively and from the literature, to 
affect the outcome of incidents adversely were shown to do so, but others 
Were not. Crowding was associated with a small increase in the likelihood of 
iWury to customers. The number of assailants had a small effect on irVury to 
customers, iWury requiring medical attention and damage to property. The 
involvement of drugs had only a small positive effect on iWury to staff. rIhe 
sex of the assailant had the opposite effect to that anticipated, in that 
women assailants were associated with increased illiury to staff. However, 
'this was probably affected by reporting practice rather than actuality in that 
women may not have been regarded as a serious threat when they became 
aggressive unless they actually caused significant injury. The involvement of 
weapons had two differing effects. Weapons brought into the premises 
actually showed a negative effect on iWury to staff. Objects obtained on the 
premises for use as weapons had a more detrimental effect on i 'ury and on IM 
damage to property. 
Some relationships were demonstrated between the outcomes of incidents 
and events that happened at the early stages of incidents. Initiation as an 
argument between customers, for example, demonstrated the expected 
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effects of increasing the likelihood of injury to customers, but decreasing the 
likelihood of injury to staff. Other initiating events (argument involving staff, 
misbehaviour, misbehaviour re closing, barred person entering) showed only 
small effects. As incidents developed, intervention by staff decreased the 
likelihood of injury to customers but increased the likelihood of irjury to staff. 
Objects obtained on the premises for use as weapons had a detrimental 
effect, as already mentioned, on both injury and damage to property. The 
culmination of incidents displayed the greatest effects on physical outcome 
as would be expected, but the earlier events were shown to have sufficient 
bearing on the outcomes to warrant further examination for strategies to 
reduce the risks from violence, particularly the timing and manner of 
intervention by members of staff. 
Ilcensees'perceptions of how serious incidents had been, although related to 
the physical outcomes, were also shown to be affected by other, less obvious 
features of incidents. These features included a weapon being brought into 
the premises, and an object being obtained from the premises to be used as a 
weapon. Other recorded features (i. e. the involvement of drugs, the number of 
assailants, a pre-planned attack, an attack on staff) also acted to increase 
the seriousness cores. However, the entire regression equation only 
accounted for 22% of the variance in the seriousness cores. This suggested 
strongly that other aspects of incidents, not specifically requested on the 
IKPP IRF but noted by licensees, were also important in the perceptions of 
the people involved in them. 
8.1.3 The incident as a process 
The development of incidents as dynamic processes was investigated through 
the identification of individual steps and common pathways through the 
reported in6dents. The logical pathway technique identified patterns within 
incidents and created a stable empirical pathway map that produced reliable 
quantitative information about how incidents progressed. Several findings 
stood out. First, the most common initiating event was misbehaviour by 
customers. Second, in over half the reported incidents, some injury or damage 
was sustained following staff intervention. Third, Miury to staff was highly 
likely to have resulted from attacks on staff, often after they had become 
involved in a customer problem, usually by intervention rather than being 
involved from the start. Fourth, the most prominent single pathway through 
incidents (11.7% of incidents), was misbehaviour by customers followed by 
intervention by staff (before any physically violent act) producing an attack 
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on staff that resulted in injury to staff. A further important finding was that 
over a quarter of reported incidents included further action after the 
assailants had exited the premises and that, for almost all these incidents, it 
followed staff involvement. Further, the maps revealed that, in 11.5% of 
reported incidents, there was physical violence only after the assailants had 
exited. 
Clearly, both the multiple regression analysis (Chapter 5) and the empirical 
pathway maps (Chapter 6) highlighted intervention by staff as a key factor 
in the development of potentially violent incidents. 7hey did not, however, 
provide information about the ways in which staff intervened. Incident 
reports rarely revealed whether the situation was handled ineptly or 
aggressively or very skilfully. More detailed information needs to be obtained 
from other sources and utillsing other methodologies, as discussed in Chapter 
2. The importance of both the public house environment and the intervention 
style of the licensee are supported by other studies, such as those by Gibbs 
(1986), Graham, LaRocque, Yetman, Ross and Guistra (1980), Leather and 
Lawrence (1995), and Wells, Graham and West (1998). 
8.1.4 71ming of incidents 
As expected, increased numbers of reported incidents occurred at the 
weekend and late in the evenings following the times that were busiest for 
most premises. The three quarters of an hour or so around closing 
particularly stood out as a problem time. Beyond this expected pattern, it 
was found that, when a violent incident was reported, there was an increased 
likelihood that a further incident would be reported in the days and weeks 
that followed. In other words, violent incidents within the public house social 
environment exhibited system memory with respect to their timing. Although 
there can be no absolute certainty that this reflected the actual occurrence 
of incidents, as opposed to the way in which they were reported, differences in 
character between the initial and subsequent incidents suggested that the 
results did not arise purely from a reporting effect. 
8.2 APPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
The results have to be interpreted in the light of their derivation largely from 
problem situations that staff recognised as having "gone wrong", rather than 
from problem situations that were successfully resolved. 7hey rarely include 
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the (probably numerous) occasions on which intervention by staff, for 
example, has averted potentially violent incidents. However, conclusions 
drawn from incident reporting perform a valuable function in highlighting the 
type of circumstances that warrant further investigation. 
8.2.1 Implications for the licensed trade 
Findings from the EPP IERS have been incorporated into licensee training 
within ADR (Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996), and are likely to be 
equally applicable for staff running other licensed premises. At the most 
straightforward level, the incident reports provide the frequency data that 
can inform licensees of features commonly involved in violent incidents and, 
therefore, times and situations in which to be extra vigilant. 7hese include 
some aspects that appear "obvious", such as the preponderance of incidents 
at the weekends and late in the evening, and the involvement of young males, 
but these serve to remind licensees that the main risks derive from the 
ordinary, the everyday social interaction within the premises, not fi-om 
planned criminal activity. Similarly, the weapons most often used in 
incidents, and related to injury, were ordinary objects picked up in the 
premises, rather than traditional weapons. Indeed, use of these ordinary 
objects was found to be predictive of irýjury to customers, of ir&ry requiring 
medical attention and of damage to property. This reminds licensees to clear 
away glasses and to consider carefully the furnishings, equipment and decor 
in terms of their potential as weapons. 
The increasing involvement of drugs reminds licensees that drug activity 
within their premises is not only illegal but also a potential source of 
aggression and violence, encouraging them to familiarised themselves with, 
and be vigilant for, the signs of drug-related activity and to seek safe 
procedures for managing such actMty (see Section 1.4). Drug awareness was 
incorporated into the KPP training workshops as the problems surrounding 
drugs became apparent through the KPP IRS. 
The findings fi-om the more detailed analyses feed into the three levels of risk 
reduction within the premises: preventative, reactive and rehabilitative 
action. For example, the findings from the pathway analysis (Chapter 6) 
were translated into straightforward pointers for licensees to follow in 
reducing the risks and were incorporated into a short report prepared for 
ADR (Beale, Cox, Lawrence & Leather, 1996), a small section of which is 
given in Figure 8.1. Similarly, the licensee training in resolving conflict 
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Figure 8.1 Excerpt from the report What happened in Violent Incidents? 
(Beale, Cox, Lawrence & Leather, 1996) 
WHAT HAPPENED IN VIOLENT INCIDENTS? 
The most common sequence of events in reported incidents was: 
Misbehaviourl/. ýInterventio& Attack on staff by customers by staff 
Other common sequences included: 
Arguments Attacks on 
between customers Injury to 
customers and fights customers 
Injury to staff 
Interventiorr' 
, ý, Pýio-FAttack or ýflý Injury to staff by staff 
Intervention Problem customer X following exit Physically problem by staff 
............ 
Eviolsein't 
act of assailant(s) t 
WHAT CAN BE DONE TO REDUCE THE RISKS FROM 
VIOLENCE IN THE FUTURE? 
PXDUCING THE RISK OF CONFLICT OCCURRING 
§ Letting customers know what behaviour is acceptable by 
Looking at the pub atmosphere: 
Do the decor, music or noise levels encourage rowdy behaviour? 
Is the pub tidy, or does it look as though no-one cares what happens 
in it? 
Are the staff always polite and welcon-Ang to everybody9 
Eliminating situations where people get frustrated 
Looking at how games and entertainments are controlleck 
Is there a proper queuing system for pool, darts, etc.? 
Are such systems obvious to new customers? 
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8.1 
Eliminating situations where people get frustrated (continued) 
Looking at closing tinw: 
Are closing time procedures well known to all customers? 
Do staff acknowledge people waiting to be served? 
Are there enough staff to handle the extra workload at closing time? 
Looking at the pub layout: 
Is there room for people to move around without impeding others? 
Is the pool table or dart board, etc. in front of the toilet door, so that 
players are constantly being interrupted? 
PXSOLVING CONFLICT 
§ Intervening in problem situations 
Knowing your own limits: 
Is it safe to intervene or should the police be caHed? 
Learning how to intervene: 
Have I been thoroughly trained in how to deal with conflict? (Ask your Area or Security Manager about Keeping Pubs Peaceful training. ) 
Do I Imow how to calm people down? 
Do I know how to get people to come to an acceptable compromise? 
Protecting people 
Protecting staffand customers: 
Do I know how to position myself so I am less vulnerAle to attack? 
Do all the staff know the emergency procedures? 
Is all emergency equipment easily accessible and checked 
regularly? 
MANAGING THE AFTERMATH 
§ Looking out for further trouble 
0 Being vigilant after conftict situations and violent incidents: 
Have the assailants gone away? 
Are they, or their associates, likely to return? 
Looking after people 
Being aware of both physical and psychological effects of 
incidents: 
Are staff trained in first aid? 
Do I know about how people might react after violent incidents? 
Do I know how to deal with them and what help they might need? 
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(Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996) was amended to shift the main 
focus from intervening in arguments between customers to include far more 
about ways of challenging customer misbehaviour without eliciting 
aggressive reaction. 
Initiation ofincidents was found to be predominantly through misbehaviour 
by customers or conflict between customers. Thii suggests that effort should 
be put into the design and day-to-day running of the premises to reduce 
misunderstanding and competition between customers by, for example, 
ensuring that staff are friendly and get to know customers, making the house 
rules clear with respect to games such as pool, having sufficient staff to cope 
efficiently at busy times, and ensuring that the physical layout does not 
produce areas with conflicting uses. Although these recommendations are 
implicit in good hospitality management, their importance is enhanced by the 
realisation that they also impact on the prevention of violence and 
aggression. 
In terms of reactive strategies, both the hierarchical multiple regression and 
the logical pathway analysis are very clear that intervention by staff was a 
key event in the development of incidents and impacted on the likelihood of 
staff being physically injured. Mis suggests that licensees need to be trained 
in safe, effective and non-aggressive intervention methods including calming, 
negotiating and closing skills, as well as protective strategies and emergency 
procedures. Such training was provided through 1KPP training (Leather, 
Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996). 7he ability to "close" an incident, 
enabling problem situations to be ended without anyone going away with a 
grievance, was shown to be important both in the number of incidents that 
included continuation after assailants had eidted and in the increase in 
likelihood offurther incidents occurring in the days and weeks following 
previous incidents. 
In terms of rehabilitative strategies, that the analysis of the seriousness 
scores revealed a large variety of contributory features is particularly 
important for line managers, security and occupational health personnel 
having to support licensees and their staff coping with problems of aggression 
and violence. It is essential that they realise that the seriousness of an 
incident cannot be assumed from its physical outcome alone and that they 
have to be sensitive to other aspects that the people involved are concerned 
about. It is important that this issue is taken seriously since a stress audit of 
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licensees revealed that, although the occurrence of violent incidents was not 
the most common stressor, it was the one that showed the most detrimental 
impact on well-being, job satisfaction and intention to quit (Leather, Lee, 
Lawrence & Beale, 1995). 
8.2.2 Implications for organisations 
For organisations gathering information for risk assessment, the work 
described here emphasises the benefits and limitations of the reporting 
system that they have to maintain by law. It demonstrates that risk 
assessment should not rely on incident reporting alone, but should also utilise 
complementary methods of collecting information, such as sampling studies, 
interviews and staff surveys (Chapters 2& 3). 
However, the study has provided support for organisations to maintain 
internal violent incident reporting systems that go beyond the legal 
requirements of national reporting, as advocated by Beale, Cox and Leather 
(1996) and by Nigro and Waugh (1996). The type of investigative analysis 
reported here is only possible if an organisations records cover a wider range 
of incidents and contain more details about those incidents than are required 
by national reporting. 
Such enhanced systems provide a learning resource that allows much more 
detailed exploration of the nature of incidents than is possible from the 
standard reports complying to the RIDDOR 95 requirements. 7he collection 
of reports of incidents with less serious physical consequences extends the 
range of dangerous occurrences and behaviours, that can be studied to 
discover frequently occurring problem situations to target for risk reduction. 
In addition, this wider reporting can be used to trigger supportive follow-up of 
incidents with little physical outcome but regarded as serious by staff and 
with, perhaps, a longaterm, psychological outcome. This approach begins to 
tackle the problem of the repeated "low level" violence that constitutes a 
chronic stressor for some workers, in addition to the acute stressor of a 
seHous violent incident. 
In order to be effective and maximise reporting, organisations need to "sell" 
the system to employees by targeting directly their reasons for not reporting 
(Chapters 2& 3). 'Mey need be given clear information about which incidents 
they should be reporting and how to report them. The system needs to be 
straightforward to use and accessible in order that employees can quickly 
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and easily report incidents. They need to be made aware of the benefits of 
reporting in terms of how the organisation uses the information. Additionally, 
employees need to be reassured that they will not bejudged on their ability to 
control violence according to the number of incidents they report, in other 
words, that it is "safe" for them to report. Establishment of a problem-solving 
culture rather than a blaming culture is essential for reporting systems to be 
really effective in identifying patterns within incidents and potential 
incidents. 
Results fi-om the incident reporting system need to be fed into the control 
cycle for the management of risk given in Figure 1.4. Statistical information 
about the number and characteristics of violent incidents, such as that 
derived in Chapters 3 and 4, allows identification of the problem and the 
situations that contribute to the risk from violence. The empirical pathway 
maps, along with the other detailed analyses, represent what happens before, 
during and after incidents, so provide the basis for a working model that can 
be utilised in the derivation of organisational intervention strategies. The 
incorporation of results from the 1KPP IRS into training for licensees and into 
the derivation of an organisational policy document, for example, illustrates 
the important role that such an incident reporting system can play within a 
total organisational approach to the management of work-related violence. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible, in this research, to use the 1KPP IRS 
directly in the final step of the control cycle, that is to evaluate interventions 
within ADR. Interventions could not be introduced uniformly or reliably 
throughout the organisation because of its complex management structure, 
so it was impossible to relate any changes in the reporting of incidents to 
specific interventi 
' 
ons. In a more centralized organisation it should be possible 
to link reporting to interventions more closely in order to detect changes in 
the number or the nature of reported incidents. 
Some of the interventions suggested by the results of this research 
encompass: preventative strategies including design of the physical 
environment, staff training and staffing levels; reactive strategies including 
laid-down procedures regarding intervention, emergency action and security 
measures; and rehabilitative strategies including compassionate response of 
management following incidents even if the incident does not appear serious 
from its physical outcome, and effective post trauma support to reduce the 
likelihood ofpsychological damage. 
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Effective post trauma care programmes need to be appropriate to the needs 
of the workers for whom they are intended, and should include preparing 
people to cope with violent incidents, as well as providing after-care (Health 
and Safety Executive, 1993a; Tehrani, 1995). Information from incident 
reporting is therefore essential to inform both the workers and the providers 
of the care programme. 'I'his preparation of workers, in addition to aftercare, 
also concurs with the U. S. national strategy for the prevention of work- 
related psychological disorders proposed by NIOSH (Sauter, Murphy & 
Hurrell, 1990). The components were (a)job design to improve working 
conditions; (b) surveillance of psychological disorders and risk factors; (c) 
information dissemination, education, and training-, and (d) enrichment of 
psychological health services for workers. 
, 
8.2.3 Implications for academic research 
Zheoreticalconsiderations 
Although this thesis did no 
't 
set out to test theories of aggression, rather to 
use theory to construct a framework by which to identify pattems in 
reported incidents, some observations can be made regarding the theoretical 
considerations. Mie usefulness of the theoretical framework outlined in 
Section 1.2 for the study of reported violent incidents has been demonstrated 
in the building of an heuristic on which to base conventional analysis 
(Chapter 5), in the development of new methods (Chapter 6& 7), and in the 
different types of information that have been extracted. In addition, some of 
the findings support theory or indicate aspects of aggressive incidents that 
theory needs to address. However, it is important that the strengths and 
limitations of incident reporting are taken into account when such 
implications are formulated. 
The self-report nature of the data might be seen as a drawback in 
psychological research. However, models of stress (see Cox, Griffiths & Rial. 
Gonzdlez, 2000) increasingly emphasise the role of perceptions in the 
experience of stress. In this situation, individuals' self-report carries more 
weight than objective assessment. "Stress arises when the person perceives 
that he or she cannot adequately cope with the demands being made on them 
or with threats to their well-being" (Cox et al., 2000: p. 42) 
The large number of variables that had influence on the outcome of incidents 
supports Macintyre and Homel's (1997) conclusion that: "Violent occasions 
are characterised by subtle interaction of several variables". This 
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emphasises the complexity of this area of research and the inadequacy of 
any one simplistic explanation of violence and aggression. 
Regarding the Novaco (1978) model described in Section 1.2.1, incident 
reports reveal little at the level of cognition and affect during an incident, but 
can provide information about apparent triggers and the sequence of 
observed behaviours. Escalation models such as Cox and Leather's (1994) 
are supported by the frequent occurrence of incidents that were seen to arise 
from the ordinary and escalate. Inappropriate behaviour, such as the use of 
abusive language or being rowdy, was seen to initiate many incidents. The 
appraisal of these as norm violations and subsequent intervention by 
members of staff would support a social interactionist perspective (Felson & 
Tedeschi, 1993a). 
A variable that was seen to be critical in the development of incidents was 
intervention by staff. This is an area where theory needs to be harnessed in 
the training of the staff. The model shown in Figure 1.1, which combines a 
simplified Novaco, (1978) model and the Cox and Leather (1994) model of 
escalation of incidents, can be readily explained and translated into everyday 
examples for training (Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996). Training 
should also take account of the restricted perceptions caused by alcohol such 
that an individual who has consumed alcohol may interpret a licenseeps 
reasonable requests to be aggressive (Felson, Baccaglini & Gmelch, 1986). 
This effect of alcohol is consistent with the relatively high number of 
incidents that occurred around closing time when the task for the staff 
changes from service provision to service denial and control, but the 
legitimacy of this change may not be appreciated by intoxicated individuals. 
It is important, for safe and effective intervention, that staff understand 
something about the levels of arousal that occur during the assault cycle, as 
desciibed by Breakwell (1997). In particular, following the crisis phase, it 
takes time for arousal levels to reduce, so that individuals in this recovery 
phase are particularly sensitive to further triggers and trouble may easily 
flair up again. The aptness of this model is suggested by the high number of 
incidents in which assailants returned soon afterwards or attacked the 
outside of the premises (see Section 4.3.5). 
Further, the study of the timing of incidents at the same premises (Chapter 
7), revealed that one of the characteristics of initial incidents that was 
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related to an increase in reoccurrent incidents was continuation after the 
incident had apparently finished. This suggests that assailants who have 
once returned to cause more trouble are likely to return again at a later date. 
Possible explanations include continuing anger and reinforcement of 
aggressive actions by peer group or family approval (see Geen, 1990). 
This finding emphasises the necessity for the theoretical consideration of 
violence not to treat aggressive interactions as isolated incidents but to take 
into account the impact of previous experiences directly related to the 
present situation. Previous experience or observation are taken into account 
in social learning theory, of course, but generally in a long-term or 
developmental context (see Geen, 1990). From a training point of view, it is 
important to consider the dosing of incidents and what happens afterwards, 
as well as before (Leather, Beale, Lawrence & Maxwell, 1996). Useful models 
and theories need to address the question of the "baggage carried over from 
even minor incidents by those involved and the mechanisms by which these 
might engender further violence either from the oziginal aggressors, the 
victims or their associates, as discussed in Section 7.4. This is particularly 
important for situations where those involved are regular visitors to the 
premises, as has been discussed by Beale, Lawrence, Smewing and Cox 
(1999). 
The finding that seriousness score was affected by presence of a weapon 
indicated that appraisal of the dangerousness of the situation, that is, what 
might have happened, was taken into account in the assessment of 
seriousness. This was despite the presence of a "real" weapon being 
negatively related to physical outcomes. An alternative explanation is that 
staff behaviour might modify when they become aware of a weapon so that 
they become more cautious. Here staff ensure that they de-escalate what 
they perceive as a dangerous situation rather than allowing escalation 
because they perceive that they are able to cope if the situation becomes 
physical, or because they do not anticipate physical violence. This 
explanation supports the social interactionist argument that, within a 
potentially aggressive interaction, individuals consider their behavioural 
options following some trigger, or change in a developing situation, and make 
a choice to achieve a particular goal (Felson & Tedeschi, 1993b). Similarly, it 
adds weight to Bjorqvist et al. "s (1994) argument that individuals weigh up 
the benefits of an action against danger to themselves in carrying out an 
aggressive action. 
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Research considerations 
The work described in this thesis has exploited a source of information about 
violent incidents that is often under-utillsed in academic research, that is the 
operational incident reporting system. There are several potential 
advantages in that these systems, which organisations are obliged to 
maintain to comply with legal requirements, maybe a rich source of real-life 
incidents described soon after they occur and potentially with a useful 
amount of detail. Incident reporting inhabits the middle ground between the 
gathering and classifying of epidemiological data, and the detailed study of 
individualincidents. 
Ihere are also a number of problems that need to be considered when 
working with commercial organisations, particularly when the research is 
conducted over many years in a large, disparate and fluid organisation such 
as ADR. Studies cannot always be as systematic as researchers would wish 
because, inevitably, commercial concerns are given a higher priority than 
such research. Changes in organisational structure, in priorities and in 
personnel impinge on the researcher's ability to sustain systematic research, 
as exemplified in Chapter 3. Also access to staff, although agreed with senior 
managers, may not always materialise in practice because of geographical 
remoteness or time pressures for the staff involved. 
Despite the limitations, this work has demonstrated that, if carefully 
designed and treated in imaginative ways, a reporting system can provide 
information at a population level that cannot be obtained from other sources. 
The data obtained from incident reporting systems are different from those 
normally gathered in psychological research. Analysis beyond the basic 
frequency information that is conventionally obtained requires importing and 
adapting methodologies fi-om other areas of science. Several aspects of the 
work break new academic ground. First, the work extends the treatment of 
the violent incident as a dynamic process by examining the outcome of 
incidents in terms of features that occur during early stages (Chapter 5), by 
seeking common sequences of events through incidents (Chapter 6) and by 
investigating the effects of incidents on what happens in the future at the 
same premises (Chapter 7). 
Second, the technique of logical pathway modelling (Chapter 6) is an 
innovative adaptation of sequence analysis, devised by the author, which 
might be applied to incidents in other settings. The detailed logical pathway 
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model (Figure 6.4) is likely to apply within similar settings although the 
empirical pathway maps derived from it would vary. The outline model 
(Figure 6.3) might be applied to other settings where customers or clients 
interact in the workplace, such as schools, leisure centres and hospital 
accident and emergency departments. The general model (Figure 6.1) and 
technique might be applied to a much wider variety of situations. 
Third, the measure of the seriousness of incidents as perceived by those 
actually involved, although crude, is innovative in that such a measure does 
not appear to have been considered in other published research into work. 
related violent incidents. The results reveal that the seriousness cannot be 
assumed from the physical outcome alone, but that many other features are 
taken into account (Chapter 5). This is an area that invites much more 
systematic research, particularly in view of the importance of perceptions in 
the development of psychological injury (Barling, 1996; Brady, 1999). It 
might be possible, for instance, to develop a simple non-cluillical screening 
measure to be used in incident reports to identify incidents from which people 
might experience the symptoms of post traumatic stress. This would be most 
useful regarding incidents that appeared objectively to be minor, but that 
were very disturbing for some or all of the people actually involved. 
Fourth, investigation of the timing of incidents (Chapter 7) took a longer term 
approach to the problem of violence in public houses, as advocated by other 
researchers in the field (e. g. Gibbs, 1986). The investigation extended the 
treatment of the violent incident as a dynamic process with discrete 
beginning and ending to consider effects carrying over from a problem 
situation to influence what happens in the premises in the future. 7he 
demonstration that the likelihood of further violence occurring at the 
premises where a reported incident had occurred was greatly increased, then 
declined slowly over the days and weeks following, appears to be the first time 
that such a system memory effect has been recorded. It confirms the 
observations of licensees surveyed by I-Ellas, Cox and Higgins (1988). Such 
findings suggest two possible extensions of the work. Log survival analysis 
itself could be used in the same way to examine the timing of incidents in 
other settings, such as schools, residential homes or psychiatric wards to 
examine the generalisability of the system memory effect. In addition, the 
finding of a system memory effect prompts the modelling of the worksite as 
an open system with a dynamic violence potential. This work, which is 
presently being developed, will go beyond the approach of Andersson and 
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Pearson (1999) and OLeary-Kelly, Giiffin and Glew (1996a) who advocate 
treating the staff within the organisation as a system with respect to 
aggression and violence. It will examine the effects of different subsystems 
including staff, customers, equipment and tasks, within the physical and 
social environment, and will utilise results from incident reporting to 
translate the model into checklists of questions to use in a risk reduction 
exercise for minimising the violence potential at a worksite (see Beale, 
Lawrence, Smewing & Cox, 1999). 
These considerations of the achievements of the work, as well as the 
potential for further development of incident reporting and the ideas and 
models that have emerged, mark this research out as worthy of attention 
from all those concerned with the health and well-being of people at work, and 
their organisations. 
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APPENDIEK 2: DEVELOPMENT OF THE ]KEEPING 
PUBS PEACEFUL INCIDENT REPORTING 
SYSTEM 
A2.1 THE "KEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL" PROJECT 
A 21.1.1 Background information 
The SEP Group worked with Allied Domecq Retailing (ADR), the major 
international food and drinks retailer, between 1987 and 1999, to examine 
and combat violence within their licensed houses. ADR operated around 
4500 licensed premises spread throughout England, Wales and Scotland. 
These comprised a wide variety of public houses in terms of size, style, 
location and clientele. Approximately 2500 of these houses were run by 
managers and staff who were employees of the company. ADR was 
previously named Allied Breweries (until 1993) then Allied-Lyons Retailing 
(1993-1994), but will be referred to as ADR throughout. 
When the collaboration with the SEP Group began, ADIVs public house 
operation was essentially organised as six semi-autonomous regional 
trading companies, two of which amalgamated in 1993. In 1995, ADR 
underwent a major reorganisation to form two main nationwide trading 
companies, Allied Domecq Inns (ADI) and Allied Domecq Leisure (ADL), 
according to type of premises. ADR retained this structure throughout the 
rest of the period covered by the work presented in this thesis, that is until 
late 1998. 
A2.1.2 The integrated strategy 
The overall strategy employed by the SEP Group was based on the concept 
of the control cycle for risk management and the integrated organisational 
approach to the management of work-related violence, both of which are 
described in Section 1.2. Within ADR, the measures that involved the SEP 
Group were implemented within the Keeping Pubs Peaceful (KPP) project 
and fell into three categories: 
Problem identification and analysis encompassed HUtial 
investigation, 
- 
subsequent research studies and the incident 
reporting system, and provided recommendations regarding 
measures to reduce risk. 
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2. Organisational response included adoption of a formal 
organisational policy, and implementation of systems for training, 
incident reporting and post-incident support. 
3. Evaluation included scrutiny of the training and the post-trauma 
support. 
All the measures implemented were seen as interdependent, with 
procedures for continually feeding information back to each other and to 
management, as outlined in Figure A2.1. A more detailed overview of the 
work carried out with ADR is given by Lawrence, Beale, Leather & Dickson 
(1999). 
Figure A2.1 Outline of the Keeping Pubs Peaceful (KPP) project 
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A2.1.3 Problem identification and analysis 
Initial investigation 
initial research was conducted within the London area during 1987-1988 to 
determine the nature and extent of the problem of violence in public houses 
(Cox, Boot, Higgins & Hillas, 1988; Hillas, Cox & Higgins, 1988). 
Information was gathered via questionnaires, interviews and existing 
incident reports. Although it was found that the mAjority of public houses 
experienced little violence on a regular basis, many managers reported that 
violence occurred in cycles, maldng quantification difficult. The results 
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revealed that many licensees were dearly working and living under threat 
of violence even if it did not always materialise as actual physical assault. 
Three of the main recommendations from this research were W the 
establishment of an enhanced reporting system for violent incidents, (ii) 
training for licensees in the management of violence, and (iii) the provision 
of adequate post incident support for licensees. The recommendations were 
all implemented within ADR. The SEP Group was primarily responsible for 
the design and implementation of the first two of these and has been 
involved with post incident support in an advisory capacity. 
Incident reporting 
rMe Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Reporting System CKPP IRS) was 
established in 1988 and continued until 1998. Reports of violent incidents 
were sent to the Incident Report Centre (IRC) at Nottingham where details 
were entered on the database. Results of the analyses were submitted to 
ADR either as summary reports or as short reports concentrating on 
particular aspects of violent incidents. ADR personnel could also ring up to 
ask for specific information from the database. Results were also 
incorporated into the EPP training workshops. The KPP IRS is described in 
detail in Section A2.2 and following chapters. 
on-going research 
Throughout the period of collaboration, the SEP Group conducted 
fundamental research on violence in licensed premises, particularly 
regarding the effect of the pub environment on people's judgement about 
violent incidents and licensees (see, for example, Leather & Lawrence, 1995; 
Lawrence & Leather, 1999). In addition, further studies were carried out to 
up-date and extend the initial investigations within ADR. These included: 
1994: Follow-up of the initial 1987 study. This was a 
questionnaire survey of all the licensees and area managers 
within the London area designed to mirror and enhance the 1987 
survey and to detect changes over time (Dickson, Leather, Beale 
& Cox, 1994b). It particularly provided information about the 
beneficial effects of support from within the company (Leather, 
Lawrence, Beale, Cox & Dickson, 1998) and the adverse effects of 
the fear of violence on licensees (Leather, Beale, Lawrence & 
Dickson, 1997) 
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1995: Stress audit. This was designed to ascertain the principal 
sources of stress for ADR staff, sources of support and methods of 
coping (Leather & Lee, 1995; Leather, Lee, Lawrence & Beale, 
1995). This indicated that, although violence was not the most 
common source of stress, it was the one most closely related to the 
negative outcomes of reduced job satisfaction, poorer wen-being 
and a greater intention to quit the job. 
1996: Incident diary study. This sampling study was designed to 
provide more information about the number and type of incidents 
that licensees and their staff experienced but did not report 
through the KPP IRS. 
A number of other studies were designed to extend these and related 
investigations. However, although they were agreed and developed in 
collaboration with ADR, they were not implemented because of last minute 
operational considerations within ADR. 
A2.1.4 Organisational response 
Company policy 
Between 1992 and 1998 company policy on violence was advanced by the 
I, Cpp Worldng Group on Violence which consisted of senior personnel 
managers, trainers, occupational health and safety advisers, area 
managers, security managers and a member of the SEP Group (Dr Phil 
Leather). Dr Leather was responsible for writing the ADR policy document 
on the management of violence, in conjunction with the occupational health 
adviser. 
7ýýnzng 
J, (PP training for licensees and their managers regarding the management 
of violence was on-going within ADR from 1989 to 1998.2-day KPP 
Training Workshops were devised and developed by the SEP Group. Initial 
development was carried out during 1989 to 1991 (e. g. Cox, Farnsworth, 
Leather, Beale, Cox & Boot, 1989). The training was evaluated in 1994 
(Dickson, Leather & Beale, 1994). The EPP training format and materials 
were revised during 1996 to 1997 (Leather, Beale, Lawrence, & Maxwell, 
1996) and a 4-day Training the Trainer course was devised and 
implemented (Leather, Lawrence, Beale & Maxwell, 1996b). Involvement of 
the SEP Group in delivery of training was on-going throughout the project, 
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including the training of ADR trainers and other personnel to deliver EPP 
workshops. 
post-incident support 
The ADR policy document provided for all licensees reporting a violent 
incident to be visited by their area manager and regional security manager 
to talk to staff, listen and reassure, to assist with practical problems and to 
assess whether a psychological debrief was likely to be required. Debriefing 
was carried out by a trained member of staff and referral to more specialist 
post-trauma counselling was available. Provision of such support was 
primarily the responsibility of the occupational health adviser. The SEP 
Group acted in a purely advisory capacity. 
A2.1.5 Evaluation 
Evaluation of the measures implemented has been spasmodic because of 
operational considerations within ADR. However, the KPP training was 
evaluated in 1994 (Dickson, Leather & Beale, 1994) and was found to be 
effective in modifying some attitudes held by licensees regarding violent 
incidents. Evaluation of the post-incident support was also carried out in 
1995 (Rodgers, 1995). 
A2.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE INCIDENT REPORTING SYSTEM 
A2.2.1 History of the incident reporting system 
I Mrhen collaboration began between the SEP Group and ADR in 1987, one of 
the first exploratory investigations to be carried out was the examination of 
reports of recent violent incidents (Hillas & Cox, 1987). The SEP Group 
researchers recommended that a more detailed report form and a common 
method of reporting for all the trading companies be introduced in order to 
collect more useful detail about the nature of incidents that occurred (Cox & 
Hillas, 1988). The introduction of a pilot form KPP IRF 1/88, designed by 
the SEP Group, and the establishment of the Incident Report Centre (IRC) 
at Nottingham in 1988 marked the beginning of the KPP IRS (Cook & Cox, 
1988). 
The definition of violence that was adopted for the reporting of incidents 
(Farnsworth, Beale & Cox, 1989) was: 
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Any behaviour deliberately intended to damage staff or customers 
(or pub/brewery property) either physically or psychologically 
(through abuse or threat). 
This definition was intended to generate information about as wide a range 
of incidents as possible by focusing on behaviour rather than just on 
outcome, in contrast to RIDDOR 95, as discussed in Section 2.2. It was 
hoped that this would encourage licensees to report some "near misses", 
that is, potentially violent incidents that were managed successfully, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.3 and explained in the publicity leaflet (see 
Appendix 3). r1he definition specifically included non-physical violence to 
encourage a recognition of the importance of psychological damage as well 
as the more obvious physical iWury. It also included attacks on property as 
well as on people, since these can be closely associated, as discussed in 
Section 1.3.2. 
Reporting of violent incidents through the KPP IRS took some time to be 
fully established throughout the trading companies but increased alongside 
the IKPP training introduced in 1990-1991 and the distribution of 
explanatory leaflets to licensees (Appendix 3). From 1992 until the middle 
of 1995, reporting was fairly stable in terms of numbers, but the major 
reorganisation of ADR in autumn 1995 caused disruption to the system. 
Reporting recovered into 1996. In April 1996 the requirement under 
RIDDOR 95 for certain violent incidents in public houses to be reported to 
the local authority came into force. Although the SEP, Group had requested 
to beinvolved in ihe necessary changes to violent incident feporting, a 
separate system was independently developed from the existing accident 
reporting system in ADR. The two systems running in tandem caused extra 
work for the regional security managers responsible for filling in the report 
forms. Reporting through the KPP IRS inevitably declined through 1997. In 
1998, the decision was taken to terminate reporting through EPP IRS and 
to develop a comprehensive reporting system within ADR using the SEP 
Group as advisers. 
A2.2.2 Incident reporting procedures 
During the study period, when a violent, or potentially violent, incident 
occurred at an ADR managed house, the licensee was expected to contact 
the company and report the incident. The recommended initial Contact 
varied both between constituent companies and over time, but has included 
-230. 
security departments, area managers and personnel departments. Most 
recently, the initial contact was the health and safety department during 
office hours and the security monitoring station out of hours. 7be initial 
contact followed established procedures to alert other relevant departments 
and personnel within ADR so that they could provide appropriate support to 
the licensee. When the security department was alerted, a regional security 
manager talked to the licensee either by telephone, for an obviously minor 
incident, or by visiting the premises, for a more serious incident. The 
regional security manager was responsible for completion of the IKPP IRF 
either directly by the licensee, or by himself in consultation with the 
licensee and any other staff involved in the incident. A copy of the 
completed KPP IRF was sent to the IRC at Nottingham. 
Instructions for filling in the EPP IRF were distributed to security 
departments along with summary reports (see, for example, Beale, Dickson, 
Farnsworth, Leather, & Cox, 1992). A 1-day information and training 
course was also provided by the SEP Group for those people who were 
responsible for completing the forms (see Beale, Lawrence & Leather, 1995). 
Such instruction and training were deemed necessary in order to: 
" maintain high standards of form completion by making security 
personnel more aware of the use made of the information and 
allowing them to raise problems with completion; 
" ensure that secuxity personnel used appropHate sensitivity when 
eliciting information from people who had recently experienced a 
violent incident, particularly in asking for a seriousness score for 
the incident. 
A2.2.3 The Incident Report Centre (IRC) 
- When the completed KPP IRFs were received by the IRC, they could be read 
by all members of the team to familiarise themselves with the incidents 
occurring within ADR. This allowed them to contribute effectively to 
training, to relevant research or investigation, or as consultants to higher 
nianagement within ADR. 
The KPP IRFs were then coded, usually by the author, and put into 
resource storage so that they could easily be retrieved at a later stage by the 
team but were not available to other people. The coded data were added to a 
database held on the School of Psychology SUN computers and analysed 
using the statistical package SPSS. The most recent version was SPSS for 
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Unix, Release 6.1 (Solaris 2.3) held on the SUN SPARC computer at the 
School of Psychology at the University of Nottingham. 
Approximately every six months a summary report was produced, 
containing the results from analysis of the database, comments from the 
report forms and the implications of the findings for ADR personnel. 
Around 50 copies were sent to directors and senior managers in ADR and 
its constituent trading companies, to personnel managers, to security 
personnel and to company trainers. Shorter reports concentrating on 
particular aspects of incidents, such as weapons or drugs, were also 
produced. These reports are listed in Appendix 1. 
Short reports were also produced in response to specific queries from ADR 
personnel. These varied from quick verbal reports given over the telephone 
to substantial documents derived from analysis of the database followed by 
examination of retrieved incident reports to obtain further details. 
The incident report system was never static but evolved continuously. 
Changes to the report form itself and the arrival of an ever broadening 
range of reported incidents ensured that the coding scheme and procedures 
had to be under constant review. This process of review is incorporated into 
the procedures at the IRC shown in Figure A2.2. 
A2.2.4 The incident report forni (IKPP 11tF) 
Although the report form in use by ADR (Taylor Walker) in 1987 was 
similar to that used by the HSE (1987), it did not provide sufficient 
information about the nature of the violent incidents on which to base 
recommendations for effective interventi 
' 
on strategies. New 4-page pilot 
forms were designed by the SEP Group in 1988 to provide a wider 
information base while being consistent with the forms that they replaced 
cKIPP IIRF 1/88: Cook & Cox, 1988). 
The author joined the SEP Group at this point and Progressively modified 
the form. At no stage were mqior modifications made to the incident report 
form. In a system operated by so widely dispersed employees, it is 
important not to implement changes too radically or too often, to avoid 
confusion. Over the years, changes to the form were required to: 
accommodate changes in the law, e. g. relating to opening hours 
for public houses; 
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Figure A2.2 Procedures at the Incident Report Centre. 
KPP IRF 
Amendment 
of coding 
scheme 
Coding 
Entry Into Resource 
database 
II 
storage 
I Specific Analysis (Short 
report query 
ý*I 
of data I-Pp, ý 
Summary 
. 
report 
Review 
clarify both questions and responses; 
allow use of the form by ADR for insurance purposes; 
obtain information about the growing involvement of drugs in 
violent incidents; 
introduce a simple measure of the licensee's perception of the 
seriousness of the incident. 
Final modifications were made to the form in 1995, following a complete 
overhaul of the coding system (see Section A2.2 4) and recoding of reports 
previously received. The resulting form IKPP IRF 4/95, which was used until 
reporting ceased in 1998, is given in Appendix 5. 
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The form was designed to obtain information relevant to the theoretical 
background informing the whole KPP programme, as was depicted in 
Figure 4.1. Closed questions were used for "hard7 information, such as 
venue, time, number of assailants, gender of assailants or weapons used, 
using tick boxes for ease and specificity where possible. Open questions 
were used for descriptive information concerning what actually happened in 
the incident, with prompts such as 'What led up to the incident? " and 
"What brought the incident to an end? " to encourage a detailed answer. rMe 
design aimed to allow sufficient space to accommodate the mqjority of 
descriptions. 
It should be noted that, for confidentiality, the details requested about the 
licensed premises (see Appendix 5) were coded only in disguised form and 
were never revealed in reports or publications. Individuals' names and 
addresses were used by the SEP Group solely for identification purposes; 
they were never coded in any way or revealed in reports or publications. 
A2.2.5 Coding of incident report data 
The original coding scheme, given in Appendix 6A, was derived by Cook and 
Cox (1988) from the early reports of violent incidents recorded in 1987 and 
1988. Ihe author made minor amendments to the coding scheme between 
1989 and 1992 to take account of changes made to the IKPP IRF. 
However, as the database grew, it became increasingly clear that an 
unacceptable amount of information, particularly about the nature of 
incidents, was being lost in the coding. Furthermore, it was difficult to fit 
some incidents to the coding structure. The original coding scheme had 
been derived from content analysis of a restricted number of incidents. 
While it was perfectly valid at the time, this type of scheme does not cater 
for the evolving character of a long term reporting system. In particular, 
coding for what happened in the incident was inadequate in that: 
it did not allow for more than one of the categories to occur in one 
incident, for example if there were both an attack on property and 
a threat to staff-, 
0 it did not cater for unusual incidents. 
A new coding scheme was devised by the author in 1993 to take account ()f 
these factors. The revised coding scheme comprised around 220 variables, 
rising to 236 by 1998.7he version in use in 1998 is given in Appendix 6B. 
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In the revised scheme, a completely different approach was taken to the 
coding of much of the descriptive information. Rather than trying to fit 
what happened in incidents into a restricted number of categories, it was 
decided to pick out common features of incidents and code each incident in 
terms of the presence or absence of these features. This approach allowed a 
number of key operations: 
" Any combination of the features within an incident could be coded 
accurately. 
" New features could be added easily to the coding scheme as they 
became apparent. 
" Variables could be expanded to provide greater insight into what 
had occurred in the incident. For example, the variable 
"argument between customers", was supplemented by the 
inclusion of twelve variables describing the type of argument, e. g. 
a domestic argument between members of the same family, racial 
conflict, an argument over a girlfriend or boyfriend, or over a 
game of pool, trouble between locals and non-locals, or between 
rival football fans or gangs. Similarly, many extra details about 
assailants and the activities in the pub at the time, such as a 
private party, could be included. 
Variables could be utilised in numerous combinations to provide 
considerable flexibility during analysis. For example, it was 
possible to retrieve all incidents in which any type of customer 
misbehaviour had initiated the incident, or only those in which 
illegal behaviour, such as stealing or drug dealing, had occurred. 
Some variables from the existing scheme were expanded to give greater 
detail, for example the involvement of closing was expanded from 
dichotomous "not around'closing" and "around closing" to a categorical 
variable including "open", "approaching closing time (within 15 mins)", 
"clearing after time, customers still present7, "clearing/locking up after 
customers gone" and "closed". This allowed a much clearer indication of the 
role of closing'to be gained from the analysis. 
Some variables were dropped from the coding scheme, although the related 
questions remained on the report form. These were items that usually 
helped to -provide an overall picture of the incident but were often filled in 
inappropriately, despite the instruction and tranning given. An example is 
"What was the employee doing at the time? " One problem that occurred 
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with this question was that often the answer given referred to the licensee 
rather than the member of staff actually involved in the incident. In 
addition, unhelpful or unspecific answers such as "working" were given. 
Other variables that were dropped were those describing action taken 
following the incident. Answers were frequently perfunctory or non- 
existent, or were made by the security staff using stock phrases. It was 
decided that it was better to utilise this information in reports by quoting 
individual suggestions or comments, in anonymised form, if they made an 
important point. 
'Me new coding scheme also developed the notion of recording the incident 
as a dynamic process. Coding for this had been incorporated in embryonic 
form as early as 1989, by the inclusion of the variables dealing with what 
led up to the incident, what the employee was doing and what happened in 
terms of the aggressive act. However, considerable information about the 
development of the incident was lost, for example, whether a member of 
staff intervened, whether there was an attack as the assailant was being 
ejected from the premises or whether there was further action once the 
assailants were outside. To enable more insight into how the incident 
developed, variables were grouped into: 
events that occurred in the initial stages of incidents; 
events that occurred as the incident developed, such as members 
of staff intervening; 
0 the aggressive or violent behaviours that occurred as the 
culmination of the incident; and 
0 events that brought the incident to an end. 
The process of devising the new coding for the descriptive information 
involved the author manually constructing a large grid with rows 
representing features of incidents. For each column representing a reported 
incident, a tick or code letter was placed opposite any feature that was 
present in the incident. New features were added to the grid as they 
appeared in the incidents being coded. Manual, as opposed to computer. 
basedo construction of this grid was preferred for two main reasons: first, to 
allow the whole list of features to be viewed at one time and, second, to 
allow notes to be written in concerning any unusual or distinctive aspects of 
an incident. 
. 
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The 1062 incidents reported from 1987 to 1993 were all entered into the 
grid in this manner. Any feature that occurred in more than 3 reported 
incidents was incorporated into the coding scheme. 
All incident reports from 1993 to 1998 were coded according to the revised 
scheme; in addition, the 379 incidents reported for 1992 were recoded. A 
total of 1983 reported incidents were included in the database coded under 
the revised scheme. Inter-rater reliability checks for the main features of 
the coding of descriptive variables are described in Section 6.2.3. 
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APPENDIX 3: PUBLICITY LEAFLET 
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APPENDICK 4: 1KPP IRF COMPLETION 
INSTRUCTIONS 
COMPLETING 
KEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL 
INCIDENT REPORT FORMS 
(KPP IRF) 
The Keeping Pubs Peaceful Incident Report Form (EPP IRF) is 
designed to be completed by, or on behalf of, the employee 
actually involved in the incident. A person completing the form 
on someone else's behalf should try to get the answer to each 
individual question, rather than just getting a general picture 
and then filling in the form from notes or memory. Only the final 
section is designed to be completed by someone other than the 
employee involved in the incident. 
People reporting violent incidents have undergone 
traumatic experiences of varying severity and may 
well be emotionally upset. Having to recount details 
of the incident may add to their distress. 
It is important that the people available to assist 
them in completing the form are aware of, and 
sensitive to, 
their needs. 
BUT 
Filling in this form in no way constitutes 'Critical 
Incident Debriefing' which is a formal procedure 
requiring a 
considerable amount of training. 
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EXPLANATORY NOTES/PROBLEMS, 
Most questions are straightforward but a few problems have been noted and 
some explanation may help. As far as time will allow, please: 
0 rIYy to answer all the questions, they are all important in 
providing clues as to how the problem of violence can be tackled. 
0 Check that the answers are all consistent. 
Complete all parts of a question if possible. Trying to extract 
details about assailants, for example, from the description of the 
incident is difficult and not always accurate. 
Include as much detail as possible in the descriptive sections and 
any comments or suggestions that licensees make in the later 
sections. 
Remember that in analysing reports we cannot assume anything, 
e. g. that'll o'clocle is evening or that'the customer' is male 
unless stated otherwise. 
Remember that practices vary among different houses and 
trading companies and we don't know what'as usual, means. 
0 If a previous, unreported incident is mentioned, try to get details 
of that and fill in a separate form. 
0 Write clearly. 
0 Ensure that information is not 'cut off, or too faint to read, 
when photocopies are made. 
Remember to include both the house name and the town. 
category 
A system of pub categorisation has been adopted by Allied Domecq 
Retailing. A simplified version of the categorisation is attached. 
Time 
Either use 24hr dock e. g. 23.00,15.30,09.20, or remember to 
include 'am'or'pm'. Always put'amor'pm' with 10.30,11.20 
etcA 
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Opening hours on dav of Incident 
Write the actual hours and notiustnormal', 'as usual'or'all day' 
as no assumptions can be made as to what normal or usual hours 
are for that house. This is required to ascertain whether the 
incident took place in or out of opening hours, or, in particular, 
around dosing time. 
Emplovee 
0 Give details of the employee who was actually involved in the 
incident rather than details of the licensee reporting the incident. 
If no employee was involved, this section can be left blank. 
Complete as much as possible, e. g. is'Chris'male or female. 
Main assailant (or aggmssor) 
Provide as much information as is known, including an estimate 
of the assailant's age. 
0 Include in'Number of assailants' all persons who became violent 
(physically or verbally), but not those who were merely part of a 
group some of whose members became violent. (It is helpful to 
indicate the size and nature of the whole group in the'Description 
of the incidenV section). 
Remember to complete the later section for details of additional 
assailants. 
Where the incident took place 
If the location was in an'Other room', specify the type of room. If 
more than one room was involved, state where the incident 
started. 
Crowding 
0 Try not to overlook this question. The assessment of whether or 
not a pub was crowded is entirely dependent on what the licensee 
considers to be crowding in his/her own pub. 
Description of the Incident 
0 Describe the incident in the employee's own words. 
0 Ensure that the specific questions are answered to provide a 
consistent framework for all the descriptions. 
0 If a more detailed descxiption of the incident is available it is 
useful to include it with the form. 
Try to indicate the sex of people involved. It will not be assumed 
that e. g. 'the customer, 'this person! or'the manager'was a man. 
. 
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Circumstances leading up to the Incident 
Include as much information as possible about 
what led up to the incident. This is the most fruitful 
source of information about common factors in the build-up to 
incidents. Licensees can then be alerted and thus reduce the risk 
of further similar incidents occurring. 
What happened In the Incident? 
What brought the Incident to an end? 
What action did the police take? 
Include as much detail as possible so that any important or 
unusual actions by staff or by assailants can be noted and used to 
alert other licensees. For example: How many staff have been 
attacked around the doorway or outside when ejecting customers? 
How many incidents have resulted in continuing action after the 
assailants were ejected or left? How many members of staff have 
been arrested after incidents when they intervened physically? 
How many incidents benefited or suffered &om other customers 
getting involved? 
Weapons 
A weapon is any object used to threaten or attack a person or property, Le. 
it is not just a recognised weapon such as a gun or knife, but maybe an 
ordinary object such as an ashtray or walking stick. 
0 Include all items used as weapons. 
Other employees or customers Involved 
0 Ensure that answers in this section are consistent with tho 
description of the incident in previous sections. 
Include both other employees and customers and state who they 
are. (There has been some loss of information about irVuries to 
customers, because this section has not been completed. ) 
Add a summary of other iWuries if there are more than can be 
indicated in the tick boxes. 
State how many people were i 'ured altogether. If this is not 111i 
known accurately, give an estimate. 
Damaste 
Include damage to glasses. Although part of everyday pub 
experience, broken glass is an added hazard in a violent incident. 
Ensure that this section is consistent with the description of the 
incident in previous sections. 
. 
244- 
Seriousness of Incident 
This question is designed to ascertain how serious the emiDlovees actual] 
involved felt the incident to be. This cannot be assumed from the amount of 
hVury or damage sustained. For example, a minor incident may have 
resulted in quite serious irVury because someone slipped and fell, whereas 
an incident in which employees or customers felt very frightened, 
threatened or upset may have resulted in little or no physical u*ijqury or 
damage. 
Handle this question carefully and 
explain sensitively, particularly 
if the employee involved is upset at the 
time. 
Include any comment made, even if the employee feels unable to 
rate the seriousness of the incident by giving a'score'. 
Use your discretionl The'score'is very important in analysing 
incidents because it is the only quantitative measure that can be 
used to point to the factors that make some incidents more 
serious than others. However, it is not worth upsetting peoplell 
Area Manaiter/Tradinit Company action required 
This section is designed so that the licensee and other employms nettially 
involved in the incident can express what they would like to see happen to 
help them deal with the consequences of the incident, either immediately or 
in the longer term, or to prevent re-occurrence of this type of incident. This 
important feedback enables management to see what type of support is 
really required and perhaps to reassess attitudes towards employees 
involved in violent incidents. 
Please complete this sectiont 
include employees'real needs and suggestions, notjust standard 
procedures. 
Area Managrer/Tradinsr Company action taken 
This section is designed partly to give a comparison of action taken with 
action required, indicating areas in which management reaction matched or 
differed from the expectations of the employees. It also shows what the 
organisation is doing in general and shares ideas and good practice. 
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APPENDIX 5: HEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL 
INCIDENT REPORT FORM EPP IRF 4/95 
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KEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL 
Dia[DENT REPORT FORM 
Ret rbo. Trading company 
House name & address 
Pub category Name of licensee 
Date Day of week Mme 
Opening hours on day of incident (please be specific) 
EMPLOYEE involved In the incident 
Name 
Address 
Any other details 
so= Age: 
Female under 211 1 
Male 21-251 1 
26-301 1 
31-401 1 
over 401 1 
Job title: 
mAIN ASSAHAITr (Use Page 3 for further assailants) 
Name 
Address 
Ishe/shelocal? No[ I Yes[ I 
sez: Esdaim" agoi 
Female under 211 1 
Male 21-251 1 
26-301 1 
31-401 1 
over 401 1 
Ishe/she Regular customer II Non-regularl I Staffj I Ex-staffj I? 
Had he/she been barred prior to the Incident? No II Yes II 
Any other details 
Number of awallontat 
Where did the Incident take place? Outside Lounge bar II Public bar II Restaurant 
Entrance II Pool room II Toilet II Other room II (please specify) 
Was the house crowded at the time of the incident? No Yes 
DMRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT 
What were the circumstances leading up to the incident? 
What was the employee doing at the time? 
IKPP MF 4/95 I 
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What happened in the incident? 
What brought the incident to an end? 
Were the police called to the incident? No II Yes II 
What action did they take? 
Did the assailant have or use any weapon? No II Yes II If so. what? 
Gun II Knife I lBaseballbat/club Gas/spray Brick/concrete Glass 
Furniture. chair etc. II Poolcue/ball Ash tray Food/drink Bottle 
Other (please specify) II 
Was the weapon: intentionally brought in I obtained from pub premises I? 
was the employee Injured? No injury 
Upset, no physical injury 
Injury not requiring medical attention 
Injury requiring medical attention 
Injury requiring short hospitalisation 
Injury requiring long hospitallsation (+24 hour3) 
Permanent disability 
Death 
Part(s) of the body Injured. Face II Head/neck II Arms/hands Trunk Legs/feet 
Please give details 
Did he /she have to take time off work? No II Yes II HowmuchUme? 
............ .. 
(dap) 
KPPIRF4/95 
. 
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Were any other employees or customers Involved? No Yes 
Please state who: 
Were they Injured? No injury 
Upset. no physical injury 
Injury not requiring medical attention 
Injury requiring medical attention 
Injury requiring short hospitalisation 
Injury requiring long hospitallsation (24 hours+) 
Permanent dLRabWt5r 
Death 
Part(s) of the body Injured. Face Head/neck II Arms/hands Trunk Legweet 
Please give details 
Did they have to take time off work? No Yes How much Umc? 
............... 
(days) 
How many people were injured in total? 
Employees: Men 
- 
Women 
- 
Customers I Men 
- 
women 
- 
Was property damaged or stolen? No II Yes II If go, what? 
Was clothing damaged? No II Yes II If so. whose and what? 
ADDMONALASSAIIANTS 
ASSAMAM 2 
Sez: Efunud" age: Name Female under 211 1 
Male 21-251 1 
Address 26-301 1 
31-401 1 
is he/she local? No Yes over 401 1 
Is he/she a Regular customer II Non-regular II Staff II Ex-staff I r? 
Had he/she been barredpriorto the incident? No II Yes II 
ASSAMANT 3 
Sez: 
Name Female 
Address 
Male 
Is he/she local? No II Yes I 
Is he/she a Regular customer II Nbn-regular II Staff II Ex. staff I I? 
Had he/she been barredpriorto the incident? No II yes II 
IKPP IRF 4/95 
UtWmtod &get 
under 211 1 
21-251 1 
26-301 1 
31-401 1 
over 401 1 
3 
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How serious do you rate this incident to have been? 
(Please give a number from 0 to 10. where 0 is trivial' and 10 is *the most serious you could 
ever imagine'. ) 
Please state the reasons for this score or give further comment: 
Do you have any reason to believe the Incident was linked to drug actMty or drug problem? 
No II Yes II 
If Tes': What are these reasons? 
Were the assailants drunk? No II Yes II 
What action would you like/have liked your Area Manager/Trading Company to take? 
Have you any other suggestions to prevent re-occurrence? 
To BE COMPLETED BY THE TRADING COMPANY 
What action was/wiU be týlmn by the Area Manager/Tra&ng Company? 
KPP IRF 4 /95 
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APPENDIX 6: ]KEEPING PUBS PEACEFUL 
INCIDENT REPORT CODING SCHEMES 
APPENDIX 6A 1KPP CODING SCHEME 1988 
APPENDIX 6B KPP CODING SCHEME 1998 
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APPENDIX 6A. 0 EPP CODING SCHEME 1988 
Trading Company 
The trading companies were coded as: 
Taylor Walker 101 
Tetley Walker Ill 
Inde Coope, Friary Meux [2] 
Alloa [3] 
Halls, Oxford & West [4] 
Ansells [5] 
-nme of Incident 
The days of the week were coded from Sunday through Saturday: 
Sunday 101 
Monday Ill 
Tuesday 121 
Wednesday [31 
Thursday [4] 
Friday 151 
Saturday [61 
The times at which incidents occurred were coded against five time periods: 
Early morning until 13.30 hrs 101 
Late morning from 13.30 hrs Ill 
Early evening until 20.30 hrs [2] 
Late evening from 20.30 hrs [31 
Out of pub hours [41 
Biographical Details 
The ages of both employees and assailants were coded using five age bands up to "over 
30 yrs". If an estimated age range was given for assailants then the calculated mean 
age was used. 
The age categories used were: 
Under 21 yrs 101 
21 to 25 yrs Ill 
25 to 30 yrs 121 
Over 30 yrs [31 
The sex of employees and assailants was coded as 
Female 101 
Male Ill 
Once the forms had been examined it was decided to categorlse the occupational 
status of employees using five groups: 
Manager 101 
Spouse Ill 
Tenant [21 
Assistant Manager [3] 
Relief Manager [41 
other Staff 151 
. 
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Thenumber of assailants involved was categorised as: 
One Ill 
TWO 121 
Three or more [31 
The addresses of the assailants were coded as being local to the pub [0] or not [1 ] and assailants were coded as being regulars in the pub [0] or not [1 ]. 
On each report form there is a space to record other details about the assailant. Very 
little information had been recorded about assailants on the forms received. 
Details surrounding the event 
The circumstances leading up to the incident were categorised as follows, on the basis 
of pilot studies of similar data: 
Conflict between customers 101 
Conflict between customers and staff Ill 
Revenge after barring/refused service 121 
Outside event/event brought in [31 
Rowdy group behaviour [41 
Conflict between staff E51 
Theemployees' activities at the time of the incident were categorised thus: 
Behind the bar 101 
In front of the bar [11] 
On breaVsocialising [21 
In cellar/other room (31 
Closing up [4] 
Something out of pub hours 151 
Opening up [6] 
Throwing someone out [7] 
The Nature of the Incident I 
This was coded using 8 different categories: 
Verbal abuse 101 
Threat Ill 
Attack on staff [21 
Attack on clients [31 
Attack on property (41 
Attack on staff & property 151 
Attack on clients & property 161 
Attack on staff & clients [71 
Attack on police 181 
Weapons 
Each assailant was coded as being armed (0] or not [1] and as being Intentionally 
armed [0] or not [1 ]. Intentionally armed would imply arriving with a weapon as 
opposed to using something which was to hand at the time of the Incident. If the 
weapon used was something from the pub premises, the type of item used was coded 
as follows: 
Ash tray 101 
Bottle/glass/ice bucket Ill 
Pool cue/ball [2] 
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Dart [31 
Furniture, e. g. a chair [4] 
More than one of these 151 
ln*uries 
The effects of the incident on the employee were coded in terms of injury-. yes [0] or 
no [1]. The degree of severity of any injury was included and was categorised as 
follows: 
Upset, but not physically injured 101 
Injury-not requiring medical attention Ill 
Injury-requiring medical attention [2] 
Injury-requiring short hospitalisation [31 
Injury-requiring long hospitalisation [4) 
Permanent disability [51 
The presence of damage to different regions of the body (i. e. face, head, arms, trunk, 
legs) was coded using a simple'yes' (0] 'no' [1 ] code for each region. The taking of 
sick leave was similarly coded: yes [0] or no [1 ]. Duration of sick leave was coded In 
the following way: 
Oneday 101 
Less than one week Ill 
Oneweek 121 
Less than two weeks [3) 
Less than one month [41 
One month 151 
More than one month [6] 
Theinvolvement of others in the incident was coded asyes [01 or no [1], as was 
any injury they received: yes [0] or no [1 ]. The severity of that injury, its location (body area), and sick leave were all coded as described above. 
PropertV 
Details of damage to property were recorded: presence of damage to property 
- 
yes [0] or no [1] and whether clothes were spoiled - yes [0] or no 
Thetype of property that was damaged was then categorised: 
Furniture [01 
Bottles/glasses [1] 
Entertainment equipment [21 
The building itself [3] 
More than one of the categories mentioned [41 
Stolen cash/drink 151 
Car(s) 161 
Personal belongings [71 
Damage to clothing was categorised as: 
Outer clothing, e. g. coat 101 
Inner clothing, e. g. shirt [1] 
Footwear [2] 
More than one of these [3] 
. 
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Place 
The location of the incident was coded in terms of 
Outside 101 
Lounge bar Ill 
Public bar [2] 
Other rooms [3] 
More than one of these areas [4] 
Police 
Police attendance was classified as yes [0] or no [1] and their action as- 
None 101 
Warning [I] 
Arrest 121 
Statementtaken (3] 
Exclusion order [4] 
Action 
The action requested ofarea management was coded as: 
Extra events (e. g. discos) cancelled 101 
None [I] 
Security measures 121 
Staff change [31 
Support [4] 
The action required of the trading company was coded as: 
None 101 
Improve security Ill 
Exclusion order 12- ] 
Private prosecution [31 
Advice/support [4] 
Other information/suggestions for preventing re-occurrence was coded as: 
Improve security 101 
Barring 111 
None 121 
Theaction subsequently taken by the trading company was coded as: 
Advice given 101 
Investigation M 
Security measures [21 
Seek exclusion order [31 
None [4] 
Theaction subsequently taken by the area managerwas coded as-. 
Extra events cancelled 101 
See manager 
Support 
Security measures [3] 
All missing data points were coded with a [9]. 
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I 
APPENDIX 6B: RPP CODING SCHEME 1998 
Reference number 
REF 4-digit number 
Trading Compa 
CO toot 
toil 
'02' 
'03' 
'04' 
'05' 
'06' 
Pub catem 
CAT loot 
1011 
'02' 
'03' 
'04' 
'05' 
1061 
'07' 
'08' 
1091 
1101 
fill 
'12' 
1131 
'14' 
'15' 
1991 
Month of incident 
Alloa Brewery '07' AD Leisure (North) 
Ansells Ltd '08' AD Leisure (Midl's) 
Ind Coope 9099 AD Leisure (South) 
Joshua Tetley : 10, AD Inns (North) 
Taylor Walker ill AD Inns (Midlands) 
Tetley Pub Company '12' AD Inns (South) 
TetleyWalker 1991 Not stated 
TDH Town Drinking House 
BBL Broad Based Local 
LCP Local Community Pub 
MDH Male Drinking House 
QTW Quality Traditional Wet/Firkin, Scruffy 
QTF Quality Traditional Food/Big Steak 
QFS Quality Food Suburban 
YPC Young Persons Circuit 
YPV Young Persons Venue, Disco, Nightclub 
WE West End 
CITY city 
POOL Pool 
HOTEL Hotel 
Family house, Wacky Warehouse, Jumblies etc. 
Mr Q's 
Other 
Not stated 
MONTH '01' January '05' May 109f September 
'02' February '06' June #lot October 
'03' March '07' July '11' November 
'04' Aprfl '08' August '12' December 
'99' Not stated 
Year of incident 
YEAR '00' 1987 '04' 1991 '08' 1995 
'01' 1988 '05' 1992 1091 1996 
'02' 1989 '06' 1993 #lot 1997 
'03' 1990 '07' 1994 ill 1998 
199t Not stated 
Dav of incident 
DAY lot Sunday V 7hursday 
It Monday f5l Friday 
Y Tuesday V Saturday 
131 Wednesday 191 Not stated 
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IBme of incident 
TME 2 digit hour 
1981 Ovemight '99' Not stated 
Involvement of closin 
CLOSE lot 
ill 
'2' 
V 
V 
191 
Em lovee's age 
Open 
Approaching closing time (within 15 mins, 
inc. time itself, e. g. 11pm) 
Clearing after time, customers still present 
Clearing/loddng up after customers gone 
Closed 
Not apparent 
EMAGE 'o, Under 21 V 3140 
lit 21-25 14' Over 40 
1 26-30 19f Not stated 
Emplovee's sex 
EMSEX 'o, Female 191 Not stated lit Male 
Emplovee'sJob title 
EMJOB '00' Manager/licensee '07' Trainee manager toil Spouse/partner '08' Other staff 
'02' Tenant 110, Retail partner 1031 Assistant manager/ fill Chargehand 
Deputy manager '12' Family 
'04' Relief manager/ '13' Friend 
Holding manager '14' Childreres supervisor/ 
'05' Bar staff Tuck shop manager 1061 Doorstaff 1991 Not stated 
Assailant's-age 
ASAGE V Under 21 V 
. 
3140 
lit 21-25 W Over 40 
1 26-30 191 Not stated 
Assailant's sex 
ASSEX V Female 191 Not stated lit Male 
Assailant`s'localij, ý 
ASLOC V Non-local 191 Not stated 
Ill Local 
Assailant's'reg ularit, V- 
ASREG V Non-regular W Barred 
lit Regular V Friend/family 
IT Staff 191 Not stated V Ex-staff 
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Number of assailants 
ASNO 2-digit number 
'20' 20 or more '93' several 
'50' 50 or more '94 crowd/quite a lot 
1911 some 1991 Not stated 
'92' group 
Gender mix of assailant gro 
ASGRP '0' Female W Including children fit Male V Only 1 assailant 
'2' Mixed 191 Not stated 
V Not stated but probably male 
Drunken/drugged state of assailants 
DRUNK '0' Not reported drunk/high IT Iligh 
Ill Drunk 131 Both 
Where incident occurred 
WBERE '00' Outside 
1011 Lounge bar/saloon bar 
'02' Public bar 
(including'barl when only one) 
'03' Restaurant 
'04' Games/pool room 
'05' Toilets 
'06' Hall/corridorlentrance 
'07' Private accommodation 
'08' Other room 
1091 More than one 
1101 ý& Q's 
till Dance floor 
'12' Off premises 
UP Wacky/children's area 
1991 Not stated 
Amount of crowding 
CROWD '0' Not crowded 191 Not stated fit Crowded or pub closed 
Wýamn used 
WEAP '0' No weapon involved 191 Not stated/not known T Weapon involved 
TvDe of weal)on 
101 Weapon not reported to have been involved 
fit Weapon reported to have been involved 
WBRICK Brick, stones, concrete etc. 
WFIRE Fire/fire bombs/petrol bombs, etc. 
WSPRAY Sprays, ammonia, CS gas, etc. 
WBAT Baseball bat, club, sticks, etc. 
VVTOOL Pool equipment 
WIRON Iron/metal bars, piping etc. 
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WGUN Gun, air rifle, etc. 
WENIFE Knife, machete, Stanley knife, sword etc. WASHT Ashtray 
WFURN Furniture, stools, tables, etc. 
WBOTT Bottles 
WGLASS Glasses 
WFOOD Food and drink 
WOTHER Other weapons 
WUNKNO Unknown weapon 
Where weap on obtained 
WOBTN '0' Obtained from premises fit Broughtin 
'2' Both 
'3' Unclear where obtained 191 Not armed 
191 Not stated 
Circumstances/conditions leading ulD to incident 
lot Circumstance/condition not reported 
fit Circumstance/condition reported 
NOOBV No obvious cause 
EQUIPINT Interfering with equipment 
MAR Attempting to get behind bar 
STEAL Attempting to steal 
NOPAY Refusing to pay 
ABLANG Abusive language 
ROWDY Rowdy behaviour 
PROVOC Intentionally provocative 
THROW Throwing things 
ACCIDNIIS Accident/misunderstanding 
ARGCUST Argument between customers 
FIGCUST Fight between customers 
ARGOUT Outside argument brought in 
ARGDOM Domestictfamily argument 
ARGSEX Argument over man/woman 
ARGFAM Inter-family argument 
ARGGRP Inter-group argument 
ARGLOC Locals/non-locals 
ARGRACE Racial tension 
ARGFBL Rival football fans 
ARGPUB Inter-pub rivalry 
ARGGNG Inter-gang tension 
ARGREG Regulars/non-regular 
ARGPOOL Argument over pool 
NOGOAFT Refusal to leave after time 
REFAFT Refusal of service after time 
REFAGE Refusal of service 
- 
under age 
REFBAR Refusal of service 
- 
barred 
REFPREV Refusal of service 
- 
previous behaviour 
REFNOW Refusal of service 
- 
present behaviour 
REQGO Request to leave 
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REQGOBAR Request to leave 
- 
barred 
TELLBAR Told barred 
INDECENT Indecent action/exposure 
INQUART Attempting to get into private quarters 
MISBEHAV Other/unspecified misbehaviour 
ARGSTAFF Argument with member of staff 
BETWSTAF Argument between staff 
REFENTRY Refused entry 
PLANNED Planned attack 
LOOKING Assailant looking for victim 
REPERCUS Repercussion from previous incident 
REPSAME, Repercussion (same people) 
REPOTH Repercussion (other people) 
STAFBED Staff in bed 
STAFOFF Staff off premises 
STAFOUTS Staff went outside 
STAFTEL Staff telephoning (led to worse action) 
LOCKING Staff locking up after session 
CLEARING Staff clearing for closing 
EQUIPFL, Equipment failure 
TVFTBL Football/rugby match/boxing on television 
SPECIAL Special event 
UNSEEN Incident not seen by staff 
CTDRUG Caught using/dealing drugs 
PRIWART Private party 
ANNOY Person annoying customers 
NIANNEW New managers 
SERVICE Problem with service 
IXTINBAR Barred person(s) allowed in 
FANS Football/rugby/racing/boxing etc. fans 
TEAM Football/rugby etc. team or club 
GANGFEAR Gang or family held in fear 
INTERVEN Staff intervened in situation 
MENTAL Mention of evidence of mental illness 
ARMY Soldiers/military involved 
VIOLENT Previous history of violence 
RETARD Assailant reported to be "mentally retarded" i. e. learning disabilities 
HOLIDAY National holiday/festival (Christmas Eve/Day, 
Boxing day, New Year's Eve/Day, Bank holiday) 
EXWAGE Ex member of staff collecting/demanding wages 
LOCALEV Important local event 
What happened in the incident 
lot Event not reported to have occurred 
fit Event reported to have occurred 
FIGHT Fight 
ACCID Accidental injury or damage 
FORCE Forced way in (or attempted to) 
FIRE Fire 
AFTAW Attack on premises after ejection 
VERBAL Verbalabuse 
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TBREAT Threat 
ASTAFF Attack on staff 
ACUST Attack on customers 
APROP Attack on property 
FAM Family members joined in (inc. girl/boyfriend) 
AFTFIG Fight continued after efection 
HELP Customers assisted staff 
RIOT Free for all/riot 
BERSER Assailant went berserk 
RETURN Assailant returned later 
RETOTH Assailant returned later with others EJATr Attack during ejection 
IMNED Immediate attack 
ATTPOL Attack on police 
BANK Attack while banking takings 
AFTTHR Threat after incident 
BACI, aN Tried to get back in after ejection SPREAD Spread to other customers not originally involved 
How the incident came to an end 
101 Circumstance not reported to have occurred ill Circumstance reported to have occurred 
NOEND Not stated 
OTHEND Other 
CALNFR Assailant calmed by friends 
CALMST Assailant calmed by staff CALMOT Assailant calmed by other/unknown 
ASLEFT Assailant left 
EJECT Assailant ejected 
POLCAL Police called 
POLARR Police arrived 
ASSINJ Assailant iWured 
OTIHNJ Other injured 
CUSTAS Customqrs assisted staff 
DETAIN Assailants detained/restrained til police arrived FUT Staff hit assailant 
ESCAPE Staff escaped or shut themselves in 
Police action taken I 
101 Action not reported to have been taken Ill Action reported to have been taken 
NOTPOL Police not called 
NOCOME Police did not arrive 
ASSGON Assailant gone when police arrived POLATE Police late 
NOACT Police arrived but took no action WARN Police gave a warning 
STATE Police took statement/investigating 
SEARCH Police mounted a search 
ARREST Police arrested assailant 
ARRSTA Police arrested member of staff 
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POCALM Police calmed situation 
POCLEA Police cleared premises 
POSHUT Police closed premises 
POHOSP Police took injured to hospital 
NOCHA Police did not press charges/released assailant 
BAIL Assailant let out on bail 
POPOOR Dissatisfaction with police action 
CHARGE Charges preferred 
FUTCHA Charges will be preferred if assailant found 
PATROL Increase patrols/protection/support for pub 
NODETS Police called 
- 
no further details 
LATER Reported to police later 
NOWIT Cannot prefer charges 
- 
no witnesses 
red 
POLINJ 2-digit number 
iniua to emplovee (if'No iWur. V, code FACE to EMSICK as'9', 
if'Upset, no physical injury, code FACE to LEGS as'9') 
EIýHNJ '0' No injury 
fit Upset or shocked, no physical injury 
'2' Injury not needing medical attention 
V Injury needing medical attention 
V Injury requiring short hospitalisation 
V IWury requiring long hospitalisation (24 hours 
V Permanent disability 
'T Death 
191 Not stated 
Iniury to em ployee's face (See EMINJ) 
PACE '0' No fit Yes 
Iniurv to emi plo-yee's head (or neck) (See ENHNJ) 
-11EAD '0' No lit Yes 
Iniury to employee's arms (See EXHNJ) ýý lot No fit Yes 
TRUNK 101 No 
-runk (See ENHNJ) 
fit Yes 
Iniury to-employee's legs (See EMNJ) 
LEGS '0' No Ill Yes 
Sick leave taken by employee (See EMNJ) 
EMSICKV None taken 
fit One day 
'2' Up to one week 
V Up to two weeks 
V Up to one month 
V More than one month 
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V SO off work 
'T Unknown time 
191 Not stated 
Second Person involved (if 'No' code INJ2 to SICK2 as V) 
ELSE 0, No or not stated 
fit Staff 
'2' Customer 
W Unclear who 
W Both 
'51 Friend/family 
169 Police 
Iniurv to second perso (if 'No injury', code FACE2 to SICK2 as'9', 
if 'Upset, no physical injury, code FACE2 to LEGS2 as 191) 
INJ2 V Nb injury 
fit Upset or shocked no physical injury 
I , Injury not needing medical attention 
V Injury needing medical attention 
W IWury requiring short hospitalisation 
V Injury requiring long hospitalisation (24 hours +) V Permanent disability 
7 Death 
191 Not stated 
Iniury to second person's face (See ELSE & INJ2) 
FACE2 101 No fit Yes 
Injury to second person's head (See ELSE & INJ2) 
IHEAD2 'o, No Ill Yes 
Inim to second person's arms (See ELSE & INJ2) 
ARNS2 'o, No Ill Yes 
Injury to second- person's trunk (See ELSE & INJ2) 
I'Mullm lot No Ill Yes 
Iniury to second person's legs (See ELSE & INJ2) 
LEGS2 101 No Ill Yes 
Sick leave taken by second person (See ELSE & INJ2) 
SICK2 'o, None taken 
Ill One day 
'2' Up to one week 
V Up to two weeks 
V Up to one month 
151 More than one month 
V Still off work 
IT Unknown time 
191 Not stated 
. 
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Number of employees iniured 
NOENIPL 2-digit number 
t991 Not stated or not known 
ENIPLM 1-digit number 
ENIPLF I-digit number 
ENIPLU 1-digit number 
stated) 
Number of customers iniured 
NOCUST 2-digit number 
'98' Some, several, etc. 
1991 Not stated or not known 
(male employees) (female employees) (employees, gender not 
CUSTM 1-digit number (male customers) CUSTF 1-digit number (female customers) CUSTU 1-digit number (customers, gender not stated) 
Damage to i)roi)ert 
DAMAGE lot No damage reported 
fit Damage reported 
'2' Extensive damage 
191 Not stated/not known 
DDISCO Damage to disco 
DnLL Damage to till 
DVEND Damage to vending machine 
DASHT Damage to ashtrays 
DSTOI, E, Property stolen 
DORN Damage to ornaments, plants 
DPICT Damage to pictures, mirrors 
DCLOTH Damage to clothing 
DFURN Damage to furniture, carpet, curtains, fittings DCAR Damage to cars, vans 
DPERS Damage to personal property 
DSPECS Damage to spectacles 
DCASH Cash stolen 
DENTER Damage to entertainments 
DPOOL Damage to pool equipment 
DBAR Damage to bar fitments/accessories 
DSTOST Stock stolen 
DSTDAM Damage to stock 
DBOTr Damage to bottles 
DGLASS Damage to glasses 
DDOOR Damage to doors 
DWIND Damage to windows 
DLIGHT Damage to lights 
DPHONE Damage to phone/PA button 
DWALL Damage to walls, fences, railings, roofs etc.. DOTBER Damage to other items 
DTOIL Damage to toilets 
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Additional assailants 
Second assailant's age 
ASAGE2 '0' Under 21 V 31-40 
Ill 21-25 V Over 40 
'2' 26-30 191 Not stated 
Second assailant's sex 
ASSEX2 '0' Female 191 
T Male 
Not stated 
Second assail ant's 'localitv' 
ASLOC2 '0' Non-local 191 Not stated T Local 
Second assailant's 'remdarit-y! 
ASREG2 '0' Non-regular V Ex-staff 
fit Regular V Barred 
Y Staff 191 Not stated 
Third assailant's age 
ASAGE3 
of Under 21 31-40 
ill 21-25 V Over 40 
'2' 26-30 191 Not stated 
Third assailant's sex 
ASSEX3 '0' Female 191 Not stated fit Male 
Third assail antfs 'Iocalit-ý 
ASLOC3 
01 Non-local 191 
fit Local 
Not stated 
Third assailanVs'regulaiitV 
ASIREG3 '0' Non-regular V Ex-staff 
lit Regular V Barred 
I Staff 191 Not stated 
Drug involvement 
DRUG 1001 None viol Caught using in house 1011 Possible or suspected 1111 Evidence of use found 
'02' Known user '12' Other 
'03' Known dealer '13' Local problem 
'04' Prescribed drugs involved '14' Had possession 
'05' Yes (no details) '15' Member of group 1061 Appeared'high' known to be involved 
'07' Not known/not sure '16' Victim drug dealer 
1081 Not asked '17' Problem in house 
1091 Not stated '18' Repercussions for 
aclean up" 
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Seriousness of incident 
SERI Score 00 
- 
10 
Employee left 
ENLEFT 
99 Not stated 
901 No comment 
Ill Employee left employment 
Y Employee transferred 
V Employee dismissed/disciplined 
W Employee considering leaving 
V Relief installed (manager distressed 
V Manager residing elsewhere while problem sorted 
"Isolated incident" or "one-off' 
ISO 
607 No comment 
report 
DETAIL '0' Good 
fit Fair 
Name & place 
SIGN 1st 4 letters of pub name 
1st 4 letters of town 
oil Comment made 
I Poor or incomplete 
131 Old or other form 
outlet number 
OUTLET 6-digit number (obtained from outlet listings) 
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APPENDIX 7: SAMPLING STUDY MATERIAL 
SAMPLE COMPLETED INCIDENT DIARY 
INCIDENT DIARY INSTRUCTIONS 
. 
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INCIDENT DIARY INSTRUCTIONS 
This diary is completely independent of the normal reporting of 
violent incidents to the company. Please continue to report to the 
company exactly as you would have done had you not been keeping 
the incident diary. 
Ensure that all your staff know this exercise is happening and that they will 
tell you about any incidents. When completing the diary, get the staff who 
were involved in, or who witnessed, the incident to decide which columns 
should be ticked. 
INCIDENTS can include a whole range of happenings from verbal abuse to 
serious physical attack. VIOLENCE is any behaviour deliberately intended to damage staff, customers or pub property either physically or psychologically (through abuse or threat). 
FILLING IN TBE INCIDENT DIARY 
When a violent or problem incident occurs, make an entry on the table for 
that day: 
1. Fill in the time it occurred in the column on the left of the sheet (column 1). 
2. Put a tick in as many of columns 2- 15 as you need to describe 
the incident. These columns represent who the problem or conflict 
was between (columns 2- 4), what sort of aggressive action(s) 
occurred (columns 5- 12), and what irýury or damage resulted (columns 13 
- 
15). 
3. In column 16 write in any weapon that was in evidence during 
the incident. 
Note: a 'weapon' includes any objects used, or threatened to be 
used, to cause harm, notiust obvious weapons uch as knives or 
guns. 
3. Put a tick in the extreme right hand column (column 17) if the 
incident is being reported to the company (area manager, security 
etc. ), otherwise put a cross. 
4. Ifyou wish to add any commentý about the incident, write them 
on one of the additional sheets provided. (Remember to put day 
and time so the incident can be identified. ) Extra information 
would be very much welcomed. 
At the end of each day: 
1.1 Check that any incidents have been entered. If no incidents have 
occurred, put a diagonal line through that days table. 
2. Initial the table for that day in the space provided. 
At the end of the fortnight: 
1. Write any more comments that you have to make on the 
additional sheets. 
2. Send the completed incident diary to Di Beale at Nottingham, in 
the envelope provided. 
Please send the diary even if there have been no 
incidents to recordl 
-269- 
APPENDIX 8: CALCULATION OF COHEN'S 
IKAPPA AND Z SCORES 
Kappa, ic, is a measure of agreement that takes into account the agreement 
that would be expected by chance. Its calculation was outlined by Cohen 
(1960). The z scores and thus the significance levels were determined 
following a procedure outlined by Bakeman and Gottman (1986) based on 
the sampling distribution of kappa described by Fleiss, Cohen and Everitt 
(1969). `Ihe calculation is as follows, where: 
PO is the proportion of agreement observed: 
PO = 
Sum of the tallies on diagonal 
Total number of tallies (N) 
PC is the proportion of agreement expected by chance: 
k 
PC 
= 
I- Pi. P. i 
where Pi. is the probability that a tally will fall in the ith row and 
Pj is the probability that a tally will fall in the ith column 
Cohen's kappa: 
Po-pc 
1-Pc 
Variance of Cohen's kappa, based on the sampling distribution of kappa 
described by Fleiss, Cohen & Everitt (1969): 
Valiance of ic 
pi. p. i[l . (p. i + pi. )]2 
k 
N(l 
- 
Pc) 
k 
i. pj(p. i + pj. )2 
. 
pC2 
SD of ic 
pi. p. i[l . (p. i + pi. )) 2+i. pj(p. i + pj. )2 
. 
pC2 
i--iUVWýp 
N(l 
- 
pC)2 
On OJLJK 
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Table A8.1 Initial problem agreement matrix 
RAT ER2 
A- FEBq C1 D Row total 
R A 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
A B 3 10 0 0 0 0 13 
T C 2 0 15 0 0 21 19 
E D 0 0 0 5 0 0 5 
R K 0 0 0 0 4 0 4 
1 L 0 0 0 0 2 _ 3 
Column 
total 
11 
11 6 
110 116 16 14 17 
4 
[:;: ] 
PO 
= 
L7 
= 
. 
8043; Pc = 
504 
= 
. 
2382 46 2116 
. 
8043-. 2382 
. 
5661 
. 
7431; 1- 
. 
2382 
. 
76181 K= 
9.8; p <. 0001 
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Table A8.2 Subsequent events agreement matrix 
RATER 2 
OJEJIF GHJ NIOIPIQJRISITIUIXIYIZIXIYIZIXI Row 
1 Iml 
1112223 total 
0 01010 01 ilo 0 010 1- 00 110 02 011 10 010 07 
E0 81 01 0 01 010000000.: 0000 01 000 01 008 
. r- 1 
1 
1 
F1.01110 
-0 
1010000-0000000010000002 
G2 01 01 5 01 01000 01 00 01 00 01 01 000 01 000,7 
Ha 01 00 21 0100 01 01 000000000 01 01 0006 
12000.01281 00 01 01 0.0 000000000000 so 0 
0
M11 
-0 
01 01 0- 4200000.0 00000-00008 
 
RN000 01 01 00 2010 000 01 00 01 000100001 01.20 
A C) 000 01 01 00110000 01 00 01 00010 01 01 01 oll il 
TP1 01 00 01 0001 01 3-. 0ý0 01 01 00001000001 oý 4 
F, 2 01 010 00001 01 0 11 00 01 01 01 0 01 01 01 oi 01 01 01 13 
RR001 OF-() 00,0010100100101010010000001 
1000000000004 01 0 01 01 01 00 01 oý 005 
1T 
-1 
0000-00000000200 010 0000003 
000 
-0 
000000000 
10 
5001000000105 
x, 0000000000000. A01 010 0000001 
yi 0,1 0.0 
-0 
101001001000000101300100206 
Zl 10-000 01 0 01 01 0 01 0.0 000300000.6 z1 
-1 
0 
X2 () 0 (). 0000000000000001 21 00000 21 
1 
.n -2- -! 
0 
-0 
,0,000,000,00000,11 0021000 01 3 Y2 
1713 000000.0 00 01 000 01 700 01 9' Z2 2- 0- 000 
-0 
x3 10 01 000000000000000001030 01 4 
Y. 3 0 
-1D1 
00o ID-1 00000000000000020 21 
g 
LO 11 
ýi 000 010 0000057 0 Z3 L2 01 o. 0.0 
1010. 
o 
107 
0 
Column 20 9152 29 4 23 03 12 
1114 l'3 151116131 
22 47346 
ýý 
177  Olu n 
total 
E-m ý 11 11ýýý 111 1 
111 
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141 7966; PC 
2495 0796 PO 
«2 17-7 ««= 31329 -* 
JC = . 
7966 
-. 
0796 
. 
7170 
ic =. 7790; 1-o0796 
. 
92041 
46.7; p< 
. 
0001 
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Table A8.3 Agreement matrix for forward empirical pathway map, 
cut off = 
. 
15 Set 1 
Present Absent 
Row 
total 
Set Present 43 3 46 
2 
Absent 6 34 40 
C lumn Ototal 49 37 W 
PO 
= 
L7 
= 
. 
900; PC 
= 
3734 
=. 
505 86 7396 
. 
900 
-. 
505 
. 
395 
ic =. 798; z=7.39; p <. 0001 1 
-. 
605 -. 495, 
Table ASA Agreement matrix for backward empirical pathway map, 
cut off = 
. 
15 Set 1 
Present I Absent Row 
total 
Set Present 39 5 44 
2 
Absent 2 40 42 
Column 
total 
1 
41. 
 
45 
1 
8-6 
PO = 
79 
= 
. 
919; , PC = 
3694 
= 
. 
499 86 7396 
. 
919 
-. 
499 
. 
420 
. 
838; z=7.76; p <. 0001 1 
-. 
499 -. 501, 
Table A8.5 Agreement matrix for forward and backward models, 
cut off = 
. 
15 Forward 
map 
Present I Absent Row 
total 
Backward Present 36 8 44 
map Absent 13 29 42 
Column 
total 49 
Po 
= 
§-5 
= 
. 
756; PC= 3710 =. 502 86 7396 
. 
756 
-. 
502 
. 
254 
. 
510; z=4.76; p <. 0001 1 
-. 
502 - 
. 
498 
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APPENDIX 9: WEAPONS INVOLVED IN 
INCIDENTS 
Glasses 
Furniture 
Guns (real and 
imitation) 
Ash trays 
Pool cues and balls 
Knives 
Bottles 
Pork pie and other 
food 
Stanley knives 
Piece of pipe 
Pick-axe handles 
Iron bars 
Baseball bats 
Briefcase/suitcase 
Hammers 
'Noxious gas' 
CS gas canisters 
Ammonia sprays 
Axes, hatchets 
Pieces of concrete 
Cut-throat razors 
Eggs, chips 
Dog chain 
Stiletto-heeled shoe 
Lumps of wood 
Victim's tie 
Starting handle 
Steel toe-capped 
industrial boots 
Bits of broken 
window 
Shillelagh 
Keys 
Mner's lamp 
Large rings 
Lighted petrol 
Pieces of broken door 
Bar stools 
Table leg 
Bricks 
piece of lead pipe 
Pick-axe 
Drain pipe 
Drinks tray 
Lighted rags soaked 
in petrol 
Rottweiler dogs 
Large stones 
Petrol. bombs 
Sling with metal 
nuts 
Pool cue rest 
Starting pistol 
Broken mirror 
Guinness display 
Surgical scalpel 
Yawara (a karate 
weapon) 
Range Rover and 
other cars 
Catapult 
Poker 
Concrete paving slab 
Table 
Fire extinguisher 
Fire 
Warming pan 
Staves 
Carjack 
Van 
Wheelchair kerb 
ramp 
Sword 
Beer crate 
Galvanised mop 
bucket 
China cups 
Bollard 
Tin of paint 
Window box 
Tomahawk 
Base, of garden 
umbrella 
Bag of rubbish 
Car dutch cable 
Carbon dioxide 
cylinder 
Beer kegs 
Crash helmet 
Christmas 
decoration 
Meat cleaver 
Rice flail (martial 
arts) 
Light bulbs 
Paint 
Wheel brace 
Bicycle (thrown at 
window) 
Monkey wrench Cigarette machine Cigarette 
Crooklock 
Knuckledusters 
Crowbar 
Dustbin lid 
Terracotta, shrub 
tubs 
Spike disguised as 
pen top 
Firework 
Explosive device 
(gunpowder) 
Scythe (from pub bric-a-brac) 
Wooden pallet Garden furniture 
Garden fork 
Golf clubs Pen 
Crib board 
Shelf fitting 
'Pepper gas' can Oven spray Steering lock 
Mobile phone Chisel 
Fence paling Scissors 
Piece of staging 
Monkey wrench 
4x4 vehicle (driven 
through wall into bar) 
Lump hammer 
Sword stick 
Hosepipetwater 
Rope barrier stands 
"A7 board 
Toilet seat Sunbed. 
TIN 
C. 
1, k2SITY 
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